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In professional partnerships, partners have to agree how to split their income 
between each other. Such a profit sharing system (PSS) must be perceived as 
being fair and motivating to ensure the enduring success of the partnership. 
Surprisingly, quite different systems are in use today in otherwise comparable 
firms. The understanding of a “fair share” and how to motivate best varies con-
siderably. Existing literature on professional service firms rarely discusses in 
which circumstances the different PSS types are adequate; non-economic per-
spectives are scarce. 
Using semi-structured interviews with senior partners from large German law 
firms, this study evaluates their understanding of trust, fairness and motivation, 
and how that links to their respective PSS’s. It adds the otherwise missing peer-
to-peer perspective to existing organisational research on fairness, trust and 
motivation. 
The findings include the presence of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
through money, but also through peer pressure. Different fairness ideals clearly 
link to PSS types. Mutual trust, based on knowing each other, is key in all but 
one PSS type. An important, but yet overlooked differentiator between PSS’s is 
whether profit distribution decisions are made based on algorithms or on human 
(committee) decisions. 
A new framework is developed that links the beliefs and values of the partners 
with the specific characteristics of the PSS, which are systematically assessed 
for the first time. This framework offers partners from law firms and potentially 
other professional service firms a methodical approach to identify and discuss 
their needs and to identify the most appropriate PSS for their specific situation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The aim of this study is to understand the significance of perceived fairness, 
trust and motivation in a situation where equal partners work together and 
share their profits, and to develop practical advice for such a situation. 
Trust and perceived fairness are generally important factors when people work 
together, as in organisations many activities require or are facilitated by col-
laborative work. If people feel they are being treated fairly, cooperation is more 
likely to occur (Cropanzano and Ambrose 2015a); trust reduces transaction 
costs and raises the probability that people will behave in a cooperative way 
by devoting time and attention to collective goals (Kramer 1999).  
For this reason, a lot of research exists on justice in the workplace (Cro-
panzano and Ambrose (2015b) provide a good overview), as well as on trust 
in an organisational context (e.g. Rousseau et al. 1998; Kramer 1999), and 
also on the connections between the two (Colquitt and Rodell 2011). Most of 
the research in these areas focusses on hierarchic situations, i.e. employer-
employee or manager-subordinate roles. Taking this perspective is under-
standable, as most organisations were, and still are, organised hierarchically.  
Research in non-hierarchic environments is needed 
Two developments however call for more attention to be paid to non-hierar-
chical situations: First, many workplaces are changing. Work that requires col-
laboration is becoming more and more important in contemporary knowledge-
intensive societies (Brock et al. 2014). Thus new forms of collaboration 
emerge, and more people work in non-hierarchical (or less hierarchic) set-ups. 
It is therefore of practical importance to advance the general understanding of 
non-hierarchical situations.  
Second, existing theoretical concepts might be biased by a prevalent hierar-
chical research setting. For example, justice research typically distinguishes 
between procedural, distributive and interactional justice (Li and Cropanzano 
2009). Distributive as well as procedural justice is most often associated with 
reward allocation, which (in a hierarchic structure) is usually unidirectional: the 
individual superior makes a decision and the subordinate then evaluates the 
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decision as more or less fair. Both the outcome one receives, and the process 
leading to the outcome, is defined externally, and seldom open for negotiation. 
The person judging the level of justice, the subordinate, is typically passive. If 
the subordinate is able to influence something, this happens at the level of the 
outcome, e.g. through a performance-related pay component. Thus there is 
some influence on the distributive level, but none on the procedural level.1  This 
passivity is also inherent in the questionnaire items developed by Colquitt 
(2001), which are frequently used to measure procedural justice (e.g. Ambrose 
and Schminke 2009; Zapata-Phelan et al. 2009; German et al. 2016).  
In a professional, non-hierarchic situation between peers however, the situa-
tion is different. Procedures as well as outcomes are subject to negotiation, 
and they likely interact. The discussion about the rules of how to allocate re-
wards will be influenced by the expectation of the outcome; especially when 
(as in this study) the persons discussing the rules are the same people who 
will eventually receive money based on the rules they are discussing. In addi-
tion, the involved persons are active, not passive: They can influence and po-
tentially change the procedures. So, the differentiation between procedural 
and distributive justice which is based on hierarchical situations is less suited 
to the context of this study.  
Law firm partnerships as an important example for a peer situation 
Law firm partnerships are an example for organisations where reward alloca-
tions are made in a professional and non-hierarchical setting. The great ma-
jority of law firms in Europe are organised as partnerships2 (Legalease 2019), 
which means that the firm is owned by some or all of the lawyers working there, 
and the profit is shared between them.  
                                            
1 Experimental research on justice often replicates this structure: the subjects are able to in-
fluence the distributive level (the outcomes), but cannot choose or change the underlying 
procedures (e.g. Cappelen et al., 2010; Gantner and Kerschbamer, 2016; Karlan, 2005; Ro-
driguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido, 2012)  
2 In many countries a specific legal form for partnerships is used that reduces individual lia-
bility, comparable to the LLC for commercial companies: e.g. a Limited Liability Partnership 
(LLP) in the UK, PartmbB in Germany, AARPI in France, S.L.P. in Spain    
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Research motivation 
The author’s interest in this specific peer-to-peer situation has developed over 
many years of work with German commercial law firms, where he helps to 
establish financial reporting systems that are used (among other purposes) 
when deciding how to share the profit between the partners. During long dis-
cussions how to best measure ‘effort’ or ‘contribution’ in a ‘fair way’, it became 
evident that questions of the perception of fairness, the trust level between the 
partners and the way they themselves use motivation through profit distribution 
were always of fundamental importance, even though often not openly dis-
cussed. Sometimes a discussion took place between the partners about for-
mulas and calculation rules, but for the author in his role as informed outside 
consultant it was obvious that fundamental differences in individual value 
judgements were the real area of dissent. When working with two different law 
firms, it was striking that these two partnerships, of comparable size and simi-
lar type of work and clients, chose two very different ways of profit sharing: 
One decided to lump the proceeds together and split them almost equally; the 
other implemented complex calculation rules, factoring in every single hour 
worked and pricing even internal help between colleagues. Both firms were 
successful, and both said they could not imagine a better system than their 
own. This raised important questions as to which was ‘best’ and why. 
Law firm partnerships are not only a good object of research for a peer-to-peer 
based sharing situation, they themselves are also an important economic fac-
tor. The legal activities sector3 employs 1.6 million people in Europe (0.3m in 
Germany) and generates a turnover of 150 billion Euro (26b in Germany) 
(Eurostat 2019). Together with management consultancies, accounting firms 
and architects, which are summarised as Professional Service Firms (PSFs), 
the turnover adds up to 889b Euro and 6m people employed4. The influence 
of PSFs on the economy and societies extends far beyond these numbers, as 
they play important roles when creating new business models, reshaping gov-
ernmental institutions, influence legislation and help diffuse new business 
                                            
3 Based on Eurostat NACE category M691, latest available figures for year 2016  
4 NACE categories M69 + M702 + M711 
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structures and practices (Empson et al. 2015b). It is therefore of general inter-
est how the leaders of those firms, the partners, make economic decisions in 
their very own domain.  
Existing research focusses on economic perspectives 
Systematic research on ‘the professions’ started in the 1930s in the USA 
(Abbott 2015). In the 1970s and 1980s, the increasing importance of salaried 
professional work in the US and the related role conflicts led to the concept of 
‘professional bureaucracies’ (Mintzberg 1979). Abbott (1988) then shifted the 
focus to Europe, and in the 1990s, the body of academic literature on Profes-
sional Service Firms began to grow (for a good overview see Empson et al. 
(2015a)). Some of this research looks at trust and fairness in this context (e.g. 
Kay and Hagan 2003; Nikolova et al. 2015) and on motivational issues (Gilson 
and Mnookin 1985; Greenwood et al. 2007). However, most of the literature 
that looks at profit sharing systems (PSSs) concentrates on economic aspects, 
and Morris and Pinnington’s case that “existing accounts present an over-ra-
tional model of change in which too much emphasis has been placed on the 
importance of individual incentives to achieve performance” (1998: 23) is still 
valid. Levin and Tadelis (2005: 164) concede that their quantitative modelling 
of profit sharing in professional parterships presupposes that “all partners have 
the same objective” and suggest that “once one moves away from strict equal 
sharing the structure of decision rights and how partnerships are governed 
becomes an important topic for future research”. Greenwood et al. also call for 
research: “We also need to know how the various incentive systems within 
these firms affect partners’ behaviours” (2017: 118). So there is little literature 
on exactly how and why partners opt for a specific system, a gap that this study 
intends to narrow. 
The results of this study are also of significant practical relevance. Professional 
surveys show that every third law firm partner in Germany (Schoen 2016) and 
over 40% of partners in the UK (Viney 2013) are unhappy with their existing 
PSS and see a need for change. Beside statistical information about the used 
PSS, there is however little advice available, how exactly partners should pro-
ceed when looking for a better-suited system.  
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Research aim and objective/ questions 
The two-fold aim of this study is: 
a) to understand the influences and interactions of interpersonal per-
ceptions with economic aspects of profit sharing systems from the 
perspective of law firm partners and 
b) to use these findings to develop a framework that helps partners in 
any partnership to choose the most appropriate profit sharing sys-
tem for their specific situation. 
The research questions derived from this overall aim are: 
What understanding of trust, fairness and motivation do law firm part-
ners have? 
How does this understanding link to their specific profit sharing system? 
Which profit sharing systems suit best to specific given structures of law 
firms and the individual interests of their partners? 
Research philosophy & methodology 
The research philosophy of this thesis is rooted in (American) pragmatism, 
according to which truth should be defined in terms of practical usefulness  
(Greetham 2006): “Truth is, what works” (Robson 2002: 43). Qualitative re-
search is best suited to exploring and understanding what individuals ascribe 
to a specific situation (Creswell 2013b). Individual, semi-structured interviews 
of senior law firm partners are therefore used as the data collection method. 
Transcribed interviews are analysed using Thematic Analysis, following the 
protocol of Braun and Clarke (2014), technically assisted by MAXQDA soft-
ware (MAXQDA 2018). 
Contributions 
This thesis contributes to different bodies of literature: First, that of trust, fair-
ness and motivation, where it adds the perspective of a peer-to-peer relation-
ship; second, that of profit sharing systems of Professional Service Firms, 
where it adds important non-economic perspectives.  
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At the same time, the research helps to resolve the practical problem of choos-
ing the right PSS for law firm partners by identifying specific contingency fac-
tors and linking them to the properties of the PSS, which are currently over-
looked. This is consistent with the concept of usefulness in pragmatism, the 
epistemological position of the author: it provides new choices about how to 
act (Metcalfe 2008: 1096). By using a practice perspective, theoretical 
knowledge is used and adapted to the needs of a given situation (Jarzabkowski 
et al. 2010).  
Thesis outline 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
In chapter 2, the research field of law firms as an important example of profes-
sional service firms will be described in more detail. Type, purpose and general 
advantages and disadvantages of PSS that are in use in these firms are com-
pared based on the academic and professional literature. Literature on fair-
ness, trust and motivation that is relevant in this context is used to develop a 
new taxonomy of profit sharing systems that allows better differentiation. It is 
argued why additional exploratory research5 is needed. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach of this study. The selection 
of semi-structured interviews as data collection method together with thematic 
analysis is justified, and the processes used are described in detail. 
In chapter 4, the findings regarding perceived advantages and disadvantages 
of PSS are presented, based on appropriate quotes from the interviewees. For 
each major type of PSS, a visual summary of preconditions and consequences 
of this PSS is shown.  
Chapter 5 concentrates on the findings on fairness, trust and motivation from 
the perspective of a law firm partner. Again using quotes from participants, the 
beliefs and values that were found to be relevant in the context of profit sharing 
systems are presented. 
                                            
5 Definition on p. 29 
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The discussion chapter (6) then draws on the preceding findings chapters and 
the literature introduced in chapter 2. An integrating framework is presented 
that combines the needs of the partners (based on contextual factors and in-
dividual needs) with the characteristics of the available PSS.  
In chapter 7, it is argued why this framework helps to close some academic 
gaps, and at the same time provides a useful, practical tool for law firm partners 
who intend to improve their existing PSS or build a new one. Some thoughts 
regarding the limitations of this study follow, and suggestions for further re-
search are made. 
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Chapter 2: Research field and Concepts 
In this literature review chapter, the research field and the constructs and con-
cepts used in this thesis are introduced, starting with the business area of Pro-
fessional Service Firms, to which law firms belong. Several existing profit shar-
ing systems are explained and their general advantages and disadvantages 
are discussed based on the respective literature. 
Afterwards, the following sub-chapter summarises the concepts of fairness 
ideals and justice principles in an organisational context. The research on trust 
following the psychological tradition is explained, and the related concepts of 
trustors, trustees, trustworthiness and vulnerability are discussed. Literature 
on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is introduced, and the relationships be-
tween fairness, trust and motivation are discussed. 
Using these theories on justice, trust and motivation, a new taxonomy for gen-
eral types of PSS is established. This taxonomy introduces two dimensions to 
classify PSS: the mode of decision-making and the scope of responsibility. 
The discussion shows that although literature as well as a pilot study indicates 
a link between the theories and the PSS dimensions, the exact relationships 
remain unclear. This calls for further exploratory research. 
2.1 Law firms as Professional Service Firms 
Law firms are an important part of the Professional Service Firm (PSF) sector, 
which is “one of the most rapidly growing, profitable and significant sectors of 
the global economy”, generating global turnover of US$1.6 trillion and employ-
ing more than 14 million people (Empson et al. 2015b: 1). Whereas the exact 
definition of PSF varies, in the narrowest sense the “classic PSF” is usually 
defined as an organisation where most members are part of an established 
profession (Nordenflycht 2010), which includes law firms, consulting firms, ac-
counting firms, and architects. A second core attribute is usually the 
knowledge-intensity of the business activities. Using a broader definition, also 
advertising firms, executive search consultancies and engineering companies 
could be treated as PSFs (Nordenflycht 2010), but it is undisputed that law 
firms are a core part of PSFs.  
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A third defining characteristic of PSFs is the type of governance, characterised 
by “extensive individual autonomy and contingent managerial authority, where 
core producers own or control core assets” (Empson et al. 2015b: 7). This is 
an important difference of PSFs compared to many other businesses: The 
owners of the company also “do the work” – not alone, but a substantial part 
of it.  
Partnerships as prevailing governance structure 
Extending Mintzberg’s (1979) concept of ‘professional bureaucracy’ as one out 
of five structural configurations for organisations, Greenwood et al. (1990) in-
troduced the concept of the Professional Partnership (“P²-form”) as an own 
organisational archetype. They focus on the professional basis of the work un-
dertaken and the ownership structure being a partnership (Greenwood et al. 
2017). Nordenflycht (2010) warns that the terms Professional Service Firm and 
Professional Partnership are now frequently conflated. PSFs might be organ-
ised as partnerships, and law and accounting firms predominantly are, but 
there are other organisational forms. The prevailing form of governance of 
classic, regulated PSFs however is that of a partnership (Greenwood and 
Empson 2003), even though in some areas (specifically tax and accounting 
firms) capital based legal forms like Limited Liability Companies or stock cor-
porations play a significant role. Those are however seldom publicly quoted, 
but remain under control of their professional workforce (Empson et al. 2015b). 
Greenwood et al. (2007) showed that partnerships and private corporations 
outperform public corporations and tied that to increased monitoring of the 
owners and greater motivation of professionals having ownership stakes.  
 
Brock et al. (2007) discuss other archetypes of professional organisations than 
professional partnerships like ‘professional firms’. Others say that the profes-
sional partnership might become less prevalent due to changes in the environ-
ment of PSFs, e.g. increased internationalisation or raising importance of in-
formation technology (Smets et al. 2017b), but at least within the classic, reg-
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ulated sector of law, a partnership is still by far the most common organisa-
tional form. In Germany for example 87 of the 100 largest law firms (by reve-
nue) are partnerships (JUVE 2017).  
Profit sharing in partnerships 
Other than in a capital-based company, where the profit is typically split by law 
according to the capital share, the profit sharing in a partnership is flexible. 
Each partnership has to agree contractually on its own system of partner com-
pensation, partner evaluation and appraisal,6 and Levin and Tadelis even call 
the redistribution of profits among the partners “the defining feature of a part-
nership” (2005: 131). This is called the Profit Sharing System (PSS). In the last 
hundred years, different archetypes of PSS were developed. The next section 
will introduce common types of PSS that are currently in use in the UK, US 
and continental Europe. 
2.2 Profit Sharing Systems 
The profit sharing system (PSS) defines how the partners in a partnership are 
paid; more specifically, as they are not employees with a salary, how they dis-
tribute the net income of the partnership between the partners. An example for 
a simple system is the Equal Share model, where every partner gets the same 
share of annual profit irrespective of individual performance. 
Types of PSS 
There is no commonly agreed taxonomy for PSS. Most academic papers focus 
on just one distinguishing aspect such as whether they measure performance 
or not and then differentiate only two (Gilson and Mnookin 1985; 
Faulconbridge and Muzio 2008) or three systems (Morris and Pinnington 1998; 
Harlacher and Reihlen 2014). In professional journals and consultancy reports, 
the PSS typically occurs in surveys as one parameter, to be chosen out of a 
                                            
6 Most law firms also employ lawyers who receive a salary, with or without profit-linked bo-
nus payments. This research however focusses on partners as owners, often called ‘equity 
partners’, and how they share the profits among each other. 
11 
list of three (Lowe 2014), five (Viney 2013) or seven (Anderson 2001; Wese-
mann and Kerr 2015) different types. However, not all law firms use any of 
these types in their pure form. Schoen (2016), who specifically asked for pos-
sible combinations, found in his (admittedly unrepresentative) study about Ger-
man law firms that only 42% of them report to use pure systems, whereas more 
than half combine two or more archetypes.  
The archetypes most often used in the literature and their key concepts are 
summarised in Table 1 (below). The term archetype is important: Sometimes, 
two systems seem to be quite similar at first glance, e.g. because they both 
use a points system to share the profit7. The important difference lies in how 
exactly the points are established. In a Pure Lockstep system, a partner gets 
additional points every year (a step on the ladder up), and the points are 
“locked”, i.e. they cannot decrease. With a Modified Lockstep, there might be 
some defined thresholds or “gates”, and a partnership or committee decision 
is necessary to move on; some systems also allow cutbacks in specific situa-
tions. In a Merit based system on the other hand, the points might be recalcu-
lated every (or every second) year based on specific metrics or decisions. 
These differences are very important, as we will see later.  
A detailed discussion of these archetypes is presented in chapter 6.4 (p. 111). 
                                            
7 In a points based system, each partner is assigned a number of points. The total annual 
firm profit is then divided by the total sum of all partner points, which gives a profit value per 
point. This point value is then multiplied by the individual number of points, resulting in the 
individual profit share. Thus, a partner with 45 points receives 50% more profit share than a 
partner with 30 points in any given year.  
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Profit sharing system 
alternative names 
Key concept Used by au-
thor 
Equal share Collective earnings. Every partner receives the 
same share. 
2,5,6,8 
Pure Lockstep Profit share increases automatically with seniority. 
Partners with the same tenure typically earn the 
same. 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,10 
Modified Lockstep 
Lockstep with gates 
Like Lockstep, but performance assessment at 
specific points in time: Only “good enough” part-
ners reach the next level. Sometimes regular as-
sessments and downgrading.  
6,7,8,9,10 
Merit based 
Hale and Dorr 
Performance based 
Formula 
Incentive-based. Several measures are weighted, 
typically turnover (work done), acquisition (selling) 
power and client care, sometimes cross-referenc-
ing and/or management tasks  
1,2,5,6,8,9,10 
Eat-what-you-kill 
 
Every partner receives what he/she earned indi-
vidually, minus firm overhead costs. Individual 
turnover is the only important measure. 
3,4,6,9,10 
Subjective Profit is distributed according to individual deci-
sions, e.g. of a remuneration committee, although 
often based on statistical information 
5,8 
Corporate Partners receive a salary, a performance bonus 
and dividends 
8 
Table 1: Overview about archetypical PSS used in law firms, as used by different aca-
demic and professional authors 
Sources: Academic: 1 Gilson and Mnookin (1985), 2 Morris and Pinnington (1998), 
3 Faulconbridge and Muzio (2008), 4 Harlacher and Reihlen (2014);  
Professional: 5 Anderson (2001), 6 Viney (2013), 7 Lowe (2014); Lowe (2016), 
8 Wesemann and Kerr (2015), 9 Schoen (2016), 10 JUVE (2017) 
Purposes of a PSS 
Like every compensation system, the PSS is not only a rule used by account-
ants to calculate monthly cash transfers, but has severe implications for how 
the partners work together, how they are motivated, what types of behaviour 
are encouraged and what not, what management systems are needed and so 
on (Armstrong 2002). The PSS is therefore one of the key ingredients for the 
governance of a professional service firm (Harlacher and Reihlen 2014). Pro-
fessionals have a strong preference for autonomy and discretion (Greenwood 
and Empson 2003; Smets et al. 2017b). This is typically mirrored in their “con-
tingent remuneration systems (…) which directly tie professional remuneration 
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to organisational performance outcomes, reduce the needs for monitoring and 
minimize agency costs” (Smets et al. 2017b: 95).  
Two characteristics are specifically important: First, the partners must be over-
all satisfied with their system and their respective profit share; otherwise they 
would eventually leave the partnership (Gilson and Mnookin 1985; Anderson 
2001). This encompasses several aspects: satisfaction with the actual out-
come, but also in comparison with their fellow partners, and satisfaction with 
the process. These aspects are strongly related to fairness and justice percep-
tion, and will be discussed in the next section. 
Second, every profit sharing system influences the behaviour, as it encourages 
or discourages specific actions. It is therefore sensible to align the PSS with 
the strategic and operational goals of the law firm, so that the encouraged be-
haviour matches the requirements of the law firm as a whole (Gilson and 
Mnookin 1985; Faulconbridge and Muzio 2009; Viney 2013).  
Scholars and consultants agree on several intended outcomes of a PSS. The 
system should foster collaboration and knowledge sharing within the partner-
ship; it should encourage excellence and entrepreneurial acting and facilitate 
to provide the best possible service to the clients (McChesney 1982; Gilson 
and Mnookin 1985; Wesemann and Kerr 2015). From an organisational per-
spective, successful partners should be encouraged to stay with the firm; from 
an individual perspective, the system should provide some stability of the in-
come level from year to year.  
Gilson and Mnookin (1985) explain these key requirements and differentiate 
between two basic models of ‘pie division’: Seniority-based and productivity-
based sharing. They focus on the gains of cooperation by applying portfolio 
theory, a theory from financial economics to value capital assets, to the human 
capital in a law firm: Cooperation enables specialisation and diversification, 
and diversification reduces the level of risk the individual has to bear. The bar-
riers are explained using agency theory, which “focuses on how organizations 
maximize the gains from cooperation by adopting structures which reduce the 
potential for participants to pursue their individual, rather than their collective, 
self-interest” (p. 332). Agency costs might occur due to three behaviours that 
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threaten a firm: shirking (not doing ones fair share of work), grabbing (taking 
more profit than is perceived by others as fair) and leaving (departing the firm 
including taking clients and business with them).  
General advantages and disadvantages of different PSS 
An Equal share system focusses on the cooperation aspect and therefore con-
tains the highest risks of agency costs. In addition, when a law firm increases 
in size, fairness conflicts between old and new partners arise. Pure Lockstep 
systems add in the seniority factor, that mitigates the latter and also provide 
an incentive against the leaving threat. The incentive for cooperation is still 
very high. Modified Lockstep systems add some means to account for hetero-
geneous performance.  
Merit based systems switch the focus to productivity-based sharing, as well as 
Eat-what-you-kill systems. Whereas the former do provide some incentives for 
cooperation, e.g. by rewarding acquisition and internal client referral, the latter 
do not.  
Unfortunately, there is always a trade-off. No system does fulfil all require-
ments, and therefore every partnership has to weigh advantages and disad-
vantages and decide for their appropriate system. Table 2 (below) summarises 
the advantages and disadvantages for each of the archetypical profit sharing 
systems from Table 1 (p. 12). 
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Profit sharing system Advantages Disadvantages 
Equal share Fosters collegiality; mini-
mises internal bickering; 
good internal client 
cross referral and 
knowledge sharing 
No reward for exceptional perfor-
mance; more attractive for low 
than high performers; fairness is-
sues between senior and new 
partners; risk of shirking / free rid-
ing  
Pure Lockstep Retention is rewarded; 
fosters collegiality; secu-
rity for partners; good in-
ternal client referral and 
knowledge sharing; risk 
reduction through diver-
sification 
No reward for exceptional perfor-
mance; more attractive for low 
than high performers; long period 
of deferred income for young part-
ners raises conflicts with senior 
partners; peer pressure on part-
ners to meet expected standards; 
risk of shirking / free riding  
Modified Lockstep (like pure lockstep) but 
also reduced risk when 
appointing new partners; 
reduced risk of shirking / 
free riding  
(like pure lockstep) but also active 
decisions needed; risk of quarrel 
Eat-what-you-kill Strong individual motiva-
tion for performance; in-
creased individual free-
dom; encourages indi-
vidual entrepreneurial 
action 
No rewards for unbillable time 
(e.g. organisation management); 
risk of hoarding clients and result-
ing less quality work; short-term 
profits might be preferred over 
long-term development 
Merit based (like eat-what-you-kill), 
with better internal client 
referral 
Systems can get complex, individ-
uals may optimise figures above 
overall firm profit 
Subjective Possible to reward ex-
ceptional skills or situa-
tions;  
Might be open to manipulation; 
trust issues 
Table 2: Advantages and disadvantages of different PSS archetypes as reported in the lit-
erature 
Sources: Gilson and Mnookin (1985); Anderson (2001); Kaiser et al. (2015); Wesemann 
and Kerr (2015) 
The last section described several different PSS archetypes with their various 
different advantages and disadvantages - all of them are actually in use in law 
firms. In other words, some partnerships decide for one, others decide for a 
different one.  
For a better understanding of why partners might agree or disagree with the 
systems in place at their practices, the concepts of fairness and justice, trust 
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and motivation are important. They will be introduced in the following sections 
in turn, with specific regard to the law firm partnership situation.  
2.3 Fairness and justice 
Fairness versus justice 
In the literature, the words ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ are often used synonymously 
(e.g. Greenberg 1987; Ambrose and Schminke 2009; Li and Cropanzano 
2009). Goldman and Cropanzano (2015) however suggest that a distinction 
between them would be sensible: ‘Justice’ should describe the adherence to 
specific rules or standards (“conduct that is morally required”), while ‘fairness’ 
should stand for the individual’s perception of these rules (“evaluative judg-
ment as to whether this conduct is morally praiseworthy”) (p. 313). 
This study is interested in individual perceptions, specifically of “fairness within 
the workplace” (Byrne and Cropanzano 2001), not in the concept of political 
theory as in Rawl’s Theory of Justice (Kukathas and Pettit 1990) or justice as 
a legal concept. This focus on the workplace, i.e. an organisational situation, 
is also important for Goldman: He argues that organisational justice is about 
“justice in the substance of the rules themselves” in contrast with legal justice, 
which is “essentially about conforming to the rules whatever they may be”, and 
recommends using the term ‘organisational fairness’ to distinguish the organi-
sational research from the legal scholars’ research (2015: 264).  
Later in this thesis, it is this concept which is meant when using the term ‘fair-
ness’; although specifically in this chapter the term ‘justice’ is also used alter-
natively with the same meaning, because cited authors have most often done 
so. 
Fairness ideals and justice principles  
Cappelen et al. describe four different fairness ideals in a situation where profit 
is first produced and then shared in a group (see Table 3 below). They oppose 
egalitarian individuals, who do not “hold people responsible for any of the fac-
tors determining production” and therefore consider all inequalities unfair; and 
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libertarian individuals on the other side, who see a full responsibility for all fac-
tors, even those driven by pure chance. Two equal opportunity approaches are 
in between: Meritocratic individuals consider all factors relevant which are 
based on individual skills, efforts and achievements (but not luck), whereas 
choice egalitarians hold people responsible only for their choices, not for their 
abilities or skills (Cappelen et al. 2010: 430). Profit should be shared based on 
those factors for which people are responsible. 
 
  
People are responsible for  
(and therefore profit share should be based on) 
Fairness ideal 
Justice 
principle 
Individual 
choices 
Individual skills, ef-
forts,  
achievements Luck 
(Strict) Egalitarianism Equality No No No 
Choice egalitarianism Equity Yes No No 
Meritocratism Equity Yes Yes No 
Libertarianism Equity Yes Yes Yes 
Table 3: Different fairness ideals consider different areas as relevant for a profit distribu-
tion decision (Cappelen et al. 2010) 
In a law firm environment, strict egalitarianism corresponds to an equal share 
system; libertarianism to an ‘eat-what-you-kill’ PSS. Both PSS’s do not need 
active decisions about the profit share, because it is determined by the under-
lying principle. More complex PSS’s however do need further distinctions, 
which are not only distribution oriented, but consider other dimensions. 
Dimensions of justice 
Greenberg (1987) emphasised the distinction between distributive justice 
(which was discussed above) and procedural justice, later expanded by the 
concept of informational justice and interpersonal justice (Greenberg and 
Cropanzano 1993). Procedural justice evaluates whether the procedures as 
such are fair; informational justice emphasises the communication aspect, e.g. 
if information is given adequately and in a timely way, while interpersonal jus-
tice looks at social facets, e.g. showing concern and respect.  
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Colquitt (2001) confirmed the validity of this 4-factor model; however, some 
limitations of this model should be considered. All justice measure items in 
Colquitt’s study are based on a hierarchical situation between the person being 
asked and a ‘decision maker’. The questions on interpersonal justice (e.g. “Has 
(he/she) treated you with dignity”) as well as on informational justice (e.g. “Has 
(he/she) explained the procedures thoroughly”, p. 389) assume a hierarchy. 
Colquitt derived his questions from Bies and Moag (1986), who analysed a 
recruitment situation, which is also inherently hierarchical. Cropanzano et al. 
(2002: 324) even define interactional justice as “the interaction between the 
individual and his or her supervisor”. Some caution is therefore necessary 
when applying that model to peer based partnerships. However, even in a part-
nership there is often hierarchy, specifically in old firms with many partners at 
very different seniority levels. Even though very senior partners might have 
only one vote in the partnership assembly as everybody else, they typically 
have much more influence and informal power. This is specifically important, 
when profit sharing decisions are made by committees, which is typical for a 
Modified Lockstep system. When a partner rates the fairness of a committee 
decision, two aspects are likely relevant: How transparent is the information 
shared by the committee regarding the decision? And does the partner feel 
being treated adequately by the committee? This corresponds to Greenberg 
and Cropanzano (1993)’s concept of informational and interpersonal justice. 
Overall justice 
Ambrose and Schminke (2009) argue that a holistic view on justice could be 
more appropriate than focussing on specific types. German et al. (2016: 35) 
summarise that “we know little about the relationship between justice anteced-
ents and the resulting global judgments”. They showed that individuals weigh 
the justice dimensions very differently when they make overall fairness judge-
ments. Again, these studies are based on hierarchical situations with “em-
ployee-supervisor dyads” (Ambrose and Schminke 2009: 495) or look at per-
formance appraisal situations (German et al. 2016).  
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There is little research on specific justice dimensions or overall justice in a peer 
relationship in relation to pay systems. Even though some quantitative re-
search constructs situations based on game theory, in which participants are 
at least randomly assigned different roles, the decision situations as such typ-
ically remains hierarchical, e.g. in a dictator game (Cappelen et al. 2007; Dana 
et al. 2007; Cappelen et al. 2010; Ubeda 2014) or they remain at least asym-
metric as in an ultimatum game8 (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). This research will 
provide first insights to close this gap.  
2.4 Trust 
There are different fields of research into trust. The behavioural field interprets 
trust essentially as rational-choice behaviour, often reducing trust to the deci-
sion to cooperate or not. This is of lesser interest in this thesis. The psycho-
logical tradition looks at expectations, intentions, affect and other intrapersonal 
oriented states of mind (Lewicki et al. 2006). This matches the research ques-
tions better, as it assumes the “possibility that trust may result from other fac-
tors in addition to, or instead of strict rationality” (ibid., p. 996).  
Trust and trustworthiness 
In their seminal work Mayer et al. (1995) propose a dyadic model for organi-
sational trust that addresses the relationship between two parties: the trustor 
and the trustee. Trust is not discussed as a general propensity, but as a non-
reciprocal, specific interaction between these two. Trust is defined as “the will-
ingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on 
the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (p. 712). 
The trustor is thus willing to take a risk to some extent.  
                                            
8 In an ultimatum game, two persons bargain about the distribution of a certain sum. The 
proposer offers the responder a certain percentage of the sum, e.g. 20%. If the responder 
accepts, the proposer keeps the rest (here 80%). If the responder does not accept, nobody 
receives anything. 
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Figure 1: Model of trust, adapted from Mayer et.al. (1995) 
According to Mayer et al., the precondition for this willingness to take a risk is 
the perceived trustworthiness: it is the enabler for the actual trust of the trustor. 
The trustor trusts the trustee, only if the trustee is considered as trustworthy. 
The trustworthiness of the trustee is shaped by three perceived characteristics: 
Ability, e.g. competences and capabilities; benevolence, as “the extent to 
which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor”, and integrity, as 
the adherence to a set of principles common to trustor and trustee (1995: 718).  
This model can be used with trustor and trustee each either being individual 
persons, teams or organisations. Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) found examples 
for seven out of the nine possible combinations in their systematic literature 
review, with main emphasis on individuals’ trust in other individuals, individu-
als’ trust in organisations and organisational trust in other organisations. The 
first two of these are of interest in this thesis: The trust of law firm partners in 
other partners, and the trust in their (own) organisation (the law firm and its 
rules). Fulmer and Gelfand also report that most trust definitions they found 
focus on the two key dimensions Mayer et al. framed: “positive expectations of 
trustworthiness” and “willingness to accept vulnerability” (p. 1171). These will 
be referred to below. 
Feedback loop 
Propensities of Trustor 
Factors of 
perceived 
trustworthiness 
 Ability 
Benevolence 
Integrity 
Trust 
Risk tak-
ing 
Outcome 
Perceived 
risk 
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The relationship between fairness and trust  
The literature on fairness portrays different sorts of relationship between fair-
ness/justice and trust. Trust might be an outcome of perceived overall justice 
(Bediou and Scherer 2014) or just of procedural justice (Cropanzano et al. 
2002). It might be only correlated to procedural justice (Colquitt 2001). Trust 
might be a form of perceived social justice (Kay and Hagan 2003) or be a me-
diator of the influence of justice on organisational commitment (Cropanzano 
and Mitchell 2005). Colquitt and Rodell (2011) say that “the connection be-
tween justice and trust remains poorly understood” (p. 183). Taken together, 
two characteristics are important, which will inform the model presented below: 
First, there is a connection between fairness and trust, but additional research 
is necessary to understand the type of connection – which might depend on 
the specific circumstances. Second, it is helpful to distinguish the different di-
mensions of justice. 
2.5 Motivation 
Motivation is often divided into intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Jordan 1952). 
Intrinsic motivation could be defined as doing something for its own sake or 
out of self-interest for reasons that arise within the person, such as feelings of 
‘a job well done’, pride etc. (Gagné and Deci 2014), whereas extrinsic motiva-
tion relies on external influence factors such as pay or bonus schemes and 
incentives. According to Deci and Ryan (2000), intrinsic motivation is con-
nected with the perception of autonomy, of competence and the relatedness 
(attachment) to other group members. Law firm partners thus typically have 
high intrinsic motivation, as all three factors are typically present in their posi-
tion. The profit share outcome of any PSS is a typical extrinsic motivational 
factor, but could also have intrinsic elements, if it takes on meaning as a sym-
bol. Higher extrinsic motivation can potentially even diminish intrinsic motiva-
tion, e.g. if it limits the perceived options for individual action and thereby limits 
self-determination (Kaiser and Ringlstetter 2011). In addition, the process of 
determining the outcome can potentially affect the intrinsic motivation nega-
tively, e.g. in lockstep based systems with remuneration committees, when 
some partners have to discuss their poor performance with committee mem-
bers and commit to counteraction. In these cases, the self-perceived autonomy 
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and competence of the struggling partner might be harmed, with a decreased 
intrinsic motivation as a consequence. For the same reason, PSS with exces-
sive control (e.g. performance based measures) contain the risk of decreasing 
existing intrinsic motivation (Kaiser and Ringlstetter 2011).  
In such situations, the exact procedures become important. Zapata-Phelan et 
al. (2009) looked at the relationship between perceived justice and motivation 
and found that procedural justice had a significant effect on intrinsic motivation, 
which was a partial mediator on the relation between procedural justice and 
performance. They conclude that ‘procedural justice rule adherence’ increases 
intrinsic motivation and thereby ultimately performance. However, their re-
search (similar to much other research on motivation) was based on either 
students or salaried employees; little research examines motivation in the spe-
cific context of peers in partnerships. It remains an open question whether the 
same relationships apply here, which will be part of the investigation of this 
thesis. 
Hierarchy 
Research on motivation often shares a property with research on justice: Hier-
archy. Miner (2005) identifies 38 different theories on ‘motivation and leader-
ship’ in the organisational context and considers 19 of them as relevant, most 
of them with a strong quantitative focus. He states that “motivation and lead-
ership have always been closely allied subject matter for organizational be-
haviour, and they appear to be moving closer to each other over time.” (p. xiii). 
This interconnection between motivation and leadership is typical for research 
on motivation and assumes by definition a hierarchical setting: a ‘leader’ needs 
followers to lead, and this is done or facilitated by ‘motivating’ them, directly or 
indirectly. Like the research on justice and that on trust, research on motivation 
in non-hierarchical organisational settings like partnerships remains scarce. 
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2.6 A new taxonomy for Profit Sharing Systems 
The existing PSS’s are typically discussed along just one dimension, as shown 
above (see 2.2). The key distinction between the PSS’s in the literature is usu-
ally, how far individual performance as opposed to seniority and group mem-
bership influences the profit distribution (Gilson and Mnookin 1985; Morris and 
Pinnington 1998; Faulconbridge and Muzio 2008). Previous research however 
indicated that another dimension should be taken into account: the way spe-
cific decisions about actual profit shares are made every year (Wiegmann 
2016 unpublished). For some systems (Equal Share and Pure Lockstep), the 
shares are predetermined, so no yearly decisions are necessary. In all other 
systems however, distribution decisions have to be made every year. This is 
based either on the application of formulas, or on human decision making, typ-
ically through committees.  
This dimension, which focusses on the actual way of implementation, is cur-
rently underrepresented in the academic literature (a long footnote in Gilson 
and Mnookin (1985: 390) is the rare exception). Professional literature how-
ever indicates the importance of this dimension: only around 20% of the large 
law firms in Germany (Schoen 2016), the UK (Viney 2013) and Europe (Wese-
mann and Kerr 2015) use pure systems, where no decisions are necessary. 
The vast majority of firms adopt a PSS that includes a mixture between group 
based and individual, performance based sharing: Modified Lockstep and 
Merit based.  
The model presented below tries to fill this gap. It is intended to help under-
stand the differences between those systems that combine performance 
based and group based characteristics; later in the discussion (chapter 6), it 
will be shown how to operationalise the model, so that it can be used in practice 
to help law firm partners decide which PSS to use.  
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By combining the two dimensions, the group vs. individual orientation and the 
human vs. formula mode, a two dimensional matrix results that can be used to 
classify different PSS’s (see Figure 2 below).9  
 
Figure 2: Classification of typical PSS by two dimensions: the orientation on group or indi-
vidual measurements, and the decision making principles based on algorithms or 
human decisions 
The two-dimensional matrix in Figure 2 connects to the conceptual dimensions 
of justice and trust mentioned above. The vertical dimension relates to fairness 
ideals, with strict egalitarianism at the top and libertarianism at the bottom, and 
therefore distributive justice principles. The horizontal dimension relates to 
trust, specifically the aspects of “willingness to accept vulnerability” and per-
ceived trustworthiness, which are the more important, the more human deci-
sions are involved. Also, interpersonal justice becomes the more relevant, the 
                                            
9 For illustration purposes, the PSS types are drawn here with sharp boundaries. In reality, 
specifically Modified Lockstep and Merit systems are quite adaptable, so that the boundaries 
blur and overlap. Equal share and Pure Lockstep do not require decisions and therefore 
spread horizontally. 
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more human decisions are included in the system. On the other hand, algo-
rithm based PSS’s are based on figures and rules, so informational justice is 
presumably more relevant for them.10  
 
Figure 3: Presumed links between fairness, trust and different profit sharing systems 
Although there are links between trust, fairness and the respective PSS’s, the 
exact relationships remain unclear at this point, specifically in this peer-to-peer 
context.  
2.7 Summary 
This chapter introduced the general area of this research: law firm partnerships 
and the profit sharing systems typically used there, with an explanation of their 
purposes and their main advantages and disadvantages as discussed in the 
                                            
10 Procedural justice (e.g. that rules are applied consistently) is likely also relevant for law 
firm partners. Procedural justice is however more linked to the execution of any PSS, and 
less suited to distinguish the different types of PSS. 
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literature. It was established that although the mechanics of the systems are 
well known, there is little research why exactly partners in one partnership de-
cide for one system, and others opt for a very different system.  
Theoretical concepts from three bodies of literature were introduced to ap-
proach this situation: First, research on organisational fairness distinguishes 
different fairness ideals, related justice principles and justice dimensions. Sec-
ond, organisational trust research in the psychological tradition, being inter-
ested in expectations, intentions and intrapersonal oriented, considers per-
ceived trustworthiness as antecedent of trust and uses the concepts of ability, 
benevolence and integrity to explain trustworthiness. Third, motivation re-
search distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic motivation and draws some con-
nections to perceived justice. 
Starting from this, a tentative model to classify PSS’s along two dimensions 
was introduced: The scope of responsibility (whether the sharing is based 
more on group or more on individual effort); and the mode of decision making 
(whether based primarily on algorithms or human decisions). Concepts from 
the literature on fairness and trust relate to these dimensions: Fairness ideals 
from egalitarianism to libertarianism relate to the scope of responsibility, 
whereas the dimensions of interpersonal and informational justice might relate 
to the mode of decision-making, as well as the degree of perceived trustwor-
thiness between the partners. The exact relationships remain however un-
clear. It was shown that most research in the area of organisational justice and 
organisational trust as well as on motivation is based on hierarchical situations 
like employee/supervisor, and little is known about non-hierarchical relation-
ships, as found in partnerships. 
Exploratory research is therefore needed to generate new insights, which is 
the aim of this research. The next chapter will describe the methodology and 
methods that are suited to this purpose.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodological approach of this thesis, the design 
and the specific methods used in the study, based on the philosophical 
worldview of the author. 
Research philosophy 
This thesis is rooted in a philosophical worldview near to (American) Pragma-
tism, based on the ideas of Charles S Pierce, John Dewey and William James. 
According to them, research starts with a problem to solve, a question, and is 
about action, interested in how to shape the future (Elkjaer and Simpson 2011). 
Theories, as well as methods, are tools for that. William James believes that 
“the truth of a statement can be defined in terms of the utility, the practical 
usefulness (…) Something is true if it allows us to accomplish what we set out 
to accomplish” (Greetham 2006: 77). Or shorter: “Truth is, what works” 
(Robson 2002: 43). With a pragmatic worldview, the difference between theory 
and practical application is blurred: “When theory is a tool, it at once becomes 
practical, provisional and pluralistic. Tools are practical because they solve 
problems, provisional because they can be replaced by better ones and plu-
ralistic because they can be used in tandem with others” (Shields et al. 2013: 
125).  
The pragmatic worldview is generally open for both qualitative and quantitative 
research approaches. This does not mean that the choice of methods is arbi-
trary: They must fit and help to ‘solve the problem’. Following Creswell (2013b), 
three approaches to research are available: Qualitative research, which is 
suited for “exploring and understanding the meanings individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem” (p. 32); quantitative research, which is 
appropriate for testing (existing) theories and examining the relationship be-
tween variables, and mixed methods, which basically integrates qualitative and 
quantitative data in one study, using however distinct designs for each. An-
other possible distinction is that of Robson (2002), who differentiates between 
exploratory, descriptive, explanatory and emancipatory research. Whereas ex-
ploratory research is interested “to find out what is happening”, “ask questions” 
and “generate ideas and hypotheses for future research”, descriptive research 
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is about accurately portraying persons, events or situations. Explanatory re-
search in contrast “seeks an explanation (…), traditionally (…) in the form of 
causal relationships”; and emancipatory research “creates opportunities and 
the will to engage in social action” (p. 59). 
Any chosen research approach should match the problem and the philosoph-
ical worldview of the researcher. Whereas researchers with a post-positivistic 
worldview, assuming cause-effect-relationships, typically prefer quantitative 
research, constructivist or interpretivist worldviews assume that meaning is 
constructed by humans through interaction with each other and the world, and 
tend to qualitative studies (Crotty 1998; Creswell 2013b). 
Research methodology 
The research questions of this thesis are concerned with perceptions and un-
derstandings of individual law firm partners regarding their profit sharing sys-
tems. A qualitative approach is therefore better suited to this research than a 
quantitative approach. The research questions are not purely descriptive, they 
do not presume causal relationships, and they are not about social action. Us-
ing Robson’s terminology, exploratory research is thus more appropriate than 
descriptive, emancipatory or explanatory research.    
Following the pragmatic approach (and consistent with the fact that this is a 
DBA, not a PhD thesis), the ultimate goal of this thesis is not a theory as such, 
but something applicable. Pragmatic research and the aim of knowledge are 
about enabling future action, not to “correspond to the world” (Rumens and 
Kelemen 2013: 13). 
Based on this epistemological position, individual, in-depth interviews and the-
matic analysis are chosen as the most suitable methods - the next section 
explains why. After that, data collection and data analysis procedures are de-
scribed in detail, the latter following the protocol suggested by Braun and 
Clarke (2014). 
Then some ethical considerations follow, which also influenced the study de-
sign. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the quality of this methodo-
logical approach. 
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3.1 Research design 
Choice of data collection method 
Individual in-depth interviews  
The research questions of this study take the perspective of individuals (what 
understanding of trust and fairness do law firm partners have…). Interviews 
are an accepted and frequently used method to access individual perspec-
tives, if not “the most widely employed method in qualitative research” in gen-
eral (Bryman and Bell 2015: 479). They are specifically suited for this study, 
as they assess “individual perceptions of processes within a social unit” and 
are appropriate for exploratory research (Robson 2002: 271). Qualitative inter-
views “encourage the interviewee to share rich descriptions of phenomena 
while leaving the interpretation or analysis to the investigators” (DiCicco-Bloom 
and Crabtree 2006: 314), which is what this thesis intends to do.  
Other available methods would include focus groups; researcher directed dia-
ries; ethnographic approaches; participant observation; biographical research 
and case study research. However, these methods are not better suited for the 
following reasons. 
Doing research that involves law firm partners presents specific challenges. 
Lawyers in general are committed to strict confidentiality principles. The law-
yer–client–relationship is protected by law11 and protecting the interest of a 
client often involves secrecy. Lawyers are trained to regulate their client’s and 
their own objectives without disclosing details or revealing intentions. This not 
only applies for client work, but also influences how they work together, and 
what information they are prepared to share with an external researcher. Law 
firm partners, i.e. the owners of the firm, pose additional challenges. These 
senior professionals work a lot, have tight schedules, and value every hour. 
They are very difficult to access, and are typically not prepared to invest too 
                                            
11 In Germany, the attorney-client privilege is codified in §43a of the Federal Lawyer’s Act 
(BRAO) and §2 of the Professional code of conduct for lawyers (BORA).  
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much time. In addition, they are used to guard their external image and are 
highly reluctant to disclose information (Empson 2018).  
This situation excludes some of the other methods mentioned: It is difficult 
enough to get access to one partner at a time. A focus group, which requires 
several participants at the same time (Braun and Clarke 2013), would be ex-
tremely difficult to organise. In addition, partners might not be open and honest 
in a group situation, given the topic of trust. For the same reason, other meth-
ods that require high involvement like researcher directed diaries are not fea-
sible, as they would require a substantial, ongoing time investment which law 
firm partners are not prepared to make. Those methods that are mainly based 
on observation are also inappropriate, as it is not possible to observe the un-
derstanding of something directly. In addition, situations related to profit allo-
cation decisions typically occur only once or twice a year and typically in con-
fidential situations like remuneration committee or partner meetings. An exter-
nal researcher will most likely not have access to these situations. Biographical 
research looks at life history of a person, but here the focus is on organisational 
structures (the PSS). Case study research might use interviews as one source 
of information, but typically also uses other sources, e.g. document analysis. 
Here again the confidentiality situation makes it very difficult to get access for 
research purposes. In addition, case studies focus on individual (or few) per-
sons, groups or organisations (Robson 2002). This research though aims to 
relate several different PSS to perceptions of trust and fairness, which requires 
a higher number of different individuals than case studies would allow for a 
one-person-research project. Individual interviews are thus the preferred 
method to collect information. 
Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews can be conducted in different ways: Highly structured with predeter-
mined questions; semi-structured, using pre-planned questions which how-
ever might be changed, omitted or be supplemented by others in the single 
interview; and fully unstructured interviews, where the conversation develops 
unpredictably (Robson 2002). 
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Highly structured interviews are typically used in quantitative research, but 
they are not well suited for exploratory, qualitative studies. Unstructured inter-
views by contrast tend to be used to examine individual roles in detail rather 
than general individual/team arrangements, according to Bryman and Bell 
(2015). They recommend semi-structured interviews particularly if the re-
searcher has a “fairly clear focus” (p. 483), which ensures that the specific 
areas of interest of the research can be discussed in a limited period of time. 
Semi-structured interviews are also ideal for discussing sensitive issues and 
provide the flexibility to adapt to unplanned situations (Braun and Clarke 2013) 
and are therefore suited for elite interviews. For a semi-structured interview it 
is however necessary to quickly establish a positive relationship between in-
terviewer and interviewee (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006), which was 
possible in this study (see section on access below, p. 35). Taking these points 
together, semi-structured, individual in-depth interviews are the best-suited 
method to collect data in this environment. 
Choice of data analysis method 
Available methods for the analysis of qualitative data 
For the analysis of qualitative data from interviews, Braun and Clarke (2014) 
discuss four methods: Thematic analysis (TA), interpretative phenomenologi-
cal analysis (IPA), grounded theory (GT) and pattern-based discourse analysis 
(PBDA). Phenomenology and GT are also included in Creswell’s (2013a) five 
approaches; in addition, he suggests ethnography and case study, which are 
not suitable for the reasons explained above, and narrative research. Of all 
these, TA is the best fitting method, compared to the alternatives: 
IPA is not interested in solutions to problems or in facts generally, but in the 
“essence” of a phenomenon. It’s about what and how the interviewees experi-
ence situations or events (Giorgi 1997). For that, phenomenologists try to see 
the world without presuppositions, by “bracketing” the world and existing the-
ories (Finlay 2008). In this study however, existing theories form the base for 
the research question, as explained in the last chapter. They inform the inter-
view guide, as well as existing knowledge of the author, and practical solutions 
are an explicitly desired outcome of this study. 
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Narrative research is typically based on told stories of (few) individuals, and 
usually takes a chronological approach (Creswell 2013a), which is different 
from semi-structured interviews.  
Discourse analysis presupposes that meaning and reality is created by lan-
guage, not only reflected by it. The author does not share this constructionist 
view, but rather sees language “as if it provides a window to the person’s inte-
rior” (p. 24), classifying this research as ‘experiential’, rather than ‘critical’ 
(Braun and Clarke 2014).  
Finally, a grounded theory approach would aim for a “unified theoretical expla-
nation for a process or action” (Creswell 2013a: 83). Theory development is at 
the core, and here too pre-existing theories and concepts typically do not play 
an important role, or are even seen as dangerous (Suddaby 2006). Suddaby 
also mentions that GT “rarely have interviews as their sole form of data collec-
tion” (p. 635). In addition, a “unified theoretical explanation” does not match 
very good with the contingency approach of Harlacher and Reihlen (2014), 
who argue that professional service firms choose forms of governance (which 
includes the PSS) based on several, mostly individual factors. Therefore, the 
GT methodology as a whole is not suited for this research, even though some 
aspects of the thematic analysis methods within GT are leading in the right 
direction. 
Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis in contrast supports a wide range of research and is not 
linked to a specific epistemological position. Braun and Clarke (2006, 2014) 
distinguish different varieties of TA. Pure inductive TA is not “shaped by exist-
ing theory” and inasmuch resembles GT; theoretical TA is guided by existing 
theoretical concepts; experiential TA looks at how participants experience and 
make sense of the world (a taste of phenomenology); and constructionist TA 
searches to explain how topics are constructed (p. 175). Boyatzis (1998) uses 
a slightly different distinction and differs between theory-driven, prior-research-
driven and data-driven approaches. Whereas the first two create codes first 
(from theory, or from prior research), which are then “applied” on the data, the 
third approach is inductive and generates new codes from the data.  
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Here, a combination of theoretical and experiential TA will be used. Prior re-
search and the specific areas involved will inform some of the categories used 
during the analysis process (Boyatzis 1998). For example, the constructs in-
troduced in chapter 2 (Research field and Concepts) like trust, fairness, moti-
vation are used as pre-defined categories. In addition to that, the explorative 
component of experiential TA allows for unexpected findings, resulting in new 
codes and themes emerging at the time of analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006).  
Many authors on qualitative research emphasise the importance of a detailed 
recording of the procedures to provide an audit trail (Bryman and Bell 2015) 
and thus ensure trustworthiness/dependability (Guba and Lincoln 1994; 
Robson 2002). This compares to the criteria of validity and reliability in the 
positivist paradigm, which are typically used as evaluation criteria in the con-
text of quantitative research. The following two sections will therefore describe 
that process in detail. 
3.2 Data collection 
Sampling 
Sampling is a key issue in qualitative research (Boyatzis 1998; Bryman and 
Bell 2015), because deep data are typically collected from a relatively small 
number of people instead of narrow information from many. The choice of in-
terview partners therefore defines and limits the data to be collected. Two sam-
pling strategies are available: Random/Convenience sampling or Purposive 
sampling (Robinson 2014). The first strategy uses randomly chosen cases 
from a defined total population, which is in practice often not ‘random’ com-
pared to the total population, but selected of an easily available group for ‘con-
venience’ reasons – preferable psychology or economics students, as in many 
quantitative studies published in 4* journals (e.g. Konow 2000; Cappelen et al. 
2007). Purposive sampling on the other hand deliberately selects participants 
based on a priori-understanding of the topic to ensure that particular instances 
of certain cases are included in the final sample (Robinson 2014). Here, due 
to the access issues described above, a purposive sampling strategy was cho-
sen. 
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A suitable purposive sampling strategy needs to balance different objectives: 
On one side, maximum variation sampling would ensure as diverse a range of 
participants as possible, supporting the exploratory, inductive approach to gen-
erate new insights. On the other hand, it might be helpful to compare data from 
participants to identify patterns, which requires that the participants share 
some specific characteristics, but are different in others (criterion sampling).  
A combination of these two sampling strategies was therefore chosen. The 
research question defines the interviewees as being law firm partners. A min-
imum firm size of ten partners ensures that all kinds of PSS’s are possible 
(lockstep for example makes no sense for very small firms). Partners were 
selected from the top 100 German commercial law firms (by revenue), using a 
popular commercial trade magazine ranking (JUVE 2017). The study focusses 
geographically on Germany, for access reasons facilitated by the author’s own 
contacts and professional relationships and because law firm’s legal structures 
and profit sharing systems as well as cultural and historical settings differ sig-
nificantly between countries (Empson et al. 2015a; Wesemann and Kerr 2015). 
Comparing different cultures and nations would be insightful, but is beyond the 
practical, pragmatic scope for this study. All interviewees therefore share the 
same German academic background as trained lawyers and all work for law 
firms for many years. Even though their income varies, it is always very much 
higher than the German average. Compared to the society as whole, they form 
a relatively homogenous group.  
The variation came in when selecting the interview partners out of this group 
of about 3.200 persons in Germany (JUVE 2017). The interviewees included 
some with a management role and some without; male and female; long and 
short belonging to the partnership; members and non-members of remunera-
tion committees. 15 participants from 10 different law firms were selected. In-
terviews were scheduled in two waves from September 2017 to June 2018.  
Table 4 provides biographical data about the interviewees and their firms; to 
ensure anonymity12, only ranges are given for specific information. Originally, 
                                            
12 Anonymity and confidentiality will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.3, p. 45 
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all interviews were given a number. However, during the analysis phase (which 
will be described in the next section) it turns out that the absence of names 
makes it much more difficult to connect information, for example to be aware 
that different quotes belong to the same person. To help with that and to facil-
itate writing in a more reader friendly way when using quotes, all interviewees 
were given alias names in alphabetical order. The alias name of the first inter-
viewee starts with A, the second with B etc. Names were chosen according to 
gender from a list of the most popular baby names in the decade of the birth 
of the interviewee (Office for National Statistics 2018), which might help to give 
an additional impression while reading. 
Nr Alias 
name 
Gen 
der 
Age Partner 
since 
Manage-
ment 
role 
Firm size 
(fee income) 
Type PSS Duration 
interview 
1 Andrew M 55-59 ~5 yrs. No 100-200m€ Modified Lockstep 59’ 
2 Bob M 55-59 ~15 yrs. Yes 100-200m€ Modified Lockstep 71’ 
3 Christopher M 40-44  ~10 yrs. No 100-200m€ Modified Lockstep 56’ 
4 Diane F 55-59 ~15 yrs. No 100-200m€ Modified Lockstep 59’ 
5 Edward M 50-54 ~20 yrs. Yes 50-100m€ E-w-y-K 67’ 
6 Francis M 45-49 ~15 yrs. Yes 25-50m€ E-w-y-K 64’ 
7 Gareth M 40-44  ~10 yrs. Yes 50-100m€ Modified Lockstep 50’ 
8 Howard M 50-54  ~20 yrs. No 25-50m€ Merit 46’ 
9 Imogen F 40-44 ~5 yrs. No 10-25m€ Merit 42’ 
10 Jennifer F 35-39  ~3 yrs. No 50-100m€ Modified Lockstep 55’ 
11 Keith M 40-44 ~3 yrs. No 10-25m€ Pure Lockstep 41’ 
12 Lee M 45-49 ~15 yrs. No 10-25m€ Pure Lockstep 49’ 
13 Martin M 55-59  ~30 yrs. Yes 10-25m€ Pure Lockstep 51’ 
14 Nigel M 60-64  ~30 yrs. Yes 50-100m€ Modified Lockstep 41’ 
15 Oliver M 55-59 ~25 yrs. Yes 25-50m€ Merit 52’ 
        803’ 
Table 4: Overview about interviewees 
For an explanation of the PSS types, see chapter 2.1 
Access 
Access is a key issue in all research but especially so when interviewing elites 
(Drew 2014). It is difficult to get access and gain their trust. The specific topics 
of interest (motivation, trust in fellows, financial implications etc.) even increase 
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the importance for a trustful situation between researcher and interviewee. 
Therefore, the existing network of the author was used, as he works in the law 
firm industry for many years and is personally known to many of the interview-
ees from business projects in the past. This “facilitated to develop rapport and 
engage with each other” and therefore helps to obtain high-quality data (Gilgun 
2014: 661), but also presents a challenge in maintaining a critical distance 
(Empson 2018), which will be discussed further down. 
Potential interviewees were selected by matching the JUVE (2017) list of the 
100 largest law firms in Germany with a list of known individuals from former 
projects. They were contacted by an e-mail explaining purpose and back-
ground of the study, including an information sheet regarding the research (see 
Appendix I: Information sheet). Elite interviewees are typically not willing to 
travel or to adapt to the researchers schedule (Mikecz 2012), therefore it was 
suggested to visit the partners in their offices to minimize their time investment 
and increase the approval rate. After two weeks, a second e-mail restating the 
importance of specifically this interview was sent.  
Fifteen out of twenty contacts consented to an interview, two replied that they 
do not participate in such interviews as a matter of principle, three did not reply 
at all. 
Interview setting 
All interviews took place in the offices of the interviewees, typically in a sepa-
rate conference room, occasionally in the individual office of the partner. Usu-
ally, only one interview was conducted each day to allow for intensive immer-
sion directly after the interview; sometimes two, if travel to a distant city was 
involved. The interviews took around one hour (details see Table 4, p. 35).  
The interviews started with an explanation of the purpose and procedure, in-
cluding how the interview transcriptions will be processed and used. After sign-
ing the consent form (see Appendix II: Consent form), the audio recording was 
started using an iPhone 5S. Checks in advance in different environments en-
sured a high recording quality.  
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All interviews were conducted in German, German language was also used 
during analysis. Only in the last step, the writing of this report, themes and 
quotes were translated into English to illustrate and inform the analysis. 
Interview guide 
The interviews were semi-structured, supported by an interview guide, that in-
cludes reminders on technical and formal procedures, the exact opening ques-
tion, and example questions to steer the discussion in case it drifted off topic 
(see Appendix III: Interview guide).  
After some initial talk, all interviews started with the opening statement “Tell 
me something about your profit sharing system”. This focussed the discussion 
on the topic of interest, without steering the interviewee in one specific direc-
tion or imposing the author’s “preordained understandings of their experience” 
(Gioia et al. 2013: 17). Almost all interviewees started to explain the mechanics 
of their PSS in an abstract, rather unemotional way. At some stage, a question 
like “And how do you think about that?” changed the focus to individual ap-
praisements. The specific topics of trust, motivation and justice were deliber-
ately not introduced by the researcher; however, when an interviewee used 
one of these words or concepts, follow up questions did refer to that. Questions 
from the interview guide were used if the interview did not move forward, drifted 
off or did not touch the topics of interest in the first 30 minutes of the interview; 
but this was rarely necessary. About ten minutes before the end of each inter-
view the participants were asked if they have “additional comments on these 
themes of fairness, trust and motivation” to refocus to the central areas of in-
terest. A closing question shortly before the end invited to add or emphasise 
subjectively important issues (“is there anything relevant in this context, which 
we didn’t discuss by now”). 
3.3 Data analysis 
The data analysis followed in general the seven stages proposed by Braun 
and Clarke (2014). Braun and Clarke themselves describe that this process is 
seldom linear, resulting in a certain overlap of the stages. Consistent with that, 
stage 5 and 6 were not strictly separated from each other. 
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Stage Task 
1 Transcription 
2 Familiarisation, first identification of interesting topics 
3 Complete coding 
4 Searching for themes 
5 Reviewing themes, finding relationships  
6 Defining and naming themes 
7 Finalising analysis while writing 
Table 5: Stages of coding and analysis proposed for Thematic Analysis  
(Braun and Clarke 2014) 
Stage 1 and 2: Transcription and familiarisation 
Later on the day of the interview, listening to the full audio recording served as 
first immersion into the data, meanwhile noting spontaneous ideas. The inter-
views were then transcribed using an external transcription service specialised 
on scientific research, using “simple transcription rules” as defined by Dresing 
and Pehl (2012). A specific non-disclosure contract was signed beforehand 
with the transcription service to enhance confidentiality, e.g. requesting high-
encrypted data transfer. Appendix IV (p. 165) contains example extracts of two 
original transcripts, together with a translation in English. Those parts are high-
lighted that are used in the findings chapters as quotes. 
Stage 3: Coding  
Having received the transcripts, they were then fully checked against the rec-
orded audio information for accuracy (Braun and Clarke 2006); misunder-
standings were corrected in the transcript. This served as the second immer-
sion into the data. At the same time, identification information like names was 
neutralised, and first memos with ideas regarding specific statements were at-
tached to the respective text segments. In a third complete reading, a full de-
scriptive coding (Saldaña 2014) of all interviews was attached to the transcripts 
(between 22 and 107 codes per interview, in total 734 different codes).  
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Stage 4: Searching for themes 
During the next cycle, the codes were clustered into related themes. Initial 
themes where the major topics of interest (fairness, trust, justice), but sub-
themes were created throughout the process. In addition, unexpected, but 
emerging themes were identified. All codes were reordered, reattached to 
themes and/or condensed during this process. Some rather similar codes were 
pooled. This stage was not linear, but an iterative process (Braun and Clarke 
2006; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009) and corresponds to stage 4 and 5 of 
Braun and Clarke (2014).  
The process of searching for themes was facilitated by using a software pack-
age for qualitative data analysis (MAXQDA 2018). The software facilitates con-
centration on codes at this stage instead of on the original transcripts, while 
providing an easy, reliable way of going back to the original quotes behind any 
code. The integrated functionality “Summary Grid” offers a quick, interactive 
overview about codes and themes. 
Other benefits and risks of using software in qualitative research will be dis-
cussed below (p. 41). 
 
Figure 4: Example overview of theme, codes and transcript segment, showing the underly-
ing original interview segment for the selected code. 
Stage 5 and 6: Reviewing themes; finding relationships, defining and 
naming themes 
In the next step, themes and connected codes were colour coded depending 
on the PSS type under which they occurred (e.g. blue for Pure Lockstep, yel-
low for Merit based, and white for more than one). The colour could then serve 
40 
as a filter for the analysis of PSS type related codes. At this stage, a graphical 
interface of MAXQDA (MaxMaps) was used to connect the different themes 
and classify them as preconditions or consequences of the respective PSS 
(results of this process including graphical overview see chapter 4, Figure 7 to 
Figure 10, p. 55, 58, 64 and 69).  
Stage 7: Finalising analysis while writing 
Up to this point, the process of generating codes, themes and finding the rela-
tionships between them was basically inductive, meaning that theory is ex-
pected as an outcome of research (Bryman and Bell 2015). The codes initially 
emerged from the interview transcripts, i.e. the reported perceptions of the in-
terviewees. The themes were also generated from the codes, even if they were 
unavoidable informed to a certain extent by the existing knowledge of the au-
thor, as well as the assumed relationships between them.  
When writing the findings chapter however, a deductive component was 
added, i.e. an aspect of ‘testing existing hypothesis’ by comparing them to col-
lected data. The second research question is “How does this understanding 
link to their specific profit sharing system?”. Where appropriate, the assumed 
relationships were therefore ‘tested’ against the different PSS types to see if 
there is indeed an influence of the PSS type on a specific idea or relationship. 
This test used a specific functionality of the MAXQDA software that allows to 
selectively show only those coded text passages which belong to a specific 
group of codes and to a specific group of interviews. A good example for the 
result of that process are the findings in chapter 5.2 (p. 77 ff.): The quotes 
showed in Table 6 (p. 81) were identified by selecting all codes related to ‘fair-
ness’, and then selecting all interviews from one PSS type (e.g. ‘Merit’), repre-
senting one row in the table, one after the other. The resulting set of quotes 
was then checked for the appearance of one of the three subthemes in the 
table. This allowed reviewing systematically if there seems to be an influence 
of the PSS type on the subtheme.  
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The use of software (CAQDAS) 
Computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (a generic software cat-
egory, abbreviation CAQDAS) was used to analyse audio files and transcrip-
tions. A good overview about general benefits and risks of CAQDAS can be 
found in Silver and Lewins (2014), who compare eight specific software pack-
ages available that year. Using their classification, three packages were pre-
tested (MAXQDA, Atlas.TI and NVivo). MAXQDA (2018) was chosen after an 
assessment of the respective features and usability.13  
While such software does not conduct the analysis as such, it provides a very 
helpful tool to organise work and assist in the creative process of developing 
and structuring ideas. Working on a text level (like in Word or Excel) is possi-
ble, as well as working visually e.g. by “moving cards” and dragging lines be-
tween them. Attaching memos to text passages, to codes, to themes or whole 
interviews helps organising and automatically provides links between audio 
snippets, text transcript, assigned codes, themes and memos. This enables 
the researcher to keep a traditional, pen-and-paper-like working style with 
cards and annotations, if desired, while profiting from modern IT. For example, 
when selecting a theme, all related codes are displayed; when one of the 
codes is selected, the respective sections in the transcription are displayed, 
and a click on the symbol next to the text section plays exactly that section 
from the audio file. This makes it very easy to check if a specific statement 
really supports a theme, and to revisit the coding, or the themes, if necessary.  
These benefits outweigh the disadvantages of CAQDAS, stated e.g. by 
Robson (2002), who mentions three of them: First it takes time and effort to 
gain proficiency; second there might be reluctance to change categories once 
established; and third the software design might impose specific approaches 
during data analysis. However, since then this software type has developed 
tremendously, and graphical design makes it very quick to learn. The second 
                                            
13 The other packages have comparable features, and would also have been generally 
suited for this work. MAXQDA’s interface is however easier to learn and has better visualisa-
tion tools using colours. NVivo has advantages when processing data tables, massive data 
sets and when using online collaboration; AtlasTI is good at integrating network maps (see 
Schmieder 2014), but these advantages are not relevant for this study. 
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argument holds even more for real pen-and-paper work, whereas renaming 
codes and restructuring themes becomes much easier in software than on 
cards. On the third argument, Silver and Lewins (2014) state that today “using 
software is a creative process since qualitative software packages – in es-
sence and design – are inherently flexible” (p. 3). This might not be true for 
every qualitative research, but certainly applies for the methods used in this 
study. 
 
Figure 5: Example of a coded segment in MAXQDA software, linked to theme and original 
transcript, including audio. As all interviews were conducted in German, German 
language was used during analysis. Only in the last step, the writing of this report, 
themes and citations were translated into English.  
Ethical considerations 
The arrangements aimed to meet ethical standards for qualitative research, 
particularly protecting information and privacy; be honest about the nature of 
the study; preventing harm to the participants; and no exploitation of the inter-
viewees (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006; Creswell 2013a; Bryman and Bell 
2015). These standards might seem self-evident at first glance, but it is not 
trivial to fulfil them: Protecting information and privacy prohibits sharing specific 
information on the interviewees. Following the recommendation of Gioia et al. 
(2013), not confidentiality was promised (which would have prevented the use 
in a published academic thesis), but anonymity. The interviewees are part of a 
group of only 3.300 people in Germany and sometimes well known to each 
other. Just two or three pieces of information might identify a person, at least 
Theme Codes 
Memos attached to code or text 
Code for that segment Coded text 
segment 
Click to hear audio 
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to other members of that group. This also limits the audit trail. This is the rea-
son why only limited statistical information about the participants is given (see 
Table 4, p. 35). 
Being honest about the nature of the study contrasts with the aim not to prime 
an interviewee with ideas or concepts. The information sheet (see Appendix I) 
is therefore a little abstruse. It informs about the general area of interest, but 
does not mention the central concepts the author was interested in in exact 
words. During the course of the interview however, these specific areas were 
explicitly mentioned, as described above. There was no indication during the 
interviews that interviewees were surprised when the specific areas were men-
tioned; in contrast, most of them started to discuss issues related to fairness, 
trust and/or motivation on their own.  
Compared to that, preventing harm to the interviewees is easier: Law firm part-
ners are powerful people, able and used to protect their own interests in situ-
ations that are based on discussion and verbal information exchange. As long 
as they can trust the researcher that the information given remains anony-
mous, they are not considered to be particularly vulnerable.  
This powerfulness of lawyers might have the downside that the information 
provided is partially censored. There is no indication that interviewees inten-
tionally provided wrong information, but as they are (due to their experience 
as lawyers) all very aware of what they say, it is to be expected that statements 
have a tendency to be too positive when describing the own situation. There-
fore, when looking at downsides of any system, also arguments from interview-
ees not using that system are of interest and were used during analysis. Some 
of the interviewees however discussed problems or limitations of their PSS 
very openly.  
Exploitation of interviewees for the sake of the researcher is typically dis-
cussed in setting when the interviewees are seen as underprivileged or vul-
nerable (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006; Traianou and Zeller-Berkman 
2014). This is not the case here. In many of the interviews, the interviewees 
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were grateful for an “interesting discussion” and asked the author for a sum-
mary of the results, which is also offered in the information sheet. The latter is 
a common way to “give back something” to participants of a study. 
Another issue comes with the selection of the interviewees. As explained 
above (Access, p. 35), the author used his personal network to contact poten-
tial candidates. This raises some problems: potential conflicts of interest may 
arise; it is more difficult to maintain a critical distance; and the answers might 
be “biased” because of the personal acquaintance of interviewer and inter-
viewee. However, the advantages prevail: Access to these persons would oth-
erwise have been very difficult or impossible. The professional (not personal!) 
acquaintance not only facilitates the access, but also the process of gaining 
trust and rapport, which can otherwise be a massive problem when interview-
ing elites (Mikecz 2012; Empson 2018). Due to the existing relationship, the 
interviewees accepted the author a priori as “knowing”, although he is not a 
lawyer himself. Mikecz (2012) describes this position as “informed outsider” as 
most effective in an elite interview situation. Empson (2018: 6) also encour-
ages this approach to focus on building rapport, trust and commitment as op-
posed to “the neopositivist’ approach (…) (of) minimizing the researcher influ-
ence and other sources of bias” and states that this “is a far more effective 
method for obtaining high quality data”. Two means helped to maintain the 
necessary critical distance: First, the unspecific opening question (“tell me 
something about your PSS”), so that the interviewees don’t try to match the 
interviewer’s expectations. Second, the fact that the analysis itself is based on 
interview transcripts, reduced to “a series of anonymized text fragments in an 
analytical software programme (so that) my critical distance is re-established” 
(Empson 2018: 9). 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter explained why this study uses individual, semi-structured inter-
views and thematic analysis as methods. It was shown that these methods are 
consistent with the epistemological position of the author and are better suited 
for the research questions and the specific environment of this study than other 
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available methods. The data collection and analysis procedures were de-
scribed in detail, to ensure the trustworthiness of this study by enhancing cred-
ibility and dependability (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Creswell 2013b). Benefits 
and risks of using computer assisted qualitative data analysis software were 
discussed. Finally, some ethical considerations were explained, which are “im-
portant characteristic of a ‘good’ qualitative study” (Creswell 2013a) too. An-
other criterion for the quality of a qualitative study is the extent to which it is 
pragmatically useful (Locke 2000), which is specifically important for a DBA 
thesis. This aspect will be covered later in the discussion chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4: Findings regarding perceived advantages and disad-
vantages of PSS-archetypes 
This thesis looks at the influences and interactions of interpersonal perceptions 
with economic aspects of profit sharing systems from the perspective of law 
firm partners. The results of the research, stemming from 15 interviews with 
law firm partners, are presented in the following two chapters. This first findings 
chapter summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the different profit 
sharing system types, as perceived by the interviewees. In chapter 5 after-
wards, specific findings regarding the topics of trust, fairness and motivation in 
relation to the PSS type are presented. Together they form the basis for an-
swering the first two research questions: What understanding of trust, fairness 
and motivation do law firm partners have? How does this understanding link to 
their specific profit sharing system? The two findings chapters concentrate on 
direct outcomes of the interviews and have the main purpose to substantiate 
key analysis points with quotes from the interviews. There is some ‘discussion 
along the way’, but the major part of the discussion will follow in an own chapter 
thereafter. This allows combining findings from all areas into one framework. 
The discussion chapter 6 will also compare the findings with the literature; 
therefore, references are kept to a minimum here in the findings chapters. 
Chapter 6 then concentrates on the third research question: Which profit shar-
ing models suit best to specific given structures of law firms and the individual 
interests of their partners? 
The findings chapters contain quotations from the interviews that informed the 
analysis. To ensure credibility and to give some context, all quotations are fol-
lowed by a source reference in the form “[Alias name]: [Transcription para-
graph], [PSS type]”. The notion “Martin: 15, Pure Lockstep” for example refers 
to paragraph 15 in the transcript of Martin, who works in a law firm having a 
Pure Lockstep profit sharing system. The name of the interviewee also refers 
to Table 4 (overview about interviewees) on p. 35, which gives the additional 
context information that Martin is male, in his late 50s, a partner for about 30 
years, has a management role in his law firm and is partner in one of the 
“smaller” law firms of the top 100 in Germany. All interviews were conducted 
in German; the quotes were translated by the author. Appendix IV (p. 165) 
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contains example extracts of two original transcripts, together with a translation 
in English; parts that are used below as quotes are highlighted. 
There is no royal road 
Almost all partners agree on one basic notion: There is no one ideal solution 
for profit sharing in a partnership, as several interviewees express: 
“I think, there is no ideal system, probably. You can find something you 
don’t agree with in any system” (Howard: 139, Merit) 
“All basic systems have their difficulties. All.” (Jennifer: 83, Modified 
Lockstep) 
 “Every profit sharing system results from balancing different conflicting 
goals. This is why ‘the’ system does not exist in the end.” (Oliver: 3, 
Merit) 
Even those partners who are very satisfied with their own PSS concede that 
their system has limits, either with respect to the individual satisfaction or to 
outcomes or consequences of their system. For that reason, many firms do 
adhere in principle to a PSS archetype like Lockstep, but include elements 
from other systems. For example, Jennifer said: 
“I don’t believe in these systems in their pure form, doesn’t matter if it’s 
Lockstep on the one side or Merit Based on the other. Rather, each of 
these systems must have correctives in some way.” (Jennifer: 11, Modi-
fied Lockstep)  
Analysis revealed two sorts of explanations for this: First, a pure system could 
lead to perceived unfairness, at least by some partners in some situations. 
Second, the mechanics of a pure system could have an unwanted steering 
effect, e.g. on motivation or effort level. The following chapter will look at these 
perceptions related to fairness and motivation in more detail. 
In addition to this generic agreement, most partners also agree on several 
specific properties of the available PSS archetypes, which will be summarised 
in the remainder of this chapter; it will be mentioned explicitly where they dis-
agree. These properties will be discussed in the following structure: On the 
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one hand, certain preconditions are favourable for a specific PSS. These pre-
conditions could be either context specific, e.g. the firm size, or they could rely 
on values and beliefs of the partners. On the other hand, each PSS has con-
sequences. These could be seen either as positive or as negative – or at least 
risky. To account for the latter, mitigation strategies such as system modifica-
tions are typically used.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Structural model to discuss PSS archetypes, adapted from Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1990) paradigm model  
There are no direct causal relationships. A specific contextual situation does 
not necessarily imply a specific PSS, and a specific PSS does not always have 
the same positive or negative consequences. In addition, a specific property 
might be precondition and consequence at the same time. For example, as 
explained in detail below, Lockstep systems need long-term oriented partners, 
but they also encourage long-term orientation. 
The arrangement of the quadrants suggests a discussion “from left to right”, 
starting with the preconditions. However, asked neutrally to “tell something 
about their PSS’s”, almost all interviewees started with the mechanics, and 
then talked about the consequences of their PSS. Only later in the interview, 
and often only after specific questions, they commented on preconditions. Fol-
lowing that priority, each of the next sections will use the same narrative se-
quence and also start with a quick reminder of the mechanics of the system 
Preconditions: Context Consequences: Postitive
Preconditions: Beliefs / Values Consequences: Negative / risks
Profit sharing system
Mitigation strategies 
Modifications 
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(for more details see chapter 2.2, p.10ff), describe the consequences, and then 
reflect on the preconditions. Quotes will be given to support the respective 
findings. 
Naturally, most partners have the best knowledge and explicit opinions regard-
ing the profit sharing system they actually experience in their own law firm. 
Some of the partners interviewed however expressed a clear opinion also re-
garding the potential alternatives, e.g. because they have former experiences, 
or because they were actively engaged in PSS type discussions, e.g. in a man-
agement role. The following findings therefore contain “insider perceptions” as 
well as “outsider perceptions”.  
The next four sections will describe findings for each of the PSS types relevant 
in this study: Pure Lockstep, Modified Lockstep, Merit Based and Eat-What-
You-Kill. The remaining three systems described in the literature (cf. chapter 
2.2), Equal Share, Corporate and Subjective did not occur in the interviews 
(the reasons for that will be discussed in chapter 6.4, p. 111 ff.).  
4.1 Pure Lockstep 
In a Pure Lockstep system, the profit share is only dependent on the tenure of 
the partner, and the individual share increases automatically every year or at 
regular intervals (every second or third year). 
Advantages 
The most often mentioned advantage of Lockstep was that it facilitates the 
cooperation between partners and specifically the internal reference of clients, 
because each partner profits from additional firm income, irrespectively of who 
actually does the work. This encourages specialisation, which in turn leads to 
higher quality of work and thus increased customer satisfaction, because every 
lawyer can concentrate on his or her strengths. In addition, cross-selling is 
encouraged; and both finally lead to higher total firm income. As Imogen puts 
it: 
“Cooperation increases the size of the cake.” (Imogen: 33, Merit) 
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Another benefit is that long-term thinking is encouraged. The individual share 
increases automatically year per year, so it pays off to stay with the firm for a 
long time, and every partner should be interested in the long-term success of 
the firm. This causes a significant stability, both Lee and Martin reported: 
“This is the core of the whole, that we had all the success. Specifically 
the tremendous personnel-wise stability - during the 20 years the firm 
exists now, never a partner left.” (Lee: 9, Pure Lockstep) 
“Lockstep is much more beneficial… look, the firm is now 90 years old 
or so, and such a stability I think you will not get with another system” 
(Martin: 23, Pure Lockstep) 
An interesting revelation is that a Pure Lockstep system has another inherent 
value: No discussion between the partners is needed with respect to the an-
nual share. As we will see below, this is a painful issue with other systems. 
Downsides 
On the other hand, partners from all systems agree that a Pure Lockstep sys-
tem uncouples financial rewards from individual performance, which might 
raise the risk of free riding. For partners with other PSS’s than Lockstep this 
risk is seen as relevant, because for these interviewees it raises both fairness 
and motivational issues: 
“(Our merit system) is fairer than Pure Lockstep. That’s like the Ameri-
can NBA. The older the players are, the more they earn, even though 
they cannot deliver the performance any more. You have to ask if that is 
fair.” (Howard: 82, Merit) 
“In a Lockstep system, where you just climb up, the longer you are 
there, you need to have other incentives that people continue to work 
and not just take.” (Howard: 17, Merit) 
However, partners who have a Pure Lockstep system do not always see that 
this risk actually occurs:  
“The question could be asked whether everyone remains sufficiently 
motivated to make an effort in the same way as they used to. Especially 
with increasing age. I would see that as an abstract danger, as an ab-
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stract risk. But I don't see it realized here. Not recognizable. But ab-
stractly speaking, yes, it is. Depending on the personality structure of 
the involved” (Keith: 15, Pure Lockstep) 
One reason suggested for that is a strong peer pressure to perform, as Martin 
said: 
“This is what makes the Lockstep system work (…) it’s the guilty con-
science what you have. There is no formal lever, yes, but you feel the 
pressure (…) you don’t want to stand there with a bad fee income (…) if 
you act reasonably normal, you will always try to get out of that situa-
tion. This is pressure, but to be honest, as a lawyer you must be able to 
cope with pressure.” (Martin: 115, Pure Lockstep) 
Partners from Merit or Eat-what-you-kill systems also see this inherent pres-
sure in a Lockstep system, and praise that their systems reduce this peer pres-
sure effect. 
A third area of perceived disadvantages is related to the mechanics of a Pure 
Lockstep system. Middle-aged partners, often being in their most productive 
stage of life, earn significantly less than more senior partners. This is accepted, 
but typically mitigated by a ceiling for senior partners: After a period of typically 
10-20 years, the share does not increase any more. However, the shares of 
all younger partners still increase, so that the ‘value’ of the constant share of a 
senior partner decreases over time. This can only be compensated by constant 
absolute growth and ever-increasing productivity, according to Edward, a sen-
ior lawyer being partner for 22 years: 
“The food chain has to produce more and more, otherwise Lockstep is 
an expropriation” (Edward: 17, Eat-What-You-Kill) 
Contextual preconditions 
Analysis showed that the most important precondition for a Pure Lockstep firm 
is the homogeneity of the partnership. It is much easier to accept that all part-
ners (at least of the same tenure) earn the same, if their performance is com-
parable, than if there are huge differences. Homogeneity can be described 
from different perspectives. Three perspectives were mentioned as particularly 
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important: the performance motivation, the performance capability and similar 
moral values between the partners. Martin for example thought: 
“You will not get the same turnover from partners in employment law 
compared to a notary. You either tolerate that spreading or not, and you 
can only tolerate that if the group has consistent value judgements (…) 
we need social compatibility also on the partner level“ (Martin: 13/48, 
Pure Lockstep). 
However it is explicitly not seen as necessary to have homogeneity in the 
range of services or the chargeable rates, said Martin: 
“When I punish someone who is as enthusiastic, as performance-capa-
ble as someone else, only punish financially because he works in an 
area which is not as profitable, but I do think this area is necessary for 
the firm as a whole to perform in the marketplace, then this would be 
unfair in our view, yes, because he equally contributes to the appear-
ance of the whole firm, and enables the higher earning partner to have 
business.” (Martin: 21, Pure Lockstep) 
This view is strongly connected to the fairness ideal of egalitarianism as de-
scribed in chapter 2.3. 
As explained above, Pure Lockstep systems need constant growth, if they 
want to avoid that the income of senior partners diminishes. This means that 
new partners have to enter the partnership regularly. A very careful partner 
selection process is needed to still ensure homogeneity, which in turn slows 
down the growth rate. Pure Lockstep firms tend to grow slowly. For the same 
reason, new partners are most often appointed from inside the firm. This en-
sures that they share the firm values and are very good known to their new 
peers. Lateral hires, i.e. the move of someone who has a senior position in 
another law firm, are very rare. 
Further contextual preconditions for Pure Lockstep seem to be a limited num-
ber of partners, and typically the concentration in only one office. The reasons 
for that are connected to beliefs and perceptions, specifically trust. 
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Values & Beliefs 
Trust in the fellow partners is the key for a Pure Lockstep PSS. For example, 
Lee said: 
“The system assumes that all agree that nobody abuses the system in 
one’s own favour, because there are no performance based parame-
ters. It is based strongly on the fact that all partners perceive it mutually 
as fair.” (Lee: 10, Pure Lockstep) 
The next chapter 5 will show that this fundamental trust between partners 
stems from knowing each other. Knowing each other in a high performance 
workplace environment means working together, and this is the reason why 
Pure Lockstep works best when the number of partners is limited. It is possible 
to know 20 or 30 fellow partners through joint projects or at least regular busi-
ness lunches, but not 200. For the same reason, Pure Lockstep firms often 
just have one (main) office in one city. It is rather difficult to connect to partners 
who work in different cities: 
“Out of sight, out of mind… this is a trivial truth and true also between 
lawyers (…) when you can easily seek talks with someone, it is easier 
to maintain and cherish consistent value systems (…) actually the one-
city-policy might be essential for (our) system.” (Martin: 26, Pure Lock-
step) 
The other essential ingredient for Pure Lockstep systems is the minor im-
portance of money as a motivator. Partners from Pure Lockstep systems unan-
imously emphasise that money is not a key motivator for them: 
“I'm a guy who doesn't make his motivation to do a decent job depend-
ent on how much money I make in detail (…) It bears a meaning, of 
course. Sure. But it doesn't have much importance for the question of 
motivation and how much effort I make here. (…) it doesn't really matter 
to me whether I have a small number of points score or a large number. 
For whether I'm making an effort here or not” (Keith: 23, Pure Lockstep) 
“The original approach of this law firm was that people came together 
who wanted to be different from Big Law. Who said that they do not 
need the second yacht or the fifth cottage and work until 11 pm each 
day (…) if you want to optimise your personal income, this law firm is 
wrong for you.” (Lee: 17, Pure Lockstep) 
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“I was here for some years, when another law firm offered twice the in-
come I had, but I did not leave. The reason: You do not work in a law 
firm like this just for financial reasons.” (Martin: 41, Pure Lockstep) 
It would seem that the motivation of Lockstep partners is primarily intrinsic, as 
opposed to the extrinsic motivational effect of money. This effect will be dis-
cussed further in the discussion chapter 6 (p. 108ff.).  
And naturally in a lockstep system, partners have to share the belief that in-
creasing seniority is equivalent to increasing proficiency, leading to increasing 
profitability, as Keith explains: 
“(Our Lockstep system) considers that / assumes that (…) the increas-
ing professional experience, the increasing seniority also goes along 
with (…) additional capabilities in subject-specific regard, also in per-
sonal regard, that was constitute such a lawyer personality.” (Keith: 25, 
Pure Lockstep) 
Figure 7 (below) provides a summary capturing the preconditions and conse-
quences of a Pure Lockstep system. The next section will cover Modified Lock-
step systems, which naturally share many preconditions and consequences 
with Pure Lockstep systems. Those items that both systems share are printed 
normal, whereas items specific for Pure Lockstep are italic in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Summary of Pure Lockstep systems, showing preconditions, consequences and 
typical mitigation strategies for negative consequences  
Items in italics are specific for Pure Lockstep, as opposed to Modified Lockstep. 
 
Preconditions: Context
Homogeneity of moral values
Homogeneity of capabilitites
Clients need cooperation
One (or few) offices 
Limited number of partners
Healthy age distribution
Consequences: Positive
Stability
Longterm thinking
Cooperation
Specialisation
No cost allocation needed
No discussions needed
Preconditions: Beliefs / Values
Seniority means increasing proficiency 
Trust in fellow partners
Money is not key motivator
Longterm thinking
Need of Harmony
Consequences: Negative / risks
Reward uncoupled from performance
Very successful partners underpaid
Pressure to perform
Without growth: Decreasing top shares
Senior partners overpaid
Limited growth rate
Pure Lockstep
Mitigation strategies 
 
 
Part-time partnership 
Develop new partners continuously 
Limited maximum points 
Consequences: Negative / risks 
Reward uncoupled from performance 
Very successful partners underpaid 
Pressure to perform 
Without growth: Decreasing top shares 
Senior partners overpaid 
Limited growth rate 
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4.2 Modified Lockstep 
A Modified Lockstep system is based on the same tenure principle as a Pure 
Lockstep system, but with a key change: Elements are added that account for 
individual performance (see chapter 2.2, p. 10 ff). They range from additional 
bonus payments for very successful partners, ‘gate decisions’ only two or three 
times in a partner’s life (decision points for further increase of profit share) to 
regular assessments of each partner’s performance every year, accompanied 
by an adjustment of the individual share points.  
Advantages 
The intended advantages of a Modified Lockstep system are very similar to 
those of a Pure Lockstep system: Cooperation and internal cross-referencing 
is encouraged, specialisation leads to increased quality, and both leads to in-
creased turnover. The system supports long term thinking and stability.  
Downsides 
One advantage of Pure Lockstep is however absent: Whereas Pure Lockstep 
systems save the pain of performance discussions between the partners, dis-
cussion is unavoidable with the modifications. Typically, the performance mon-
itoring in a Modified Lockstep system is done through a remuneration commit-
tee. Interestingly, partners see the need for such monitoring, but more as a 
necessary evil than something desirable, like Nigel: 
“This is necessary, It’s not nice, that’s for sure, especially the talks you 
have to hold, but it’s necessary because otherwise you are subsidising 
people and do not get them to acquire [new clients] but just administer 
what they have.” (Nigel: 61, Modified Lockstep) 
It would seem that the reason for the modifications is to mitigate the inherent 
downsides of a Lockstep system, and only indirectly to provide an advantage. 
Different modifications address specific downsides: 
- Monitoring and controlling procedures, as well as ‘gates’ for further 
partner promotion aim to reduce the risk of free riding and an inappro-
priate amount of non-profitable work .  
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- Bonus schemes want to reduce the risk that very successful partners 
feel underpaid and leave the firm.  
- The inherent pressure to perform is reduced specifically for underper-
forming partners, if they accept a reduced profit share level or a slow-
down of their increase. 
Contextual preconditions 
Homogeneity of performance is also seen as a facilitator for Modified Lockstep 
systems by Nigel: 
“(We are) uniform in our levels of turnover. If we had an outlier, what 
you call a ‘rainmaker’, we probably would not satisfy such a person, and 
I could understand that, but unfortunately or thankfully we don’t have 
that problem.” (Nigel: 33, Modified Lockstep). 
However, other law firms with a Modified Lockstep system do allow some 
spread in the profit share by assigning bonus payments to exceptionally suc-
cessful partners. Generally speaking, the modifications allow for more hetero-
geneity in the partnership, and the stronger the modifications are, the more 
dissimilarity in the partnership is possible. This issue is discussed in detail in 
chapter 6.2 (p. 101). 
Values & Beliefs 
Analysis showed that the basic beliefs compatible with a Modified Lockstep 
system are similar to those of a Pure Lockstep system, but again moderated 
by the respective modifications. The system is still based on the assumption 
that partners that are more senior are generally more profitable and/or deserve 
a larger profit share than junior partners for other reasons. Long-term orienta-
tion is needed, as junior partners know that they will have to wait for larger 
shares.  
Trust in the fellow partners is still important, but the level and type of trust is 
different from a pure system. It is not necessary any more to trust that every 
single fellow partner will always perform at maximum level, because sanctions 
and adjustments are possible. The trust object, the trustee, shifts from the in-
dividual fellow partner to the committee which makes those decisions.  
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Figure 8 gives a summarising overview about the preconditions and conse-
quences of Modified Lockstep systems. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Summary of Modified Lockstep systems, showing preconditions, consequences 
and typical mitigation strategies for negative consequences 
Items in italics are specific for Modified Lockstep, as opposed to Pure. 
 
Preconditions: Context
Homogeneity of capabilitites
Clients need cooperation
Consequences: Positive
Stability
Longterm thinking
Cooperation
Specialisation
No cost allocation needed
Preconditions: Beliefs / Values
Seniority means increasing proficiency 
Trust in committee
Money not key motivator
Longterm thinking
Need of Harmony
Consequences: Negative / risks
Reward uncoupled from performance
Very successful partners underpaid
Pressure to perform
Without growth: Decreasing top shares
Senior partners overpaid
Modified Lockstep
Mitigation strategies 
Controlling systems 
Bonus schemes 
Accept under-performers 
Develop new partners continuously 
Limited maximum points 
Consequences: Negative / risks 
Reward uncoupled from performance 
Very successful partners underpaid 
Pressure to perform 
Without growth: Decreasing top shares 
 
Senior partners overpaid 
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4.3 Merit Based 
In a Merit Based system, the performance monitoring is the basis of the profit 
distribution, as opposed to a Modified Lockstep system, where performance 
figures might be used to modify the Lockstep more or less, but are not key for 
the profit share.  
Advantages 
A Merit based system tries to depict the different aspects of successful entre-
preneurial acting in the profit share of the individual: It’s important to work hard 
and generate fee income, but also to acquire new clients, to care for existing 
client relationships, or to manage the firm. All these activities are financially 
recognised and thereby encouraged. This is seen as an advantage compared 
to Eat-what-you-kill-systems that only look at the fee income. The considera-
tion of acquisition (selling) power is specifically important and typically the sec-
ond most important measure, beside the amount of fees charged. Howard, a 
Merit proponent, sees the resulting effect on collaboration as even stronger 
than in Lockstep systems: 
“The main benefit [of our PSS] is that we have collaboration. In law 
firms where they don’t share the profits from a specific mandate be-
tween those who do the work, those who manage and those who 
landed the account, where they allocate the profit to just one of these 
buckets, the team spirit is not encouraged (…) in my old firm we had a 
lockstep system which led to collaboration, but [here] it’s of higher inten-
sity.” (Howard: 33, Merit) 
The intended results of cooperation are the same as for Lockstep systems: 
Cooperation leads to more cross-selling and fosters specialisation which in the 
end increases total turnover. 
An interesting revelation is that a major and unique advantage of a Merit based 
system is seen by interviewees in the fact that it provides individual partners 
freedom to decide themselves how and how much they work: 
“I can allow myself to serve an unprofitable client just because I want 
to.” (Imogen: 37, Merit) 
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“It gives the individual more freedom, because you can decide to work 
less without having a bad conscience, because in return you get less 
money.” (Oliver: 22, Merit) 
This allows the partners to adjust amount and intensity of work to their individ-
ual circumstances, without having to renegotiate with their fellow partners or 
having a bad conscience. This is therefore a major advantage compared to 
Pure Lockstep systems, where this is an issue (cf. p. 50 f). 
Downsides 
Analysis points out three specific downsides related to Merit based systems. 
The first is linked to the principle that the system is based on a regular perfor-
mance review. For example, Howard experienced: 
“It’s certainly stressful to be evaluated every year… if you know that you 
are monitored every year.” (Howard: 85, Merit) 
Even though there is no direct justification pressure in case of bad perfor-
mance, as it would be the case in a Modified Lockstep system, the mere fact 
that figures are compared and ranking lists evolve could lead to pressure. 
The second downside is reduced individual security, compared to a Lockstep 
system. If a partner has a bad year, maybe health problems, this will affect the 
individual income immediately. In the interviews, this was seen by Jennifer as 
a disadvantage compared to her system: 
“The Lockstep system is one that allows me to sleep quietly to a certain 
extent (…) while in other systems, in Merit Based systems it is usually 
the case that I have to take care of myself much more. In case of doubt 
I will not be caught by the crowd if I have a bad year somehow” (Jen-
nifer: 15, Modified Lockstep) 
The third problem is that a Merit Based system tries to translate different as-
pects of entrepreneurial acting in a formula – but in the end, just one figure has 
to be the result: the profit share. The exact mechanics of calculation become 
important. In this situation, discussions about the adequacy and fairness of 
formulas and rules are unavoidable, and every single decision could be chal-
lenged (and lawyers are trained in doing so), as Diane said: 
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“It is well known that is very difficult to measure and you can quarrel 
endlessly about who did when acquire a new client and who was re-
sponsible for the new mandate…” (Diane: 69, Modified Lockstep). 
Imogen also challenges their actual formula: 
“I would change (the formula) a bit (…) would make that a bit more fa-
vourable on a negotiating base (…) change this three year rule” (Imo-
gen: 115, Merit) 
Howard compared the calculation mechanics from the actual law firm and the 
firm before:  
“In my old firm, the acquiring partner became 100% (of the acquisition 
bonus) forever. That did not foster collaboration… did not make sense.” 
(Howard: 49, Merit) 
These are all examples for the difficulties that arise from the necessity to agree 
on specific calculation rules in Merit based systems. 
Analysis further shows that Merit based law firms try to mitigate these down-
sides with two basic strategies:  
1. Some firms smooth the swings by calculating averages, e.g. for two or 
three years: 
“For every year, the average turnover of the last three years is calcu-
lated, so that slumps could be compensated” (Imogen: 3, Merit) 
2. To account for individual cases and address the adequacy issue, 
some firms allow or even require an individual negotiation of shares in 
a specific mandate between two partners (especially regarding acqui-
sition), instead of using a formula. This is what Imogen suggested in 
the quote above and the way Howard’s firm actually does: 
“(Two partners) negotiate (the acquisition distribution) individually be-
tween them. They are the only ones who can settle that (…) I think that 
this individual thing is good, but has the downside that there is a lot of 
fuel for conflict” (Howard: 47, Merit) 
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Contextual preconditions 
A Merit based system is suited to a heterogeneous partnership. Both very 
strong and below average performers can coexist in such a system without 
causing too much discussion. It is also possible to consider different market 
conditions, e.g. concerning different areas of law, or between different coun-
tries, as Howard describes: 
“As a partner you have a certain market value. Some partners are in 
great demand, because they work in a specific area of law, and we 
want them in our law firm. (…) Look at the football premier league. It’s 
the same there. The players who are in great demand earn much more. 
That’s totally fine.” (Howard: 29, Merit). 
For that reason, such systems might be introduced at a stage when the heter-
ogeneity of the firm exceeds a certain level, as Oliver experienced: 
“We had a Lockstep system (…) That worked well for long years (…) 
then we experienced like other law firms that the fee income of partners 
diverged in different advised industries or different areas of law (…) as 
long as we were in a range of plus/minus 50 percent (…) it was no 
problem at all. But then (…) we had revenue differences with a factor of 
four (…) and that leads to dissatisfaction, and the risk was too high to 
get quarrel into the partnership” (Oliver: 5, Merit) 
Values & Beliefs 
The most important precondition is that the Merit Based system is based on 
the assumption that money (as an extrinsic motivator) is the key motivator for 
partner behaviour. Therefore, the profit share should reflect the individual per-
formance, the effort and the labour directly and as accurate as possible. Merit 
Based systems intend to foster cooperation, as well as Lockstep, and the in-
tention to collaborate has also to be a common value in such a system, as 
Howard said: 
“I believe that people who basically want to work for themselves don’t 
stay in such a firm for long, in such a (Merit based) partnership … be-
cause they don’t feel good at the end, if all others (cooperate) around 
them” (Howard: 25, Merit) 
The difference to Lockstep is that a Merit based system encourages coopera-
tion by providing a direct bounty and assumes that the prospect of increased 
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individual profit will help encouraging partners to collaborate. Howard gives an 
example for that: 
“When I say ‘OK, let’s sell the IP law to my colleague so to say, give the 
client to my colleague’, and know that half of it will give me credit later 
on, then I have an incentive to do so” (Howard: 33, Merit) 
This issue of extrinsic motivation will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.3 
(p. 84).  
Figure 9 (below) gives a summarising overview about the preconditions and 
consequences of Merit based systems. 
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Figure 9: Summary of Merit based systems, showing preconditions, consequences and 
typical mitigation strategies for negative consequences 
4.4 Eat-what-you-kill 
In an Eat-what-you-kill system, every partner basically receives the revenues 
which he or she generated with their team, minus direct costs. Shared costs 
like office rent or IT costs are allocated. 
Advantages 
Due to this principle, the earnings of one partner are relatively independent 
from those of the other partners. This entails three main advantages: First, it 
allows a huge diversity of partner performance. It is easily possible to have 
Preconditions: Context
Heterogeneity
Consequences: Positive
Autonomy of decisions
Cooperation
(through acquistion factor)
Preconditions: Beliefs / Values
Money as key motivator 
Merit of individual freedom
Profit share should reflect individual 
performance
Prefer cooperation to individual work
Consequences: Negative / risks
Evaluation pressure
Reduced individual security
Complex mechanics of calculations
Merit based
Consequences: Negative / risks 
Evaluation pressure 
Reduced individual security 
Complex mechanics of calculations 
 
Mitigation strategies 
Controlling systems 
Smoothing of calculation (2-3 yrs) 
Flexible individual agreements 
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very strong and less strong performers in the firm, be that because of personal 
capabilities or the respective area of law.  
“Someone can certainly be a partner, even if I [don’t expect him to] in-
crease his turnover every year by 10% (…), but he is nevertheless in 
the field of law that we want to offer (…) and he has perhaps also still 
good ideas (…) I find that very important in this system.” (Edward: 23, 
Eat-what-you-kill) 
It remains at the discretion of the partners how much they work, which gives 
them a great autonomy of decision. It is therefore easier for them to account 
for individual circumstances, like changing work-life-balance needs. 
At the same time, partner reviews and mutual controlling, which are typically 
seen as a pain in Lockstep firms, are not necessary: 
 “[In a lockstep system,] the more I pay for presence time, the more I 
have to control that was is done by other means. We do that directly 
with money.” (Francis: 107, Eat-what-you-kill). 
Another perceived advantage of the direct link between individual work and 
profit share is the motivational aspect. Partners in Eat-what-you-kill law firms 
have a strong incentive to work hard and try to improve their business (as long 
as they are motivated by earning more money, cf. chapter 5.3). As with the 
Merit based system, it is again at the discretion of each partner, how they 
achieve that, by working more hours, negotiating higher rates, or invest in ac-
quisition that is more individual. In this study, there was however no indication 
that this encourages very successful individuals (‘rainmakers’) to prefer Eat-
what-you-kill systems to other PSS’s. 
Downsides 
Lack of cooperation between partners was seen as the key disadvantage, con-
sistent with the literature. Two reasons were mentioned for this: The first is 
related to motivation - there is no direct financial benefit for a partner to coop-
erate with others. They will only profit indirectly from referring clients to col-
leagues, because the client might be happier or will not ask another law firm 
for help. At the same time, they risk that the client might not be satisfied with 
the colleague (which backdrops to themselves), or - even worse - might be 
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more satisfied compared to themselves, so that they might lose future busi-
ness to him or her. This risk rises, if partners in a firm share the same work 
area. This is different from the other systems, where the partners participate 
directly - either due to increased overall profit (Lockstep) or through a formula 
that considers acquisition (Merit based). 
The other impediment for cooperation is the heterogeneity of personalities it-
self: 
“[Our system] leads to a type of partnership which is very amorphous in 
their performance abilities, in the way they work. Maybe sometimes an 
obstacle for cooperation. Not that people are not willing to cooperate, 
but because they can afford it, they potter around everyone on their 
own, whereas systems that pay for collaborative effort lead to more en-
deavour to work together.” (Edward: 23, Eat-what-you-kill) 
A related downside is the risk that this PSS might encourage partners to accept 
work for which they are not optimally qualified, which leads to reduced quality 
and resulting reduced client satisfaction. Partners actually having an Eat-what-
you kill-system however report that they are aware of this risk, but do not ac-
tually observe it in practice, Francis describes: 
“Quality becomes weaker… you encroach on other’s territory… these 
are typical charges or fears, but we can say that they did not come true 
in practice.” (Francis: 7, Eat-what-you-kill) 
Other than in Lockstep systems, there is no equalising effect if a partner has a 
‘bad year’, for whatever reason. One mitigation strategy for that is that profit 
share calculation is done for a two-year period. One partner however argued 
that it is the individual responsibility to provide for the future or pay for insur-
ances.  
Contextual preconditions 
For the reasons explained above, Eat-what-you-kill systems are suited for a 
heterogeneous partnership. Other than in Merit based systems, it might even 
be counterproductive when partners share the same area of work.  
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Because this system does not foster and does not need cooperation, it is suited 
for situations in which partners do not know each other well, e.g. when partners 
who did not work together before decide to form a partnership (the relation 
between knowing each other and cooperation will be discussed in chapter 5). 
Some specific areas of law also provide situations where cooperation between 
partners is not needed in the day-to-day business, e.g. where lawyers are pri-
marily working as insolvency administrators. 
Values & Beliefs 
Eat-what-you-kill systems have a strong individualistic orientation, and de-
pending on the individual perspective, this is seen either as good or not: 
“Eat-what-you-kill is very egocentric.” (Howard: 141, Merit based) 
“(The PSS) is a mirror of the partnership, that we appreciate our individ-
ual free space and individual presence. (…) Every man is the artisan of 
his own fortune, and that is what we want. (…) Previously I was dog-
matic, thought that people have to be what the system expects (…) to 
concede this variability, I find that totally liberating.” (Edward: 41-55, 
Eat-what-you-kill) 
Another principle is a certain short term orientation. Profits are typically distrib-
uted every year; there is no inherent long term incentive. This is however not 
always seen as a disadvantage compared to Lockstep systems with their long 
term orientation. Edward for example expressed: 
“This is a central question (…): Do you have certainty that this firm can 
‘give back’ in five or ten years? We don’t know. That’s wisdom of age. 
To count on the fact that the firm still exists in ten years, where do they 
take the confidence from? That’s why a man like me, who can’t believe, 
is not in a big firm like that. (Edward: 77, Eat-what-you-kill) 
The key technical difference compared to Merit based systems is that the turn-
over is basically the only measure for the profit share. This requires the belief 
that all other efforts are not important or that they finally result in more or less 
turnover anyway, as two interviewees explain: 
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“Our shared dogma is that you receive approximately that share of the 
profit that you generated as turnover before. When this is the result of a 
system, that’s totally fair, you know.” (Edward: 41, Eat-what-you-kill) 
“The argument that someone who is honorary professor, who publishes 
is beneficial for the firm… all these arguments are not under debate any 
more. We cannot buy something from that.” (Francis: 19, Eat-what-you-
kill) 
Finally, the often-mentioned advantage of such a system, that it encourages 
effort and performance, is based on a key assumption about motivation: That 
money is the key motivator to perform: 
“With money, you can always lure people the most, if the system is 
transparent and predictable (…) I believe in the management of the in-
dividual by individual incentives” (Francis: 99, Eat-what-you-kill) 
This is in a strong contrast to the beliefs of partners regarding motivation in a 
Pure Lockstep system, as explained above. 
Figure 10 (below) gives a summarising overview about the preconditions and 
consequences of Eat-what-you-kill systems. 
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Figure 10: Summary of Eat-what-you-kill systems, showing preconditions, consequences 
and typical mitigation strategies for negative consequences 
4.5 Summary 
The partners interviewed agree that there is no ideal, general solution for profit 
sharing in a law firm partnership. This chapter showed how the four main PSS 
types are perceived with respect to the preconditions of the system and to the 
consequences each of them has; Figure 7 to Figure 10 in this chapter provided 
a summarising overview about preconditions and consequences of each PSS 
type.  
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Some consequences of specific types of PSS are generally accepted. When 
choosing or not choosing a specific PSS, partners accept that they have or 
have not that advantage (and vice versa its disadvantages). The choice de-
pends on the priority the partners give to that advantage compared to others. 
Partners differ in their valuation of a specific advantage, but agree on the me-
chanics. An example for that is the time horizon: The interviewees agree that 
Lockstep systems (both pure and modified) are long-term orientated, whereas 
Eat-what-you-kill systems are short-term oriented. Partners know that and ap-
praise what they actually have. The same applies for contextual preconditions 
like the homogeneity of the partnership: It is agreed that Pure Lockstep sys-
tems need a homogenous partnership, whereas Eat-what-you-kill systems fa-
vour heterogeneity.  
For other characteristic of PSS, partners disagree in their perception of the 
mechanics. Here, they typically agree on an intended outcome, e.g. that a PSS 
should provide incentives for good and hard work. They differ however in how 
best to achieve that outcome, and this difference is often related to beliefs and 
values. For example, Eat-what-you-kill- and Merit-advocates assume that 
money is the key motivator for a law firm partner, whereas Lockstep-propo-
nents emphasise that this is not the case. 
The next chapter will look in more detail into the areas of beliefs and values, 
starting with the topic of trust, which was mentioned as a key issue specifically 
for Lockstep systems. 
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Chapter 5: Findings related to trust, fairness and motivation 
This chapter presents the findings related to the three beliefs and values that 
are part of the research questions: Three sections concentrate on findings re-
lated to trust (5.1), to fairness (5.2) and to motivation (5.3), followed by a sum-
mary (5.4).  
The previous chapter took a perspective starting from each profit sharing sys-
tem and identified preconditions and consequences, one type of preconditions 
being the beliefs and values for the respective PSS. This chapter concentrates 
on the latter, and another perspective is added. Now the beliefs and values 
are the starting point, and it will be shown what partners think about each of 
them, and how those thoughts, beliefs and values compare and relate to their 
respective PSS. At the end of this chapter, Table 7 (p. 91) contains a summary 
about the key findings. 
5.1 Trust 
This section summarises the findings on trust. Three major themes that re-
sulted from the analysis are described: Trust is essential in some, but not all 
profit sharing systems; trust requires Knowing the Others; and there is a rela-
tionship between trust and transparency. 
Trust is key to most PSS types, but not for Eat-what-you-kill 
Forming a partnership, or joining an existing one, requires a certain trust in the 
fellow partners as such. Becoming a partner is usually a long-term decision, 
and most lawyers doing so worked hard towards that goal for several years. In 
the partnership, they do not only share economically the fruits of their work, 
they also work together on a day-to-day basis, and they are legally liable to 
each other for the individual legal work they provide to their clients14. It’s there-
fore unsurprising that many interviewees, but not all, declare trust to be a key 
ingredient of their partnership, e.g. Howard, Imogen and Lee: 
                                            
14 The extend of liability depends on the specific legal form of the partnership 
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“In the end, these (profit sharing) systems only work if people trust each 
other. If not, without that prerequisite, no system works.” (Howard: 113, 
Merit) 
“Between us equity partners, we have such an appreciation that we 
trust each other blindly.” (Imogen: 85, Merit) 
“We all know that this trust relationship is more important than every-
thing else for the continued existence of this system.” (Lee: 15, Pure 
Lockstep) 
But this view is apparently not common to all law firms. It would seem that 
there is a connection between the general level of trust in the fellow partners 
and the PSS type: Whereas the topic of trust was explicitly mentioned by part-
ners from Lockstep and Merit systems, trust was not mentioned at all in any of 
the interviews of partners from Eat-what-you-kill law firms. An explanation for 
that might be that trust is not a prerequisite in this system, as the own profit 
share is (almost) unaffected by the work of the other partners, and trust is 
therefore not seen as important in the context of the PSS. The practical out-
comes of this important aspect of trust in relation to the PSS will be returned 
to in the discussion chapter 6. 
Another indication for a strong relationship between PSS type and the im-
portance of trust in the fellow partners already appeared in the previous chap-
ter, where it was shown that trust in the fellow partners seems to be a key 
precondition for Lockstep systems, especially for Pure Lockstep (see p. 53). If 
for example a Pure Lockstep partner decides not to work as much as the other 
partners anymore and to live at their expense, there is little they can do. Part-
ners therefore have to trust each other that this will not happen. Lee for exam-
ple argued: 
“There is effectively no sanction mechanism. As long as someone does 
not do something really harmful, which would allow a termination with-
out notice of the partnership, the threshold is very high. There is no pos-
sibility to get rid of someone, except if you dissolve the whole partner-
ship. Only at the price of self-destruction you can get rid of someone.” 
(Lee: 15, Pure Lockstep) 
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Such trust is not needed in an Eat-what-you-kill system, where a partner who 
is working less basically reduces his or her own income, not that of the other 
partners. 
Trust requires Knowing the Others 
Analysis showed that many interviewees agreed on one prerequisite for their 
trust: Knowing the persons they trust, i.e. the trustees. Two factors influenced 
whether this knowledge is available: First, the absolute number of partners and 
second whether they work in the same office, i.e. spatially together or not. 
Lee for example stated: 
“The trust, the mutual trust, is the limiting factor and I think that it’s basi-
cally impossible to sustain a trust relationship -which is necessary to 
keep this system stable - with an unlimited number of people. I think it 
would even not be possible with (our) 16 partners in two offices (…) a 
second location would be harder to cope with than three additional part-
ners” (Lee: 13, Pure Lockstep) 
Oliver described the effect that the increasing number of partners had upon 
the trust between them: 
“As long as we had seven or eight partners (…) we knew what the oth-
ers did. Now with 15 partners in two floors, it happens that I don’t see 
some for weeks. Previously unthinkable - we met every day -, (…) and 
this weakens trust, according to the motto “Is he working enough at all 
or is he sitting in the sun?” (Oliver: 11, Merit) 
Martin confirmed the same issue: 
“As long as you have people around you, have a manageable size at 
one location, where you can always seek a one-to-one talk, you are 
able to have a common value system” (Martin: 27, Pure Lockstep) 
A third factor which facilitates knowing each other and thereby fosters trust 
might be whether the partners share the same area of law, and therefore know 
more about the details of each other’s work. Edward, who was in a Lockstep 
system years ago, reported: 
“We are too many partners now. We were only six then. But much more 
important than the number was that we had a consistently structured 
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and commonly served client base. Everybody could appraise what the 
others do, why they do it, how they do it (…) when we grew, we didn’t 
know enough about each other anymore.” (Edward: 3, Eat-what-you-
kill) 
Other interviewees, like Lee and Martin however reported a trustful situation 
even though the partners work in different areas of law with different clients. 
It would seem that knowing each other is key for trusting each other, and that 
different precedents exists to facilitate this knowing. The absolute number of 
partners and working together in an office are important, but there might be 
other context-specific factors facilitating or hindering familiarity between part-
ners. This is consistent with the standard trust model of Mayer et al. (1995), 
introduced in chapter 2.4 (p.19). In that model, trust is a result of the perceived 
trustworthiness of the trustee, and the trustworthiness increases with repeated 
interaction (Lewicki and Benedict Bunker 1996). This relationship between 
knowledge about fellow partners, based on ease of frequent communication 
and resulting in trust, will be discussed further in chapter 6.2 (p. 100). 
Trust and financial transparency  
Another aspect mentioned in the context of trust was the extent to which the 
financial figures are transparent between the partners. An interesting discovery 
is that only for partners in Modified Lockstep systems this transparency is de-
batable from the start. Some of these partners argued that transparency 
should be limited, e.g. Bob, who currently holds a management position in his 
law firm. He argued that providing financial figures draws too much attention 
and hinders the partners from working efficiently: 
“I think a not unimportant factor for profit sharing systems and their han-
dling is how transparent the firm handles its figures and in which cycle. I 
think one should show restraint. That is, not hide them, but also not dis-
tribute them every month (…) everybody should know where he stands, 
but not peek at the others (…) it distracts the colleagues.“ (Bob: 145, 
Modified Lockstep) 
Gareth, also a partner with a management role, gives another argument 
against transparency, related to the (perceived) limited economical capabilities 
of his peers: 
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“We have total financial non-transparency, deliberately. Only the prac-
tice group leaders receive figures regarding their practice group. The 
two managing partners know the total figures of the firm. Reason: If you 
provide single figures to the partners, you will always have misunder-
standings, because lawyers typically cannot interpret figures correctly.” 
(Gareth: 4, Modified Lockstep) 
Diane also saw a certain danger for the stability of a law firm due to transpar-
ency: 
“I experienced the change from a normal Lockstep without disclosure of 
the individual partner contribution - and the rapid dissolution of the law 
firm in close proximity of time to the conversion of the system [to full 
transparency]” (Diane: 31, Modified Lockstep) 
At the same time, she also disliked non-transparency: 
“Meanwhile we are quite good positioned, it is relatively transparent. 
(…) And honestly speaking, I like that, because the alternative would be 
that only two or three see that. If you were lucky to be in a circle of very 
wise people, that wouldn’t be a problem and bring about peace, but 
wise people are rare.” (Diane: 31, Modified Lockstep) 
The idea of “wise people” whose decisions one should trust without knowing 
the details is also challenged by Jennifer, a younger partner also without man-
agerial experience: 
“Whether I’m bright or not, I don’t want to be patronised. This assumes 
that I had an incredible trust in my management that they do the right 
things. That has to be built, that trust. It does not appear just like that.” 
(Jennifer: 37, Modified Lockstep). 
However, Jennifer also recognised a tension related to transparency: 
“You might approve or not – let’s say we have a certain non-transpar-
ency here in the firm. But if you really strive, you can get to the bottom 
of the figures (…) On the other hand, I lived in a complete transparent 
system before, and I have seen to what stark dissonances this can 
lead, if you don’t have a reasonable culture of conflict.” (Jennifer: 33, 
Modified Lockstep) 
It is worth remarking that specifically partners with a managerial role praised 
financial non-transparency in a Modified Lockstep system. It is arguable that it 
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is easy to claim non-transparency for the others from a management position 
with full personal access to all information, but both Diane and Jennifer are 
examples of partners without management responsibilities who still favour a 
degree of financial non-transparency for the sake of ‘peace’. 
In contrast, partners in both Eat-what-you-kill and Merit based systems concur 
unanimously that their systems are transparent, e.g. Francis, Imogen and Oli-
ver: 
“[In Lockstep systems,] the arbitrary distribution of profit, like what a 
committee does, this is all very non-transparent (…) This is my personal 
opinion, I’m a big friend of transparency, because I experienced it differ-
ently” (Francis: 77, Eat-what-you-kill). 
“I like that it [our PSS] is transparent.” (Imogen: 16, Merit) 
“It’s not about the ‘trust’ question alone, it’s more about the mixture be-
tween trust and the question of fairness (…) if someone decides to work 
40 hours per week [and someone else 70], the results are obviously dif-
ferent. And this touches the aspects trust and fairness. If this is commu-
nicated openly, than there is the trust that nobody does something se-
cretly.” (Oliver: 63, Merit). 
It seems that the idea of ‘trust’ is not used here in the classic sense as ‘the 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party' (Mayer 
et al. (1995), see p. 19), but as an absence of betrayal. Trust is seen as the 
outcome of the PSS and how the communication works, not a requirement, as 
it is the case in the (partly) non-transparent Modified Lockstep system.  
In other words: Trust in the context of financial transparency is of increased 
importance only in Modified Lockstep systems, but not in the other PSS types. 
The trustees (the persons who are to be trusted) are the partners who make 
the actual modification decisions specific for Modified Lockstep. They are typ-
ically elected and form a group usually called a remuneration committee. 
Gareth reported that in their firm, the partner remuneration committee is con-
sequently called ‘trust committee’ (Gareth: 6, Modified Lockstep). 
In all other PSS, transparency is also an issue, but not in the context of trust, 
but as an aspect of fairness, as could be seen in the statement of Oliver above. 
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The next subsection focuses on fairness related issues and later the discus-
sion chapter will come back to the issue of transparency (6.5, p. 118).  
Summary of findings on trust 
This section showed three major themes related to trust that were identified in 
the interviews. First, the importance of trust is different, dependent on the PSS: 
Trust seems to be very important for Pure Lockstep systems, of use in Modified 
Lockstep and Merit systems, but not so in Eat-what-you-kill systems. Second, 
knowing each other seems to be a prerequisite of trusting each other, and 
there a some antecedents which facilitate knowing each other, particularly a 
small number of partners and one (or a small number of) physical locations. 
Third, there is a connection between trust and the level of financial transpar-
ency, which is specifically important in Modified Lockstep firms. 
5.2 Fairness 
The perception of fairness varies significantly between the interviewees and 
matches in general the principles of the respective PSS.  
Fairness is a key element for every PSS 
Generally, the fairness of profit sharing as such is seen as a very important 
ingredient of a successful PSS, because otherwise unhappy partners might 
leave the firm. Christopher and Edward for example explained: 
“If you want to survive as a large partnership, you must have a reasona-
bly fair system, otherwise you would not sustain in the market for more 
than five years. Because meanwhile it’s common practice that lawyers 
change their law firm, even if they are partners.” (Christopher: 7, Modi-
fied Lockstep) 
“In the end, the system must lead to everybody feeling themselves 
treated fairly.” (Edward: 11, Eat-what-you-kill) 
Francis however is an exception. In his firm, profits are distributed strictly ac-
cording to the fees individually earned, and he used that as an explanation for 
the fact that fairness issues are not discussed openly: 
“Cynically I would say that no one dares to use fairness related argu-
ments, because this law firm, this might be typical for us and similar law 
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firms, pretend to be very economical. There is no large room for such 
discussions” (Francis: 40, Eat-what-you-kill) 
Implicitly however, fairness is seen as relevant even in this system; the Eat-
what-you-kill system as such is seen as providing the fairest way to split profits, 
as will be discussed below. 
Fairness is always considered as subjective 
Several interviewees from different PSS stress that there is no objective fair-
ness, but that fairness is dependent on people’s individual value systems and 
dependent on perspectives and circumstances and is therefore subject to on-
going re-evaluation and sometimes re-negotiation: 
“Fairness depends on your value system, and in our firm apparently the 
value of the whole entirety is rated much higher than the focus on indi-
vidual performance. I think there is no absolute fairness.” (Lee: 87, Pure 
Lockstep) 
“I suppose every partner in our firm would claim that what he is advo-
cating is a fair model. It always depends on the perspective. And I see 
things partly different than senior partners.” (Imogen: 133, Merit based) 
 “You should not treat profit sharing systems dogmatically. They should 
accomplish that every partner thinks they are adequately considered. 
That means, to my experience, that you have to tweak the PSS every 
few years. (…) The most important point is that one can talk if [you have 
the feeling that] you have much more performed than you got this year 
(…) and then you sit together and talk until everybody says yes that’s 
fair.” (Edward: 3/23, Eat-what-you-kill) 
A fair system should always be based on performance (results) 
All partners interviewed, even those partners from Pure Lockstep systems, 
said that a fair profit sharing system should be based on results. Analysis 
showed that there are however important differences in the details. The dis-
tinctions come in when looking at three different dimensions: 
1. Is a fair system based only on turnover or also on other results? 
2. How are results defined and measured- are there only quantitative or 
also qualitative measures?  
3. What is the time horizon to assess results? 
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Turnover is everything vs. Other results count too 
Edward and Francis, both from Eat-what-you-kill-systems, were of the opinion 
that only turnover is an adequate measure for results, and that basically no 
other aspect should be considered when sharing profits: 
“We would call it fair if let’s say you contribute 15% to the firm’s ad-
justed turnover, than you can’t just go with 9% of the profit, and also not 
with 24%, but you float around 15%. (…) Our shared dogma is that if 
you get approximately the share of the profit which you generated, than 
this is totally fair.” (Edward: 23/41, Eat-what-you-kill) 
“Certainly that is the question that pops up in Eat-what-you-kill systems 
again and again: Is turnover all that counts? Is that really just? We had 
discussion about management tasks (…) or a professorship (...) these 
arguments come back, but between us [partners] they are fully dis-
cussed as irrelevant. We can’t buy something from that. ” (Francis: 
19/21, Eat-what-you-kill) 
Howard and Jennifer also argue that turnover is the key element, but see that 
in addition other aspects might also be important for a fair share: 
“It must not be that partners who basically perform on the same level 
are rated totally different. You would need solid arguments that some-
one who contributes financially the same is compensated differently (…) 
you start with the turnover. What does he contribute to the turnover? 
And then you start to adjust.” (Howard: 87, Merit) 
 “What I would definitely change [in our PSS] is on what basis the adap-
tion parameter are calculated. They are [currently] not calculated ac-
cording to turnover, but to the work done, without considering how 
many hours were actually charged and paid (…) I would change that 
and look at what did we charge. Or even better: what did the client actu-
ally paid. ” (Jennifer: 57, Modified Lockstep) 
Only quantifiable results count vs. Qualitative results are important too 
These additional aspects could be quantifiable, or not. In Merit based systems, 
there might be additional calculations as Howard reported: 
“Of course turnover is important, but it’s about the overall contribution to 
the firm. And to measure that, it’s not only the turnover; there are also 
credits for, say, the acquisition of clients.” (Howard: 5, Merit) 
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Christopher in contrast explicitly stressed that qualitative factors should also 
be part of the modification decisions they make in their Modified Lockstep sys-
tem: 
“The sum of all contributions, and that is quantitative plus qualitative, 
should more or less be equivalent to the profit share the partner gets” 
(Christopher: 18, Modified Lockstep). 
Short term vs. Long Term perspective 
Regarding the time horizon, there is also a clear difference between the fair-
ness perceptions of interviewees from different PSS types. Edward for exam-
ple argued strongly for a short term perspective: 
“Every system must lead to a fair result in every single year, because 
it’s like a confidence trickster to say ‘don’t be pathetic if it’s unfavourable 
for you now, but in six years from now you will be there’. If in six years 
you are still here or two people died with cancer or the four most im-
portant clients went broke, nobody knows.” (Edward: 35, Eat-what-you-
kill) 
In contrast, interviewees from Pure Lockstep systems emphasise a long term 
perspective on the relation between results and profit share. This is inherent 
in the Pure Lockstep system as such, but also valid in the context of comparing 
the results between two partners with similar seniority, according to Keith: 
 “I think it's fair that someone who has just become a partner with not as 
much professional experience as someone who has been a partner for 
eight years or ten, that he earns less at the present time, but neverthe-
less has the certainty that (…) something accrues, if one has been a 
partner for several years.” (Keith: 25, Pure Lockstep) 
 “I would therefore, at least for manageable periods of time, where dif-
ferences in turnover arise, not come to the conclusion for myself that it 
is immediately unfair now (…) (if) that would stretch over many years, 
then yes, then it would possibly no longer be according to my under-
standing, possibly no longer fair and equal.” (Keith: 27, Pure Lockstep) 
Table 6 (below) gives a summarising overview how the three depicted dimen-
sions appeared in the interviews, and in which profit sharing systems. In addi-
tion to the quotes above, other occurrences are included (letter refers to the 
initial of the interview partner, figure to the paragraph in the transcript). 
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A PSS is con-
sidered fair, if  
Pure Lockstep Modified Lock-
step 
Merit based Eat-what-you-
kill 
…profit de-
pends only or 
also on re-
sults 
Also 
(K:27,M:21) 
Also 
(A:129,C:7,J:57) 
Also  
(H:5,O:7) 
Only 
(E:23/53, F:19) 
…perfor-
mance is 
measured also 
qualitatively 
(quantitatively 
anyway) 
Yes 
(K:27,M:21) 
Yes 
(C:18,G:5) 
Sometimes 
(H:87/95,I:5) 
 
No: 
(O:7) 
No 
(F:19) 
... the time 
horizon is 
long, medium 
or short 
Long (>8y) 
(K:27, L:71) 
Long to medium 
(4-8y) 
(C:30/48, J:10) 
Medium to short 
(3-4y) 
(I:3/21) 
Short (1-2y) 
(E:35) 
Table 6: Fairness and performance measuring per PSS type:  
Different dimensions are typical for certain PSS types 
Are the circumstances relevant for a fair profit distribution?  
In those cases when interviewees think it’s not only quantitative performance 
results that should determine the profit share, they typically mention effort as 
an important subjective measure to assess if the profit shares are seen as fair 
or not. Partners are not seen as being responsible for external circumstances 
that lead to lower performance; therefore, profit share should not be affected. 
Martin and Keith, both from Pure Lockstep, explain: 
“[Our] law firm has to include parts from different areas of law to suc-
ceed on the market as a whole. If I’m going to punish someone now fi-
nancially just because he is working in a not so profitable area, which I 
seem necessary for the firm to perform on the market, that would be un-
fair in our point of view (…) because he is enabling the business of the 
more profitable partners” (Martin: 21, Pure Lockstep) 
“I would ask (…) whether everybody is making an effort. Because that 
would be an important criterion for me” (Keith: 27, Pure Lockstep) 
Howard argues in the same direction: 
“It just comes that we have to provide employment law as a commercial 
law firm (…) but it’s structurally not possible to achieve high hourly 
rates. Our service would not be complete without, and exaggerated, 
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such a partner makes sacrifices by servicing that area of law. In my 
opinion, you have to count that in.” (Howard: 87, Merit) 
In contrast, Edward uses the exact same example of providing employment 
law services with low hourly rates to argue that this should not influence profit 
sharing, and Francis also stated that they explicitly decided not to factor the 
‘employment law issue’ in: 
“Employment law may lead to justice, but not to turnover worth mention-
ing (…) you could argue it’s a result of the individual performance, if you 
can sell yourself in the market or not. Full stop.” (Edward: 5, Eat-what-
you-kill)  
“The employment lawyer can only charge 250 Euro per hour, whereas 
in transaction law, you can make millions. (…) But if you want to be a 
full service law firm, you need both. So for that matter you need to pay 
both fairly. (…) These arguments come back, but between us [partners] 
they are fully discussed as irrelevant. We can’t buy something from that. 
(Francis: 19, Eat-what-you-kill) 
It is striking here that reflecting about the same situation, partners from Pure 
Lockstep law firms think that the circumstances (here the area of law) should 
not influence the profit share, whereas partners from Eat-what-you-kill firms 
are convinced that the area of law was the choice and therefore sole respon-
sibility of the respective partner. The former corresponds to the fairness ideal 
of Egalitarianism, which does not hold people responsible for any factor deter-
mining production, whereas the latter contains elements of Libertarianism, in 
which people are seen as fully responsible (cf. literature section on fairness 
ideals (p. 16) and summarising Table 3, p. 17). 
Fairness and financial transparency and the absence of arbitrariness  
In the last section on trust, it was shown that in Modified Lockstep systems, 
and only in those, financial transparency was commented in a nuanced way, 
whereas in all other PSS, partners emphasise on it (see p. 74 f.). The argu-
ments in favour of transparency were typically related to fairness, e.g. in the 
statement of Oliver (see quote on p. 76), or when Francis stated: 
“I am an advocate for transparency, because I experienced it differently. 
I know profit sharing systems, where you get a handwritten table every 
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month and somehow at the end you get money, but you don’t know 
why, how is that calculated. For me, justice means absence of arbitrari-
ness and transparency.” (Francis: 77, Eat-what-you-kill) 
This aspect of perceived fairness which relates to the procedures and the in-
formation provided, not the results, will be discussed in the context of proce-
dural and informational fairness later in the discussion chapter. 
Fairness versus harmony 
Some partners in Modified lockstep systems argued against full transparency, 
for the sake of harmony in the partnership. It is important to notice that these 
partners do not argue that non-transparency makes the system fairer. To the 
contrary, they concede that there is a trade-off, but they value the peace-mak-
ing effect of non-knowledge higher (to a certain extent), like Nigel: 
“Merit based might be fairer by giving every partner what he generates 
minus costs, but this leads to intolerances, and for me personally it’s of 
greater value to have peace in the firm instead of having these distribu-
tion battles every year.” (Nigel: 104, Modified Lockstep) 
Jennifer was also aware of this conflict between peace and perceived proce-
dural fairness through transparency: 
“On the other hand, I lived in a complete transparent system before, 
and I have seen to what stark dissonances this can lead, if you don’t 
have a reasonable culture of conflict.” (Jennifer: 33, Modified Lockstep) 
Gareth, whose Modified Lockstep-based firm deliberately chose financial non-
transparency, also argued that showing detailed figures leads to misunder-
standings, but with a different argument: in his opinion lawyers frequently could 
not read figures correctly (see quote on p. 75). 
Summary of findings on fairness 
This section showed the major themes related to fairness that were identified 
in the interviews. Generally, a fair PSS is considered as very important for a 
law firm. Fairness is however perceived as subjective and based on individual 
value systems. All interviewees agree that a fair system should primarily be 
based on performance results, but differ in respect to three dimensions: if there 
should also be other factors in addition to results, if those additional factors 
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should be only quantifiable or could also be qualitative, and which time horizon 
the resultant assessment should be based upon. There is a distinct influence 
of the PSS type on the answer to these questions. Finally, transparency was 
often mentioned as a prerequisite of a fair PSS, but specifically for Modified 
Lockstep systems, a trade-off exists between transparency and a desire for 
harmony in the partnership. 
5.3 Motivation 
Becoming a partner in a top law firm takes years, is usually the result of hard 
work, and only some lawyers of all those who started working in that area ac-
complish that goal. The interviewees all did. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
general motivation level of the interviewees is very high, and that they consider 
this a matter of course, like Nigel and Imogen: 
“The motivation has to be there, that’s basically a prerequisite. If one 
wants to become partner here, you have to make sure that he wants to 
push the firm like the others” (Nigel: 213, Modified Lockstep) 
“A certain inward urge, some ambition do we want to see from our eq-
uity partners, and a willingness to achieve.” (Imogen: 69, Merit) 
There is an inherent extrinsic motivational effect based on peer pressure in 
these quotes (see also Martin’s quote, p. 51), that will be discussed later on.    
Beside this general motivation level however, the analysis of the interviews 
showed two different and more specific areas of motivation: Money and feeling 
comfortable. This section looks at motivation through money first and then at 
motivation through well-being factors. This distinction is also consistent with 
the literature (cf. chapter 2.5, p. 21), where money is typically seen as an ex-
trinsic motivator, whereas motivation factors based on perceptions of auton-
omy, competence and relatedness to other group members are defined as in-
trinsic motivators (Deci and Ryan 2000).  
Extrinsic motivation through money is always important 
Almost all partners interviewed agree that money is an important motivational 
factor for first joining and later performing in a top-level partnership. This is 
stated either explicitly, e.g. by Francis and Diane below, or implicitly, e.g. when 
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Bob answers the question “How happy are you with your PSS” by referring to 
his individual income: 
“Well, me personally, I come off well with it economically. I have no rea-
son to complain” (Bob: 28, Modified Lockstep) 
“With money, you can always lure people best, if the system is foresee-
able and transparent.” (Francis: 99, Eat-what-you-kill) 
“Money is a very, very strong factor, money and ego.” (Diane: 119, 
Modified Lockstep) 
It is however not the absolute amount of money which is primarily relevant for 
the motivational impact. Indeed, there seems to be an absolute minimum that 
a partner expects to receive. This minimum is already technically embedded 
in Pure and Modified Lockstep systems, because there is always a minimum 
level of shares for a partner (e.g. 20 points), but the idea of a minimum share 
could also exist in Eat-what-you-kill-systems, as Edward reported: 
“Because we are a partnership, we said that there is a lower limit. If 
someone is a partner, he must get a minimum profit (…) a partner 
should always earn more than a salaried lawyer” (Edward: 15, Eat-
what-you-kill) 
Above that minimum level however, while keeping in mind that for the partners 
interviewed, this level is far above average German income levels (and even 
above those of the entirety of all lawyers in Germany), the absolute amount is 
not always relevant as such: 
“The question is: do I have 40 or 80 thousand Euro more or less in my 
pocket. I think there are people for which that would be relevant, for me 
it’s not.” (Imogen: 37, Merit). 
“People met here who said they don’t need a second yacht or the fifth 
cottage” (Lee: 17, Modified Lockstep) 
Money as a proxy for power and reputation (an intrinsic element) 
However, that does not mean that the potential of earning even more money 
does not motivate any more. Instead, the relative share compared to other 
86 
partners might become more important than the absolute share, as Jennifer 
reported - and Andrew complained about: 
“What motivates me in a good year is that I can pat myself on the back 
and say: "I have made so much turnover this year, I am so much better 
with this turnover than so and so many partners around me". That moti-
vates me, to be honest, more than what I get in return. I define success 
by that.” (Jennifer: 13, Modified Lockstep) 
“If they get a lot, they are important a lot (…) it’s scary how the need for 
admiration is so important. There are a lot of neurotics along the way.” 
(Andrew 149-151, Modified Lockstep) 
In other words, money still motivates, not as such, but as a proxy to power and 
reputation. This is also immanent in the phrase “money and ego” in the quote 
above from Diane (119). Diane, though not being in a management position 
herself, concedes that 
“as management, you have to make sure that all modifications in sensi-
tive areas, and this includes the ‘money honour’ - reputation is always 
included - that you don’t risk that (…) your structure got mixed up or 
loses incentives” (Diane: 11, Modified Lockstep) 
These were quotes from Modified Lockstep partners. It seems that partners 
from Pure Lockstep systems see the same relationship between money and 
ego, but have a decidedly different valuation of it. Lee even considers it as 
dangerous: 
“I can’t imagine a person, even those partners I know from other law 
firms [who have the needs for more money]. [They] don’t buy them-
selves luxury yachts and blow the money they earn. I think it’s more an 
ego thing, this ‘I compare, I know that I belong to those at the top of the 
food chain, just for my self-image’. These people, you must keep them 
out here, make-or-break.” (Lee: 67, Pure Lockstep) 
In chapter 4 it was shown that specifically the partners in Pure Lockstep sys-
tems emphasise that money is not the key motivator for them (see quotes from 
Keith, Lee and Martin on p. 53).  
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Other than money, three areas emerged from the interviews as a potential 
source for motivation through feeling comfortable: satisfaction by doing excit-
ing work, working together in a team, and having self-reliance. These are in-
trinsic motivators, as they are based on perceptions of autonomy, competence 
and relatedness. 
Intrinsic motivation can be based on content-related satisfaction 
Some partners emphasise that the work itself they are doing motivates them. 
This is typically expressed by opposing a choice between more money and 
more satisfaction, e.g. by Lee and Imogen: 
“Nobody would be in the mood for doing mindless due diligence work or 
court collection proceedings, even if one earned twice the money. The 
feeling that we are doing exciting work is motivating for all of us. To 
strive for fascinating matters and to work on a quality level that enables 
such work, this is pushing us.” (Lee: 25, Pure Lockstep) 
“The question is: Does it balance each other? The question if I’m ex-
ploited (…) because I have a lower share than others. If this is balanc-
ing with the joy doing the job and a good working atmosphere.” (Imo-
gen: 17-18, Merit). 
This does not mean that the interviewees see a general contradiction between 
profitability and job satisfaction – if both coincides, so much the better. But in 
those cases when there is a conflict, these partners make their choice towards 
satisfaction, at least sometimes. 
Beside this satisfaction, which is generated by the content of the professional 
work, there is another source of intrinsic motivation based on the human rela-
tionships inside the partnership. 
Intrinsic motivation can be based on relationships 
Some partners believed that the relationships15 between them and their fellow 
partners play an important role for their motivation, like Diane and Howard: 
                                            
15 All references to relationships in the interviews related to a professional relationship to 
other partners, not a personal relationship. This does not of course exclude the existence of 
personal relationships, but if they do exist, interviewees did not mention those.  
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“I’m lucky here, because the work here is really great fun for me, and 
the cooperation with my colleagues, not all of them, but many of them, 
and with the one or other client is enough motivation for me. I have to 
say, I like to work, and I feel appreciated and respected” (Diane: 56, 
Modified Lockstep) 
“You need to like the people here, with whom you work. You don’t need 
to marry them, but somehow like them, I think. If you only see that as a 
business place for work and you don’t care about the people who work 
there (…) then this system will not function permanently.” (Howard: 113, 
Merit) 
Almost at the opposite end, Andrew considered that he does not rely too much 
on most of his colleagues: 
“I don’t need them. I’m not interested in them. OK, some of them are 
decent, but the major part (…) I don’t care about them (…) my perspec-
tive is at the maximum to simply stay here, because that’s the way it is. 
I don’t burn for it.” (Andrew: 303, Modified Lockstep) 
It looks like relationship based motivation is only relevant for some partners. 
Diane and Andrew are partners in the same law firm, whereas Diane and How-
ard represent different PSS types; therefore, there is no indication that this 
type of motivation might be related to the PSS type. 
Intrinsic motivation can also be based on self-reliance 
A third element for non-monetary motivation is the extent of self-reliance that 
the interviewees experience. Some interviewees acknowledge that to a certain 
extent, partners even in the same firm have different capabilities and different 
needs, and that a PSS has to allow for that. 
“You need to make sure that everybody has the freedom he wants to 
have or needs to develop optimally. Some do it this way, some do it that 
way (…) this possibility, you must ensure that everybody has that” (Ni-
gel: 213, Modified Lockstep) 
One or more of these three types of non-money related, intrinsic motivation 
factors could be found in all interviews, irrespective of the PSS type. It is there-
fore generally important for law firm partners to keep these factors in mind and 
ensure that the organisational environment allows for it, but they are not suited 
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to facilitate any decision regarding the best matching profit sharing system as 
such.  
Summary of findings on motivation 
All interviewees said that money – or more specifically: the profit share they 
receive - is a strong motivator. It seems however that not the absolute amount 
is most important, but the relative amount. The reason for that is that the ab-
solute level is perceived to be rather high anyway, and that the profit share is 
seen as a signpost for power and reputation inside the law firm. Beside this 
motivation factor with both extrinsic and intrinsic elements, many partners said 
that there are non-money related, intrinsic factors that are relevant for their 
motivation: The satisfaction they get from doing the work itself, from positive 
relationships towards their fellow partners, other colleagues and clients, and 
strong perception of self-reliance in their position as partners.  
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the findings related to trust, to fairness and to motivation were 
presented and analysed as to whether and to what extent perceptions of the 
interviewees are connected to the profit sharing system. It was shown that trust 
seems to be a key element for Pure and Modified Lockstep as well as Merit 
based systems, but not so to Eat-what-you-kill systems. Trust requires know-
ing the other partners, and three factors could be identified that facilitate this 
knowledge: a relatively small number or partners, a physical proximity, and 
(sometimes) sharing the same area of law. In the context of trust, the need for 
financial transparency was found to be unopposed by partners from Merit and 
Eat-what-you-kill systems, but surprisingly to be debated by partners from 
Pure and specifically Modified Lockstep systems. Those partners saw a con-
flict between transparency and the need for peace and harmony in a partner-
ship. 
The perception of fairness seems to be strongly related to the PSS. The differ-
ent answers to three hypothetical questions correlate to the PSS type: For it to 
be fair, should the profit share depend only on performative results, or also on 
other things? Should the performance be measured only quantitatively, or also 
qualitatively? And should the time horizon for such measurement be short, 
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medium or long? Another differentiating aspect of fairness is whether effort 
should be an additional criterion for profit share, as opposed to just perfor-
mance-based results. Only partners from Pure Lockstep systems argued that 
way, and partners from Eat-what-you-kill systems actively objected to this.  
Motivation was found to be primarily connected to money, i.e. the profit share 
received individually. Above a certain minimum level, money was however 
seen to be more important as a proxy to power and reputation relatively to 
other partners, the absolute level seems to be less important. Peer pressure 
also acts as an external motivator. Other than that, three aspects add to the 
intrinsic motivation of law firm partners: content related work satisfaction, the 
relationships to colleagues and the extent of self-reliance that the partners ex-
perience. 
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Key findings See page 
Trust is key to most PSS types, but not for Eat-what-you-kill 71 
Trust requires Knowing the Others 
 Knowing the Others is facilitated by physical proximity 
and low numbers of partners 
73 
Trust and financial transparency 
 Transparency is challenged only in Modified Lockstep 
74 
Fairness is a key element for every PSS 77 
Fairness is always considered as subjective 78 
A fair system should always be based on performance (results)  
 Difference between PSS’s, if in addition other quantitative and/or quali-
tative measures should be considered 
 Difference regarding long or short time horizon 
78 
Are the circumstances relevant for a fair profit distribution? 
 Eat-what-you-kill partners say no, others say yes 
81 
Fairness and financial transparency and the absence of arbitrariness 82 
Fairness versus harmony 
 Modified Lockstep partners see a conflict 
83 
Extrinsic motivation through money is always important 
 Absolute sum is only relevant up to a (relative low) level 
84 
Money as a proxy for power and reputation (an intrinsic element) 85 
Intrinsic motivation can be based on content-related satisfaction 87 
Intrinsic motivation can be based on relationships 87 
Intrinsic motivation can also be based on self-reliance 88 
Table 7: Summary of key findings on trust, fairness and motivation 
Whereas this findings chapter concentrated on the first two research question 
regarding the understanding of trust, fairness and motivation, the following dis-
cussion chapter will put these findings in the context of the literature, integrate 
them with the findings on PSS types from chapter 4 and approach the more 
action-oriented third research question by introducing a framework to opera-
tionalise the findings. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
This study has two research aims: first, to understand the influences and inter-
actions of interpersonal perceptions with economic aspects of profit sharing 
systems from the perspective of law firm partners; and second, to develop a 
framework that helps partners in a partnership to choose the most appropriate 
profit sharing system in their specific situation.  
In this chapter, the findings presented in the two preceding chapters are dis-
cussed in the context of the different bodies of literature introduced in chapter 
2: Literature on law firm partnerships and specifically their profit sharing sys-
tems on the one hand (2.1 to 2.2), and literature on trust, fairness and motiva-
tion on the other hand (2.3 to 2.5). These bodies of literature provide the back-
ground to the first research aim: The understanding of the individual law firm 
partners regarding trust, fairness and motivation (cf. findings chapter 5), and 
the properties of the different profit sharing systems which are available - the 
technical properties as well as the perception of these properties from the per-
spective of the partners (cf. findings chapter 4). 
In pursuing the second research objective, a framework will be presented as 
part of this discussion, which integrates the two parts. Following the epistemo-
logical position of the author rooted in pragmatism (cf. chapter 3), this frame-
work “seeks to solve a problem” and “is about action” (Elkjaer and Simpson 
2011). The problem to solve is that of the third research question: How to iden-
tify the best suited PSS for a given law firm and/or group of law firm partners. 
The discussion is structured as follows: First, the general structure of the 
framework is introduced on a conceptual level, together with some examples 
to facilitate the general understanding (section 6.1). A detailed discussion of 
every part of the framework then follows (6.2 to 6.6). An example shows how 
to operationalise the framework (6.7). The final section (6.8) then moves the 
perspective from the individual person to the partnership and discusses the 
implications of choosing or changing a PSS. 
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6.1 A framework that integrates partner needs and PSS types 
The underlying idea of this framework is that a profit sharing system must fit to 
the needs of the partners who decided to use that system to split their profits, 
if the system is meant to provide stability and enduring success for the firm. 
Many authors concede this implicitly (e.g. Gilson and Mnookin 1985: 390; 
Viney 2013: 43; Lienemann 2018a: 150), but are rarely explicit as to how ex-
actly this fit can be evaluated and achieved. Stender for example concludes 
that “the profit sharing system has to follow the culture [of the partners], not 
the other way round” (2018: 138). Few would contest this statement, but it 
leaves open, what exactly ‘culture’ means, how partners could identify if they 
share the same understanding, and how they could determine if their PSS 
matches with their ‘culture’ or how they could improve that matching. Ander-
son, after providing a good overview regarding the mechanics of different PSS 
archetypes, finally recommends us to “gain a true reading of what your part-
ners do and do not want in a compensation system”, but ends in advising to 
“ask an outsider (…) to facilitate a brainstorming session” to achieve that 
(2001: 11). There remains a gap between on the one side the insight that part-
ners have different needs and on the other side the quite substantial 
knowledge about the available PSS’s. 
A framework therefore needs to integrate these two perspectives: The needs 
of the partners with the exact properties of the available profit sharing systems 
(see Figure 11 below). 
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Figure 11: Overview about framework used to align law firm partner’s needs and available 
profit sharing systems. The blocks will be explained in detail below. 
For the left block in Figure 11 (Partner needs), the findings presented in chap-
ter 4 have shown that the partner’s needs can be discussed using two catego-
ries: Those needs which arise from their specific, or ‘objective’ contextual pre-
condition, such as the number of partners and offices; and needs that are 
based on their individual values and beliefs, such as their understanding of 
fairness or the way they are motivated.  
The contextual factors however do not describe or constitute a need as such, 
but only have an indirect effect through their influence on individual needs. An 
example for that is the influence of the number of partners on the trust level 
between the partners: An increasing number of partners usually has an ad-
verse effect on the trust level between the partners, because they don’t know 
each other that good anymore (cf. findings in chapter 5.1). The number of part-
ners alone is not relevant for the choice of the PSS; the reduced trust level 
associated with a rising number of partners however is (this issue will be dis-
cussed in more detail below).  
Figure 12 (below) summarises this concept. 
Partner needs PSS types 
Matching of 
Partner 
needs and 
PSS 
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Figure 12: Examples for partner needs, distinguishing between contextual (external) and in-
dividual factors 
The right block in Figure 11 (PSS types) also needs further classification, for 
two reasons: PSS modifications are relevant, and the PSS characteristics are 
more important than the mechanics. 
PSS modifications are relevant 
Findings as well as the literature show that most law firms modify the pure PSS 
types (Viney 2013; Wesemann and Kerr 2015; Schoen 2016); and different 
modifications can change the nature of a PSS quite considerably. It is therefore 
necessary to distinguish not only between the generic PSS archetypes (as 
summarised from literature in Table 1, p. 12), but to consider the typical mod-
ifications that are used in practice, specifically for those two archetypes that 
are defined by their specific modifications: Modified Lockstep and Merit based. 
This will be done below in 6.4. 
Characteristics of PSS are important, not mechanics 
In addition, the goal of matching the partner’s needs with the PSS types re-
quires another level of analysis. The PSS types and their modifications basi-
cally describe the mechanics of profit distribution. It is however not the me-
chanics that must fit to the partner’s needs, but the characteristics of the PSS.  
An example of such a characteristic is whether a PSS encourages or discour-
ages internal client referral. Take for example a law firm with a Merit based 
PSS that measures and ‘pays’ explicitly for client acquisition to foster client 
Contextual factors 
1. Number of partners 
2. Age structure 
3. …  
 
Individual factors 
1. Trust level  
2. Fairness orientation 
3. … 
Partner needs 
PSS types 
Matching of 
Partner 
needs and 
PSS 
96 
referral16. The interviewees did not express a need for this measurement as 
such (the mechanics), but for the intended consequences of that measurement 
(cf. findings in chapter 4.3, p. 59ff). They chose their specific Merit system (i. 
a.) because of the fitting characteristic ‘encourages client referral’. Other inter-
viewees also wanted to have a PSS with this characteristic, but chose another 
PSS with a total different mechanic, having the same characteristic ‘encour-
ages client referral’: Pure Lockstep.  
It is therefore necessary to identify systematically the relevant characteristics 
that distinguish PSS’s and its modifications from the others. This will be done 
below in section 6.5. The result of including these additional two levels of anal-
ysis can then be aggregated in a matrix structure, with the characteristics in 
the rows and the PSS modifications in the columns. Figure 13 (below) gives 
an example for this structure, the final result can be found in Table 12 (p. 132) 
at the end of section 6.5. 
                                            
16 Measuring and rewarding client acquisition is linked to client referral, because the sepa-
rate measurement of acquisition is only relevant when the acquired clients are referred to 
and served by other partners. If every partner serves all acquired clients alone, there is no 
difference between measuring turnover only or measuring turnover and acquisition. 
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Figure 13: Examples for classification of PSS types 
When matching Partner’s needs with the PSS, the alignment should now hap-
pen between the individual partner needs and the PSS characteristics (the 
rows in Figure 13), not the PSS types (the columns). As a result, the best-
suited PSS for a specific set of partners’ needs is that PSS with the most 
matches between needs and characteristics. This matching process at the 
core of the framework is where in practice the discussion and the bulk of the 
work starts. An approach how to do that will be described below in section 6.6. 
Figure 14 (below) shows a summarizing overview about the entire framework.  
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Figure 14: Complete framework to align law firm partner’s needs with PSS characteristics, 
based on available PSS’s and their typical modifications 
This framework also helps to explain an effect known from the literature (An-
derson 2001; Viney 2013) and findings (cf. quotes on p. 47): Many partners 
emphasise that no available PSS is perfect, even their own, even if they cre-
ated it deliberately. This is explicable, because it is unlikely that any one sys-
tem exists (with whatever modification) that has exactly that set of character-
istics that would perfectly fit to any one partner’s exact needs. The choice of a 
PSS therefore typically needs compromises, even if all partners would have 
exactly the same needs. In the real world, a second layer of compromises is 
usually added: Most likely, the partners that form a partnership do not have 
exactly the same needs, so that the theoretically ‘best suited’ PSS might vary 
from partner to partner. When the partners agree on one system, at least some 
individual partners need to make some more compromises. 
From a practical perspective, the purpose of this framework is to help law firm 
partners in evaluating their existing profit sharing system and/or to choose a 
system or a modification that suits their purposes. The different components 
of the framework can be translated into questions that should be asked and 
eventually answered during that process: 
1. What environment are we in? 
2. What do I want as a partner? 
3. What PSS types and modifications are available? 
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4. What characteristics do these PSS types have? 
5. Which PSS characteristics match best with my needs? 
Answering these questions finally enables the group to answer the big ques-
tion: 
6. Which PSS type/modification is best suited for us? 
It is worthwhile noting that question 2 and 5 are asked from an individual per-
spective, whereas question 1 and specifically 6 take the perspective of the 
group, the partnership. Figure 15 (below) shows where these questions are 
answered in the framework. 
 
Figure 15: Framework structure represented by questions to be asked by partners during a 
PSS evaluation 
In the following sections, the individual components of this framework will be 
discussed in detail: Section 6.2 discusses the contextual factors related to part-
ner needs (question 1), section 6.3 the individual side of partner needs (ques-
tion 2). In section 6.4 it is argued which PSS archetypes and modifications are 
available (question 3). Section 6.5 introduces the characteristics that seem to 
be relevant to the PSS choice and assesses how they are distinct for each 
PSS (question 4). In section 6.6, the individual needs will finally be matched 
with the PSS characteristics (question 5), and section 6.7 will give an example 
how to operationalise that approach. The big question 6, which PSS to choose 
as a partnership, is discussed in section 6.8.  
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6.2 Partner needs – contextual factors 
Q1: “What environment are we in?” 
This section argues that four main contextual factors are important: Number of 
partners and offices; Homogeneity of Partnership; Clients requiring coopera-
tion; and Age structure of the partnership. 
Number of partners and offices 
The number of partners in the partnership is one of the most important factors 
that influence the needs of the partners, together with the number of offices 
(locations) in which these partners usually come together to work. Both num-
bers are important for the extent of the familiarity between the partners; they 
influence strongly how good the partners know each other (cf. findings in chap-
ter 5.1, p. 73). Working together at one physical place typically allows people 
to meet regularly, either intentionally or occasionally when having lunch or 
walking around. When partners work in different locations, the acquaintance is 
much lower, summarised in Martin’s quote “Out of sight, out of mind” (p. 53). 
The absolute number of fellow partners is also a limiting factor for the mutual 
knowledge: The number of meetings or lunch breaks a single person can have 
with others is finite. The more partners the partnership has, the less likely it is 
that a single partner has face-to-face contacts with most of his fellow partners 
on a regular basis.  
Knowing the other partners affects the trust level between the partners. Ac-
cording to Mayer et al.’s 1995 model, trust depends on the perceived trustwor-
thiness that the trustor attributes to the trustee, the other partner (cf. Figure 1, 
p. 20). This trustworthiness depends on the ability, the benevolence and the 
integrity of the trustee that the trustor perceives. All of these factors depend on 
knowledge about the trustee and are supported by direct contact. Becerra and 
Gupta found “clear empirical evidence of the important role of communication 
in explaining perceived trustworthiness” (2003: 42), and Lewicki and Benedict 
Bunker (1996) showed the importance of repeated interaction over time for 
trust development, also confirmed by van der Werff and Buckley (2017). A rel-
ative small number of partners and a small number of offices are therefore 
typically associated with a higher general trust level between the partners.  
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Homogeneity of the partnership 
Another important contextual factor is the homogeneity of the partnership. 
Greenwood and Empson (2003: 923) reason that for professional service firms 
(PSF) with relative similar work, where partners “share similar training and val-
ues”, it is much easier to build consensus than in a heterogeneous organisa-
tion. Harlacher and Reihlen (2014) also argue that the degree of homogeneity 
influences the “culture” of a PSF and also the choice of the PSS. They propose 
that “increasing heterogeneity of values and beliefs makes it more likely that 
firms will use eat-what-you-kill or scorecard [Merit based] instead of lockstep 
remuneration” (p. 139).  
It is however difficult to define or evaluate the ‘homogeneity of values’ as such, 
but there are some contextual factors that influence the degree of homogene-
ity. Obviously, with an increasing size of the partnership the potential for het-
erogeneity rises, simply because more people are involved. Multiple offices, 
even more if in different countries, also increase the likelihood of heterogeneity 
due to the different cultural backgrounds of the partners. In Germany in partic-
ular, most large law firms with multiple offices merged only after the year 1989, 
when a law change allowed supra-regional partnerships for the first time (Kääb 
and Oberlander 2005). As a result, the local offices each have their own history 
and resulting from that often a specific culture different from other offices. The 
result is often a degree of homogeneity within one office, but not between of-
fices of the same law firm. This can even lead to different profit sharing 
schemes per office: Francis for example explained that each office of his firm 
allocates the profits separately, and although they generally have an Eat-what-
you kill-system, the partners in one office decided to use a point based Lock-
step model locally (Francis: 3).  
It is possible to manage the homogeneity of a partnership to a certain extent. 
In Germany, the law firm Hengeler with about 85 partners is famous for that. 
Francis commented on Hengeler: 
“They are extremely homogenous. Someone said they are more a con-
gregation than a law firm.” (Francis: 103, Eat-what-you-kill) 
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In a newspaper interview, a partner from Hengeler explained their homogene-
ity with the fact that they almost always promote partners from inside, lateral 
hires are rare (Balthasar 2018). As a result, a new partner already worked for 
many years as an employee in the firm, sharing the same culture, and is well 
known to the existing partners.  
Two other aspects of homogeneity are the similarity of the clients serviced by 
each partner (cf. Edward’s quote on p. 73) and the homogeneity of areas of 
law, e.g. when a firm specialises only on employment law instead of being a 
full service firm, because partners then share more similar education and work 
areas. There is however some evidence that these aspects of homogeneity 
are less relevant than the homogeneity of values: Specialised law firms in Ger-
many do not tend to use Lockstep systems (see Table 8 below). Therefore, 
the assumption that homogeneity increases the suitability of Lockstep should 
be restricted to the homogeneity of values and beliefs. 
 Pure 
Lockstep 
Modified 
Lockstep  
Merit Eat-what-you-kill 
Specialist firms 1 1 5 1 
Table 8: Number of top 100 German law firms being specialised on one or few specific ar-
eas of law, per PSS (JUVE 2018) 
Clients requiring cooperation 
The specific client structure yet has an influence beside the homogeneity as-
pect. It seems to be important if the services provided to the clients require 
cooperation between partners or not. Cooperation might for example be nec-
essary for subject-specific reasons, because clients need advice from different 
areas of law as part of a specific project. This aspect is different from the ques-
tion of whether the firm is strongly specialised or to the contrary provides ser-
vices for all kinds of legal areas: in the latter case, different clients might typi-
cally demand different services independently of each other, so that coopera-
tion is not necessary. The need for cooperation is therefore independent from 
the degree of specialisation of the law firm and should be assessed separately.  
If clients often require cooperation, the partners benefit from an environment 
where cooperation between partners is actively fostered. Otherwise, increased 
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cooperation between partners might be helpful e.g. for cross-referencing or 
innovation (Fu et al. 2015), but in total, the benefits from cooperation might not 
outweigh the individual barriers (Gilson and Mnookin 1985). 
Age structure of partnership 
The age structure of the partnership is very important for Pure and Modified 
Lockstep systems, because the age (the seniority, not the physical age) is the 
key influence factor for the profit share. These systems are based on the model 
that more junior partners generate more profits than they withdraw, whereas 
longer serving partners receive more than they generated in the current year. 
All partners however become automatically more senior from year to year, so 
that this model requires a steady flow of new, junior partners to maintain the 
relationship between givers and takers and to fulfil the promise of raising in-
come over the years. Without that, the share of the most senior partners di-
minishes from year to year because of the static number of points (shares) 
they have; this is likely to be seen by them as an unfair situation (cf. quote 
Edward, p. 51). It is therefore vital for a Lockstep law firm (both Pure and Mod-
ified) to ensure that the age structure of the partnership is spread evenly to 
prevent perceived unfairness among the most senior partners. 
At the same time, specifically for Lockstep firms it is important to agree on the 
‘mechanics’ for retirement. Some firms have specific phase out rules, where 
the number of points diminishes above a certain age, some have a strict cut-
off age of 65 or 67 years, where partners have to leave the partnership (JUVE 
2018). One interviewee described that their firm introduced a ‘part-time part-
nership model’, which allows partners to reduce their workload and at the same 
time ‘frees points’ for more junior partners.  
 
This section discussed the contextual factors - the environment that influences 
the needs of the law firm partners. These factors are typically easy to agree 
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on in a partnership17. But there are also individual needs, beliefs and values, 
and these might differ considerably – the next section addresses them. 
6.3 Partner needs – individual factors 
Q2: “What do I want?” 
Findings showed that the interviewees expressed several common require-
ments, especially the need for a system which is generally perceived as fair 
(cf. chapter 5.2, p. 77) and which reflects that money is an important extrinsic 
motivation factor (cf. chapter 5.3, p. 84). More interesting for the purpose of 
this framework that intends to explain and help with the choice of a suitable 
PSS are the differences between partner’s needs. This section looks at those 
needs that differ and the beliefs and values behind them.  
Fairness ideal 
The taxonomy model introduced in chapter 2.6 (p. 23) presumes that the indi-
vidual’s fairness ideal is one of the two main dimensions that are relevant for 
a PSS choice. The findings confirm this idea: partners from Pure Lockstep 
firms explicitly described a position of choice egalitarianism, whereas an Eat-
what-you-kill partner held a libertarian position (cf. p. 81). Strict egalitarian po-
sitions were not present in the interviews; this is consistent with the non-exist-
ence of Equal Share models in this study.18 Bartling and von Siemens argue 
that for inequity adverse partners, “the equal sharing rule arises endogenously 
as an optimal solution to the incentive problem in a partnership” (2010: 1). If 
so, the non-existence of Equal share means that partners in large law firms 
are typically not “inequity adverse”. This is not surprising, as most of the part-
ners were promoted to partnership using a tournament model (Galanter and 
Henderson 2008; Smets et al. 2017b), where they learned to be compared and 
compensated based on performance – and since they prevailed, it is rather 
unlikely that they hold a strict egalitarian position.  
                                            
17 At least partners should easily agree what their current situation is like. There might be 
discussion about the intended future, e.g. if the firm should grow, open new offices or service 
additional areas of law, thereby becoming more heterogeneous. 
18 The reasons for that will be discussed in chapter 6.4, p. 116 ff. 
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This tournament history also helps to explain why law firm partners using Lock-
step can have a choice egalitarianism position (cf. p. 16) and an inherent ap-
preciation of performance, which seems to be a contradiction at first glance. 
On the one hand, individual skills, efforts and achievements are not relevant 
for the profit share in Lockstep, which is consistent with choice egalitarianism 
(Cappelen et al. 2010). On the other hand, the Lockstep situation is based on 
the knowledge that their fellow partners have only reached their position in a 
tournament because of skills, efforts and achievements in the past that are 
comparable with their own. Combined with the trust that the fellow partners 
continue to do so, and supported by a guilty conscience (cf. quotes p. 51), the 
performance effort is ensured.  
The understanding of the own fairness ideal is therefore a key prerequisite for 
the choice of a PSS. All partners agree that performance should be an im-
portant element. To work out the differences, the questions developed in chap-
ter 5.2 are suitable (cf. summary in Table 6, p. 81) and will be used below. 
Beside this dominating distributive aspect of fairness, also informational and 
procedural fairness aspects seem to be relevant for law firm partners, which 
supports the classification of Greenberg and Cropanzano (1993)19. 
Informational fairness: need for transparency versus need for harmony 
The need for transparent decisions is a classic example for informational fair-
ness. Even though many interviewees expressed this need, for some of them 
transparency collides with harmony and stability in the partnership (cf. chapter 
5.2, p. 82).20 Having such need for harmony or not is therefore another decid-
ing criterion for the choice of the PSS. The preference for preserving harmony 
does not mean conflict-avoidance and inaction, especially when combined with 
                                            
19 Specific indications for the importance of interpersonal fairness did not occur in the inter-
views. This might be tied to the peer relationship of law firm partners, as most examples for 
interpersonal fairness presume a hierarchic relationship (Bies and Moag 1986; Colquitt 
2001). In reality, interpersonal fairness might nevertheless be an issue, when committees 
are staffed with very senior partners who decide about junior partners, resulting in a de facto 
hierarchic situation. Future research might address this issue. 
20 Only partners from Modified Lockstep systems expressed the conflict with transparency, 
which will therefore discussed further down in 6.5. 
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a high trust level (Empson 2013). Partners with a need for harmony typically 
prefer Lockstep systems, which match the higher trust level there (see below). 
Procedural fairness  
Procedural fairness is also important for the interviewees, e.g. as the “absence 
of arbitrariness”. In algorithm-based systems, transparency and the absence 
of arbitrariness are strongly connected: If the rules and the figures are trans-
parent, and only then, there is no room for arbitrariness (cf. quote Francis, p. 
82). For human decision based systems however, perceived procedural fair-
ness is possible without full transparency, as Christopher feels: 
“Fair is, that you have a comprehensible and entrepreneurial viable ra-
tionale for every [committee decision] (…) The process [of decision-find-
ing] and the single aspects are not transparent, but the result is reason-
able for me, where I can judge the partners concerned.” (Christopher: 
16, Modified Lockstep) 
This perception of procedural fairness is based on two pillars: The trust in the 
integrity of the committee members including the procedures during their (se-
cret) decision making processes; and a ‘cross check’ of the results with their 
own perception. In Christopher’s case, the trust results from the fact that he 
was member of the decision-making committee previously. This is an interest-
ing supportive argument for the use of rotation systems when staffing commit-
tees, as it is practiced in Imogen’s firm.  
Trust level: trust in people versus trust in the system 
The fairness perception in Christopher’s quote above needs trust as a precon-
dition. At the same time, the trust also results from experiences, both past 
(committee work) and current (comparison of results with own judgement). The 
latter is consistent with Bediou and Scherer’s (2014) view that trust is an 
outcome of perceived overall justice, and it confirms the feedback aspect in 
Mayer et al.’s (1995) model (cf. Figure 1, p. 20). 
Professional literature also highlights the importance of general trust for the 
PSS, e.g. Viney: “Put simply, if you have complete trust in the person or people 
responsible for profit-sharing decisions then frankly it doesn’t matter what re-
ward system you have in place” (2013: 13). The findings in chapter 5.1 indicate 
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that such trust requires knowing, and chapter 6.2 described the circumstances 
that facilitate or hinder acquaintance between partners and therefore trust, e.g. 
a small number of partners and offices. Nikolova et al. argue in the same di-
rection with the process nature of trust, resulting from interactions. They found 
three social practices in favour of trust: signalling ability and integrity; demon-
strating benevolence, and establishing an emotional connection (2015: 232). 
These social practices however need practice (sic) - and in addition to the spa-
tial aspect discussed in the last section, there is also a temporal aspect. Prac-
tice in the form of social interactions needs time. If there was not enough social 
interaction yet, trust might not have been developed. This is a typical situation 
for law firm start-ups (except if the founding partners did work very close to-
gether before). In a recent interview, a partner described exactly this case: 
“When we founded our firm, we didn’t know each other well enough” – their 
Equal share model, totally based on trust, failed and was replaced by a Merit 
based one (Stender 2018: 134).  
If the trust level between partners is rather low for these or other reasons, an-
other request to the PSS results: Avoiding human decisions in favour of algo-
rithms. This is the second dimension of the taxonomy model introduced in 
chapter 2.6 (p. 23). In this case, trust in people is replaced by trust in the sys-
tem, in transparent and predictable algorithms. However, algorithms are not 
neutral: In what they measure, they include a value judgement, and therefore 
also require some discussion and decisions. The COO of Norton Rose, a large 
international law firm, commented: “The profit sharing system might be as so-
phisticated as possible – if trust is missing in the partnership, that cannot be 
compensated.” (Lienemann 2018a: 33). It seems that some level of trust is 
needed with algorithm-based systems too. 
Eat-what-you-kill systems might be an exception: no sophisticated algorithms 
exist, and no committee has to make decisions – from the perspective of the 
PSS, trust is not needed. This is consistent with the finding that of all interview-
ees, only the partners from Eat-what-you-kill systems did not mention trust at 
all.  
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Motivational factors  
All interviewees conceded that they are extrinsically motivated by money. 
Many interviews said that they are not motivated by the absolute sum, as long 
as a minimum level of income is ensured21 (cf. chapter 5.3). Whereas some 
partners stressed that additional income is not important for them anymore, 
others are still motivated. In this case, money is typically a proxy for power and 
reputation (cf. p. 85; also Viney (2013: 42)); the symbolic meaning of money is 
more important than the instrumental (Gupta and Shaw 1998), the motivational 
effect of money gets an intrinsic aspect. The tournament history of the part-
ners, during which the then-associates where typically measured by the 
amount of hours and fees they charged might have trained this behaviour.  
It is helpful to distinguish the fairness aspect from the motivational aspect of 
money: The fairness aspect accentuates the sanity factor of a pay level that is 
deemed appropriate compared to the circumstances (primarily performance, 
but also seniority, effort etc.). There is a tolerance band which is accepted, 
exemplified by Oliver’s explanation why they finally decided to go away from 
Lockstep: 
“As long as we were in a range of plus/minus 50 percent around the av-
erage (…) it was no problem at all. But then (…) we had revenue differ-
ences with a factor of four. And that's the position where people say: ‘I 
can't really compensate for that with such a system anymore’ “ (Oliver: 
5, Merit) 
Accepting up to 50% deviation between performance (based on revenue) and 
profit share is a sign that the motivational aspect of money was long deemed 
to be of minor importance. In the end, the (lost) homogeneity of performance 
in the partnership was the trigger for the change.  
                                            
21 The participants and generally the basic population of this study are not at all comparable 
with the German average: The average profit share of the partners in a top 100 law firm in 
Germany is above 700.000 Euro per year (JUVE 2018), the lowest rarely below several hun-
dred thousand Euro. 
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Several intrinsic motivation factors could also be identified (cf. Table 7, p. 91). 
They are important; however more or less present in all PSS types and there-
fore not suitable to distinguish between PSS. There were no indications in the 
interviews, that the extrinsic motivation by money has a detrimental effect on 
this intrinsic motivation, as Deci and Ryan (1985) suggest. On the other hand, 
Shaw and Gupta (2015)‘s contrary point of view that financial incentives en-
hance intrinsic motivation, couldn’t be confirmed either.  
Autonomy  
An important part of intrinsic motivation is the perception of autonomy (Deci 
and Ryan 2000), as lawyers typically commit to professional autonomy 
(Faulconbridge and Muzio 2008). The needs of partners however differ, as 
perceived autonomy can have different manifestations: In a lockstep system, 
a partner can contribute to the firm using different individual strengths, be it as 
a ‘finder’ (of new clients), a ‘grinder’ (actually doing the work) or a ‘minder’ 
(care for existing clients)22. The ‘fixed’ salary allows individual autonomy in de-
ciding how to work, although limited by peer pressure and a guilty conscience. 
This does not typically include the freedom to decide how much to work; it is 
expected that every partner works at full capacity (cf. quotes p. 51).  
In a Merit based system on the other hand the autonomy is based on the ab-
sence of a guilty conscience. The partners are (within limits) free to decide how 
much they work and how much effort they put into it. This way, it is much easier 
to balance work and life for them. The increasing importance of “recalibrated 
work-life preferences” specifically for younger lawyers (Smets et al. 2017b: 
100) is a challenge for established firms when balancing the needs of senior 
and junior partners, when senior partners were socialised in a culture of 70+ 
hour weeks. Merit based systems seem to have advantages regarding this 
challenge. 
For other partners it is the absence of control that constitutes autonomy: 
                                            
22 The terms of finders, minders and grinders are typically used in the context of Merit sys-
tems, where each role is assigned a fixed percentage of the profit.   
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“What is important for all of us is that we like the independence, not be-
ing controlled from London or New York or from a central office” (Lee: 
17, Pure Lockstep).  
A partner with this attitude will not be happy in a Modified Lockstep system 
with a remuneration committee located in another country. The individual un-
derstanding of autonomy is therefore an important means to help partners to 
decide ‘what PSS do we want?’. 
Relationship between procedural justice and intrinsic motivation  
A direct relationship between procedural justice and intrinsic motivation 
(Zapata-Phelan et al. 2009) could not be found. Interviewees rarely spoke 
about experienced injustice; where they did, it was action-oriented, e.g. when 
Imogen mentioned that she raised an issue in the partnership meeting (Imo-
gen: 21). This might be grounded in the difference between a peer-to-peer 
situation and a hierarchical situation, where the subordinate might only resign 
when a manager defers procedural justice.  
 
This section discussed the individual partner needs that a profit sharing system 
should fulfil. Table 9 below summarises the areas of these needs. The next 
section will now move the focus from the left side in Figure 14 (p. 98) to the 
right side: the different available PSS’s.  
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6.4 Profit sharing systems and their modifications 
Q3: “What PSS types are available?” 
It is not sufficient just to assess the different PSS on the archetype level, as 
they appear in the academic and professional literature (cf. chapter 2.2, sum-
mary in Table 1, p. 12). There are two reasons for this: first, not all archetypes 
are actually used in the segment that is the focus of this study (the 100 largest 
law firms in Germany). Second, for the modified systems it is important to dif-
ferentiate between the specific modifications, because each modification has 
different implications on perceived fairness or motivation. This section explains 
which PSS’s and which modifications are important and should therefore be 
integrated in the framework. 
Three PSS archetypes were not found in the interviews: Equal share, Subjec-
tive and Corporate. This is consistent with the professional literature: An over-
view about the profit sharing systems used in the 100 largest law firms was 
published during the research phase of this study in JUVE (2017) and showed 
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that none of the top 100 firms uses one of these three systems.23 The reasons 
for that are individually different, consistent with the academic literature: 
 Equal Share, meaning that all partners receive exactly the same 
share, only works with a small number of partners (Kaiser et al. 2015), 
and when the partners have basically the same seniority. It is there-
fore an option for start-ups (Stender 2018), but tends to be replaced 
by Pure Lockstep when a ‘second generation’ of partners is admitted, 
because typically the founding partners do not want to share equally 
from the beginning with a ‘junior’. It is therefore not used in large, 
grown up organisations like those in this study. 
 Corporate, based on partner salaries and dividends, assumes the le-
gal structure of a corporation, not a partnership. Only 13 of the top 100 
German law firms are not partnerships, and even those apply the 
same principles as partnerships, e.g. that the salary rises automati-
cally with the seniority (i.e. Modified Lockstep) or is calculated using a 
specified formula (i.e. Merit) (JUVE 2017). It is therefore not sensible 
to use this type separately; it is also rarely used in the literature (cf. 
Table 1, p. 12). 
 Subjective means that individuals (often a committee) are making the 
profit share decisions. Most authors do not use this PSS archetype 
category (cf. Table 1, p. 12). Wesemann and Kerr (2015) are an ex-
ception; in their survey, they even categorise half of the US law firms 
as being of this type. The issue of subjectivity is not in the focus of ac-
ademic authors, who typically only contrast performance/productivity 
based with seniority-based systems (Gilson and Mnookin 1985; Morris 
and Pinnington 1998; Smets et al. 2017a). Gilson and Mnookin how-
ever commented on subjectivity and concluded that only in the specific 
implementation of a PSS archetype it becomes a fairness judgement 
                                            
23 JUVE includes a disclaimer that not all of the information presented is reliable, because it 
relies on undisclosed market information. The author’s experience and specific knowledge 
about many of the law firms on the list can confirm this statement: The data presented are 
not exact, sometimes wrong, but give generally a correct impression about the economic sit-
uation of the law firms. 
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issue whether a formula or a human decision is considered appropri-
ate (1985: 390). Following this logic, a ‘subjective’ system could be ei-
ther classified as a Merit based system (when the committee decision 
is based on the calculation of specific scores) or a Modified Lockstep 
system (when the decision is based on seniority). However, the issue 
of subjectivity remains important and it is one of the strengths of 
Wesemann and Kerr’s system to introduce that category. It will there-
fore be considered below when the specific modifications of Modified 
Lockstep and Merit are discussed. 
The remaining four PSS archetypes that were actually used in the inter-
viewee’s firms (Pure Lockstep, Modified Lockstep, Merit based and Eat-what-
you-kill) will now be discussed in more detail.  
It should be noted that the boundaries between the systems are not always 
precise in practice. If for example an Eat-what-you-kill law firm shares the prof-
its generally based on individual turnover, but allows to “transfer” parts of the 
turnover from one partner to another partner who acquired the client, this could 
also be called a Merit system. The same blurred boundary exists between 
‘Modified Lockstep systems with a bonus’ and Merit based systems. The law 
firm Arnecke Sibeth Dabelstein for example distributes 95% of its profits ac-
cording to Lockstep and 5% using a bonus scheme - the Lockstep component 
prevails. Another law firm (BRL) however distributes 70% according to Lock-
step and 30% performance based, and a third (BBL) uses a 50% / 50% ratio 
(JUVE 2018). The latter could also be called a Merit based system; it becomes 
difficult to classify the firm as one PSS type. Nevertheless, it is helpful to dis-
tinguish the systems, because the intended consequences of each are gener-
ally different, and the reason for combining different PSS’s is typically the at-
tempt to leverage the specific disadvantages and advantages. 
Pure Lockstep 
All Pure Lockstep systems are relatively similar. They typically have a mini-
mum number of points (the entry level), a maximum number (the plateau) and 
a number of steps in between. The absolute number of points is not important, 
as the points are only used to calculate the individual share as a portion of the 
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total, but the relation between maximum and minimum points is. The interview-
ees reported multiples between 1:3 and 1:5, meaning that the partners with 
the highest share earn three or five times of what an entry level partner re-
ceives. This is consistent with JUVE (2018) who report multiples between 1:2,5 
and 1:5, with between 3 and 12 steps in between, and Wesemann and Kerr 
(2015). Even though these differences can make a substantial difference in 
practice, as they postpone the individual income more or less into the future 
(Gilson and Mnookin 1985), they are structurally similar. 
Some interviewees described some smaller modifications like a guaranteed 
minimum income for junior partners to ensure that a partner earns always more 
than a salaried lawyer, but these modifications do not change the nature of the 
system and were also reported from law firms with PSS other than Pure Lock-
step. For the purpose of this study, it is therefore not necessary to further sub-
divide this PSS type.  
Modified Lockstep 
When the Pure Lockstep system is fundamentally modified, it is usually called 
“Modified Lockstep”. Such a fundamental change always touches one or both 
of the two pillars of the Lockstep system: The lock, which means that a share 
is ‘locked in place’ and cannot drop once reached; and the step, which means 
that the share ‘steps up’ automatically in regular intervals, e.g. every second 
year. 
Several typical modifications are in use in the firms of the seven interviewees 
who have a Modified Lockstep system (cf. Table 4, p. 35). The professional 
literature on PSS also describes some modifications, however only on a sta-
tistical level and without discussing the differences (Schoen 2016; JUVE 2017; 
JUVE 2018). Academic authors sometimes acknowledge that Lockstep modi-
fications exist which aim to introduce a performance element into the system, 
but typically also do not distinguish between the modifications (e.g.Empson et 
al. 2013; Cleaver 2014). Many authors even ignore modifications at all and 
only discuss the Pure Lockstep system (e.g. Brock 2006; Faulconbridge and 
Muzio 2009; Harlacher and Reihlen 2014). 
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Modifications are however important, and they are the rule, not the exception: 
Viney (2013) found 4 times more Modified than Pure Lockstep firms in the US, 
and Schoen (2016) found approximately a 1:1 ratio in Germany (both statistics 
are admittedly not representative). The main reason for modifications is to mit-
igate inherent downsides of a (pure) lockstep system (cf. chapter 4.2, p. 56).  
According to JUVE (2018) and confirmed by the interviews, the main modifi-
cations in use in Germany are: 
 Gates: A gate stops the automatic step up at specific stages, usually 
two or three times in a partner’s career. A gate always needs an active 
decision before the partner might move up on the ladder.  
 Bands: Usually, the steps available for the partners are fixed point val-
ues, like “80 / 85 / 90”. With bands, they are adjusted up or down, but 
only in a limited way, e.g. “80 +-5 / 90 +-5”. The variance inside the 
band can either be calculated or decided by a committee. 
 Point reduction: Partners might be downgraded to a lower level (which 
breaks the lock). This is typically reserved for an exceptional situation 
like underperformance for several consecutive years and requires an 
active decision.  
 Bonus schemes: Exceptional performance of (very few) partners will 
be rewarded in addition to the standard lockstep share. This might 
comprise exceptional turnover, an outstanding client acquisition, or 
(seldom) management tasks. Typically, 2 to 10% of the total firm profit 
is taken for this (JUVE 2018). The award decision is typically made by 
a committee for one specific year. 
 Phase-out rules: Whereas every lockstep system has an inherent limi-
tation due to the plateau point level, some law firms decide in addition 
to reduce the points of partners when they reach a retirement age. 
It is worth noting that all of these modifications (except the phase out) need a 
qualitative decision, typically made by a remuneration committee. These com-
mittees do use quantitative financial information to support their decisions (an 
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example see Stecklbach (2018)), but it is the human capability to consider un-
foreseen and complex situations that distinguish a committee decision from a 
formula decision (Wiegmann 2017 unpublished) .  
Merit based 
In a Merit based PSS, the individual share of a partner is calculated every year 
based on several factors, usually with the turnover as most important single 
measure (if turnover was the only measure, the system would be called Eat-
what-you-kill). The second component of a Merit based system is always the 
acquisition achievement, although the metrics used are different from firm to 
firm. The main forms are: 
 Simple (Turnover & acquisition): There is only a turnover and an ac-
quisition element 
 plus client service: In addition to turnover and acquisition, a client ser-
vice role is defined and rewarded. The US firm Hale & Dorr introduced 
its PSS in the 1940s and rewarded the “finder” (acquisition), the 
“minder” (client responsibility) and the “grinder” (doing the legal work = 
turnover), therefore this system is also called ‘Hale & Dorr system’ 
(Anderson 2001). 
 plus management: Some Merit based firms do reward management 
tasks like committee work in addition to the other measures (JUVE 
2018), some explicitly don’t (like Imogen’s firm, where as a balance 
the management roles rotate every three years). 
 Smoothing: A standard Merit system calculates the profits based on 
one year’s figures. This can lead to considerable individual income 
fluctuations. In a system with smoothing, average figures from two or 
three years are used. This reduces the variations and introduces a 
mid-term component. 
 Forward impact only: In a standard Merit system, the calculated 
shares are used to split the profit ex post: After a year’s end, the fig-
ures are calculated based on that year’s performance, and the profit of 
that year is distributed accordingly. With Forward impact, the perfor-
mance in the last year only has an impact on the current year’s profit 
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distribution. This intends to encourage exceptionally strong partners to 
stay with the firm, because they will harvest the fruit only a year later. 
 Team performance: Metrics are not based on an individual partners 
figures, but (at least partially) on a group of partner’s figures, e.g. that 
of a practice group. This intends to encourage cooperation at least in-
side the groups. 
There are other criteria which are sometimes included in the Merit calculation, 
e.g. new partner development, employee development, employee utilisation, 
project responsibility, enhancing firm visibility, scientific articles, capacity for 
teamwork, pro bono work (JUVE 2018). 
Eat-what-you-kill 
Eat-what-you-kill systems are always focussed on the individual turnover of 
every partner. There is however a difference related to cost allocation: 
 Individual costs: Costs are allocated to each partner, either on an indi-
vidual base for each cost, or (for reasons of simplification) per head, 
e.g. office rent.  
 Shared costs: Some firms share all or some of the overhead costs like 
office rent, IT costs, secretaries etc. If these costs are shared, this is 
based on the idea that stronger shoulders can bear more costs and in-
troduces an element of equalisation. 24 
Table 10 (below) provides a summary of the above-mentioned PSS types and 
modifications and shows how often they were mentioned in the interviews (cf. 
Table 4, p. 35). An analysis of the verbal descriptions of the profit sharing sys-
tems of the 100 largest law firms in Germany in JUVE (2018) confirms that 
these PSS modifications are generally in use in Germany.  
                                            
24 When a firm deduces the total costs from the total turnover, and starts to distribute the re-
sulting profit from there, this has the mathematical effect that partners with more revenue 
bear more costs than partners with less revenue.  
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PSS Type / modification Number of in-
terviewees that 
use this PSS / 
modification 
Number of top 
100 law firms in 
German that 
use this PSS / 
modification 
Equal Share 0 0 
Corporate 0 0 
Subjective 0 0 
Pure Lockstep 3 13 
Modified Lockstep  7 39 
Modified Lockstep: Gates 6 13 
Modified Lockstep: Bands 0 4 
Modified Lockstep: Point reduction  5 9 
Modified Lockstep: Bonus schemes  6 23 
Modified Lockstep: Phase out rules 0 3 
Merit 3 45 
Merit: Just turnover & acquisition 3 12 
Merit: Plus client care 0 7 
Merit: Plus management 0 12 
Merit: Smoothing  1 3 
Merit: Forward impact only 1 0 
Merit: Team performance 1 2 
Eat what you kill 2 3 
Eat what you kill: Shared costs  1 2 
Eat what you kill: Strict cost centres  1 1 
Table 10: Number of law firms using each PSS and modification, according to interviews 
and JUVE (2018). Text analysis and attribution by the author. 
6.5 Relevant characteristics of PSS and modifications 
Q4: “What characteristics do the PSS have?” 
This section discusses the relevant characteristics that allow distinguishing the 
PSS’s from each other. For each of the 17 characteristics introduced (see Ta-
ble 11 below) it is argued why that characteristic is relevant, and how the dif-
ferent PSS’s relate to this characteristic, using findings from the interviews and 
the literature. None of the characteristics is per se ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – it depends 
on the needs of the partners, if a certain characteristic is desired in a given 
case or not.  
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The characteristics divide into groups. The first three (a., b. and c.) belong to 
the vertical dimension ‘Scope of responsibility’ in the taxonomy model intro-
duced in chapter 2.6 (see Figure 2, p. 24) and focus on what is rewarded. The 
second group (d. to f.) correspond with the horizontal dimension ‘Mode of de-
cision making’, i.e. the principle how decisions are made. The third group (g. 
to k.) considers the specific advantages of all systems. The last group (l. to q.) 
contains further characteristics that interviewees reported as important.  
Scope of responsibility (what is rewarded) 
a. Rewards are based on performance 
b. Rewards are based on seniority 
c. Rewards allow for exceptional performance 
Mode of decision making 
d. Decision-making and thereby discussions are avoided 
e. Decisions are based on humans (committees)  
f. Decisions are based on algorithms (formulas) 
Advantages 
g. Is long term oriented  
h. Encourages client referral and collaboration 
i. Encourages non-billable/management work 
j. Provides individual financial security 
k. Encourages individual autonomy and diversity 
Other 
l. Is based on detailed performance monitoring 
m. Involves peer pressure to perform 
n. Requires trust in fellow partner’s efforts 
o. Emphasizes extrinsic motivation by money 
p. Considers (also) qualitative performance 
q. Needs decisions about financial transparency 
Table 11: Characteristics to distinguish Profit Sharing Systems 
Table 12 at the end of this section (p. 132) contains a one-page summary of 
all characteristics and shows how strong or weak each characteristic is present 
in each PSS. 
a. Rewards are based on partner performance (or not) 
One of the most important, if not the most important characteristic of a PSS is 
whether the sharing is based on individual performance or not. Gilson and 
Mnookin (1985) postulated a dichotomy between productivity based and sen-
iority based systems; however these should be treated as two independent 
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characteristics, as PSS could be based on neither (like Equal Share) as well 
as on both of them: most modifications of Lockstep try to add a performance 
component to the seniority focus of a Pure Lockstep system.  
When performance is declared to be relevant, the subsequent problem is al-
ways how to define and measure it – this leads to further characteristics which 
will be discussed below. 
b. Rewards are based on seniority (or not) 
The second main characteristic is whether seniority is a key element for profit 
sharing or not (Gilson and Mnookin 1985), typically measured in years of be-
longing to the partnership. Seniority is desirable for two different reasons: It is 
seen as a proxy for expert knowledge (resulting in higher hourly rates), a larger 
network (resulting in more mandates), and thereby indirectly increasing profit-
ability. The second reason is related to fairness: Partners that are more senior 
have contributed to the building and the success of the firm for a longer time, 
e.g. by building a brand, and this is awarded. The difference between these 
two aspects of seniority becomes visible when lateral hires occur (experienced 
partners are admitted to the partnership). In Pure and Modified Lockstep sys-
tems, such a ‘lateral partner’ needs to be classified and assigned an initial point 
value. If the second, fairness related aspect prevails, the lateral partner would 
start with a lower point value in his new law firm than if the first, experience 
related aspect is prioritised. 
c. Rewards allow for exceptional performers  
One of the main reasons for a change from a Pure to Modified Lockstep sys-
tems is the perceived necessity to reward exceptional performers (Balthasar 
2018). The rationale behind that is that exceptional performance is seen as 
important for the law firm and that it is apprehended that such an over per-
former could tend to leave the firm (Galanter and Henderson 2008), thereby 
reducing overall profitability (Kaiser and Ringlstetter 2011).  
Specifically partners from Pure Lockstep systems emphasise that the idea of 
rewarding exceptional performance is related to the question of whether moti-
vation is based on other things in addition to money (cf. findings chapter 5.3 p. 
84ff, also Ströder (2018)).  
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d. Decision-making and thereby discussions are avoided 
Equal Share and pure Eat-what-you-kill, even though representing two very 
different concepts, also share one characteristic: In both systems, the profit 
share is determined by the system. There is no need for discussion; the share 
can be calculated. In Pure Lockstep, decisions about number and height of the 
steps are necessary during the setup of the system, but once in use, usually 
no further, yearly recurring decisions are needed. It could be argued that a 
Merit system, which is strictly based on calculation of figures, behaves the 
same way. However, as soon as a remuneration committee exists or ‘manage-
ment decisions’ are needed to access performance or grant bonuses, the need 
for decisions and therefore discussion arises. This immediately adds fairness 
issues (cf. findings chapter 5.2, p. 77ff) and a potential for conflict in the part-
nership. 
In addition, together with the need for active remuneration decisions, the issue 
of transparency of those decisions arises (cf. findings on trust and financial 
transparency, p. 82). Not having the need for decisions is therefore a value in 
itself. This might be one explanation, why Equal share or (in older, larger law 
firms) Pure Lockstep is sometimes admired as the better PSS, but seen as 
‘unfortunately’ not adequate any more for the own firm (cf. Edward’s quote p. 
73).  
Merit based systems also involve decisions, e.g. when two partners negotiate 
who gets an acquisition credit for a new mandate. This includes “a lot of fuel 
for conflict”, as Howard pointed out (see quote on p. 61).  
e. Decisions are based on humans (committees)  
As soon as decisions are needed when determining the profit shares, as in any 
Modified Lockstep and most Merit based systems, these decisions could be 
based either on human decisions or on algorithms. However, the two ways are 
not mutually exclusive, and are therefore discussed as two different character-
istics here (e and f below). In a Merit Based system for example, the main part 
of the profit share might be calculated using an algorithm based on turnover 
and acquisition, whereas another part is awarded by a committee.  
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A human decision does not mean an arbitrary decision. Committees will likely 
decide based on facts, including statistical information (Wesemann and Kerr 
2015), but also on pure qualitative considerations, i.e. based on the percep-
tions of the other partners, using a survey (Anderson 2001).  
Gilson & Mnookin put this decision between humans and algorithms in a fair-
ness context and argue that it “turns on a judgment about the best way to 
insure that the members of the firm view the particular allocation as legitimate 
(…) Implementation by formula (…) seeks fairness by eliminating individual 
judgment (…) Implementation by subjective division (…) seeks fairness by 
substituting the individually tailored outcomes possible through personal as-
sessment for the potentially arbitrary results of a rigid formula. The particular 
implementation method chosen is likely to depend heavily on the characteris-
tics and personality of the particular firm” (1985: 390). This is consistent with 
findings in previous work of the author, where one partner declared that they 
actively decided against arithmetic calculation and “explicitly want to have a 
remuneration committee, who consider personal achievements, setbacks, and 
so on, illness, I don’t know, and more like that (…) where one is evaluated as 
a human being”. In contrast, a partner from another law firm called those hu-
man decisions “stupid to nauseous”, based on “functionaries” and “bootlick-
ers”, and claims that their algorithm based system avoids “unobjective deci-
sions” and “closed doors” (Wiegmann 2016 unpublished: 8). The vehemence 
of both statements indicates that the decision between committee and formula 
is of great importance for the choice of a PSS.  
f. Decisions are based on algorithms (formulas)  
The alternatives to human decisions are algorithms, also called formulas. This 
basically means that the profit share can be calculated from data, typically fi-
nancial data.  
There is an important difference between PSS where financial figures are used 
by a committee to assess performance, e.g. in a Modified Lockstep system, 
and a truly algorithm based PSS, like in a Merit or Eat-what-you-kill system. 
When figures are used in a lockstep system, this is often done to identify and 
handle exceptions, e.g. to deal with partners that are exceptionally good (and 
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deserve a bonus) or exceptionally bad (and require a downgrade or denial of 
passing a gate). Interviewees emphasised that this does not happen often 
(Bob: 9, Gareth: 3). ‘Normal’ ups and downs in turnover, acquisition or what-
ever is measured do not influence the profit share.  
In an algorithm based PSS however, every single transaction has a direct in-
fluence on the profit that is distributed at the end of the year. This tempts part-
ners to optimise the transactions as such. Depending on what is measured, 
partners might change their conduct or the way they record things to optimise 
the result. This furthers a tendency to micro-manage the individual mandates: 
partners start to discuss the exact percentages of their acquisition contribution 
(Howard: 57), or how many associates of another partner they had to super-
vise – whatever is actually measured. These kinds of discussion are not very 
productive, and do not contribute to a cooperative mood between the partners.  
g. Is long term orientated 
Lockstep systems are inherently based on the postponement of the reward 
into the future, whereas Eat-what-you-kill systems are short term oriented. 
Merit based systems are typically medium to short term oriented, depending 
on their mechanics (cf. Table 6, p. 81). Lockstep as such is based on an inter-
generational contract: in the first years as a partner, the profit share is relatively 
low; in later years, it is continuously rising. Low point partners deliberately post-
pone some of their potential earnings into the future. This requires a long term 
perspective, but it also produces long term perspectives, as firms become very 
stable (cf. quotes p. 49 f), because it is in the interest of every partner to stay 
with the firm as long as possible. On the other hand, this can also be experi-
enced as a lock-in: Changing the partnership for whatever reason becomes 
unattractive. 
A long term orientation also needs trust in the long term success of the firm. If 
this trust is not there (cf. Edward’s quote, p. 67), a system based on long term 
commitment is not attractive. 
Current professional literature postulates a shift away from long term orienta-
tion and argues that this is related to general changes in society having a focus 
on the present (Balthasar 2018), and that partners “don’t want to wait any more 
124 
for the second marshmallow” (Lienemann 2018b). There is however only cur-
sory evidence for this.  
h. Encourages internal client referral and collaboration 
Collaboration among autonomous knowledge workers is not only helpful for 
the organisation, but also for the single professional (Gardner and Valentine 
2014) and is therefore generally desired. Lockstep systems are described as 
encouraging client referral and collaboration in the literature (Gilson and 
Mnookin 1985; Anderson 2001; Kaiser et al. 2015) and in the interviews (cf. 
chapter 4.1 advantages, p. 49). Eat-what-you-kill systems by contrast bear the 
risk that cooperation is not encouraged (ibid, cf. chapter 4.4 Downsides, p. 65).  
In Merit based systems, client referral (also called ‘acquisition’ or ‘origination’) 
is very often the second most important score after individual revenue. There 
seems to be a difference between the US, where ‘New client origination credit’ 
is the most important factor, and Europe, where 50% of the law firms call it 
“irrelevant” for their PSS (Wesemann and Kerr 2015). This is however explica-
ble technically: Wesemann and Kerr report 79% of law firms in Europe having 
Lockstep, 23% thereof Pure Lockstep25, other than in the US, where Lockstep 
is scarce. In a Lockstep system, the individual client referral rate is indeed not 
measured and therefore “irrelevant” for the profit share. It is therefore no con-
tradiction to report that in Europe, due to the high rate of Lockstep systems, 
client referral is “irrelevant” for the PSS and at the same strongly encouraged 
(cf. findings).  
Major et al. report for London law firms that the move from Lockstep towards 
Merit based systems had “a negative effect on collaboration, information shar-
ing and allocation of work” (2017: 4), which is consistent with the interview 
findings. 
                                            
25 These figures are not consistent with Lowe (2016) and Schoen (2016) and should there-
fore be used with care, but the tendency of European law firms relying much more on Lock-
step than US firms is generally accepted (Morris and Pinnington 1998; Wesemann and Kerr 
2015). 
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i. Encourages non billable / management work 
In an Eat-what-you-kill system, where the profit share is only dependent on 
how many work hours can be charged to a client, every hour used for other 
purposes like firm management or other non-billable work is detrimental for the 
individual profit share. This contains the risk that such firms are under-man-
aged, e.g. that not enough time is invested in the strategic development of the 
firm. Some Merit based systems try to mitigate that risk by assigning points for 
those tasks; others rotate responsibility for those tasks through the partnership 
– it is however questionable, whether treating management tasks as ‘a burden 
which has to be carried’ leads to results of high quality. In Lockstep systems 
in contrast, there is at least no financial disadvantage for partners who engage 
in management tasks.  
This situation is a markedly different to ordinary companies, where manage-
ment positions are almost always better paid than the average employees.  
j. Provides individual financial security 
Lockstep systems inherently provide financial stability for the individual part-
ners, as the share does not change if a partner has individual fluctuations in 
performance, number of hours worked etc. Stability does not mean guaranteed 
income – if the total profit of the firm drops for systematic reasons, maybe 
because of an economic downturn, the share percentage remains the same, 
but the absolute share obviously drops. Unsystematic risks like the insolvency 
of a client or demand fall in a specific area of law are however shared and 
portfolio theory attributes a value to this (Gilson and Mnookin 1985). In Merit 
based systems, the reduced security there is consequently seen as a down-
side (cf. Jennifer’s quote, p. 60). Some Merit based systems try to mitigate this 
by calculating their profit shares based on figures of two or three years, which 
leads to a smoothing of the effects; the general difference that the partners still 
bear unsystematic risks on their own remains however the same. Oliver com-
mented on this with a sentimental undertone: 
“In the past we would have said ‘if a partner becomes seriously ill for 9 
months, does not matter’ (…) this would be difficult today among 
younger people (…) everyone simply has to hedge against risks them-
selves” (Oliver: 13, Merit) 
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He and his peers still decided to switch from Lockstep to Merit, among others 
due to the next characteristic:  
k. Encourages individual autonomy and diversity 
There is an inherent conflict between homogeneity and individual autonomy, 
that surfaces specifically in Lockstep systems. 
Lockstep systems, specifically Pure Lockstep, do not only need homogeneity 
in the partnership as a precondition (cf. chapter 4.1, p. 51); they also lead to a 
homogenous partnership structure due to their careful partner selection pro-
cess. This might also have unintended side effects. According to portfolio the-
ory, which recommends diversification, homogeneity increases risk (Gilson 
and Mnookin 1985). Another side effect is that it limits the growth rate, because 
lateral partner moves are very difficult.  
The Lockstep model is inherently based on a comparable work ethic of the 
partners, as they are all expected to strive on the same level. This increases 
the peer pressure on the partners and limits the autonomy e.g. to decide to 
work less hours (cf. chapter 4.1, quotes on p. 51). Empson and Chapman in 
contrast argue that lockstep systems provide “partners some degree of protec-
tion from managerial controls (…) [and] serve to support the emphasize on 
individual autonomy embodied in the interpretative scheme of the partnership” 
(2006: 146); this does however not incorporate the power of peer pressure, 
that emerged from the interviews.  
A merit based system (and even more Eat-what-you-kill) allows for much more 
heterogeneity in the partnership. In these systems, partners can work on dif-
ferent levels of effort without bad conscience: If they work less, they just earn 
less. This enables more individual freedom (cf. quotes on p. 59) and reduces 
the peer pressure. Changing family models, and generally the growing rele-
vance of work-life-balance lead to increasingly different conceptions of the im-
portance of long work hours. Oliver, a lawyer in his sixties, commented on this 
topic:  
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“In my generation, 30 years ago we all had a rigid image how much a 
partner should work (…) But today there are two who want to make ca-
reer – if they want to have a family too, they need to find a balance, 
without having too much pressure” (Oliver: 23-25, Merit) 
l. Is based on detailed financial performance monitoring 
All interviewees agreed that a fair PSS should be based on results, but had 
different opinions whether assessing the results requires only quantitative or 
also qualitative information (cf. chapter 5.2, Table 6, p. 81). Some financial 
performance monitoring is therefore common in all law firms. The use and ac-
cess to this information is however different: In Lockstep systems, sometimes 
only the management and/or remuneration committee members know all fig-
ures (Viney 2013; Lowe 2014: also reported by Bob and Christopher). In Merit 
based and Eat-what-you-kill systems, typically partners have access to all in-
formation, because the profit share is directly based on it.  
There is however a great variance as to what exactly is measured, and in what 
detail (cf. chapter 6.4.). Measuring something and using the result to affect the 
profit share directly (in Merit and Eat-what-you-kill) or indirectly (in Modified 
Lockstep) has two main goals: First, ensuring fairness; second, affecting be-
haviour (Morris and Pinnington 1998; Anderson 2001). 
Measures themselves are not ‘objective’; they always include a judgement. For 
example, would it be sensible to measure the working hours of the partners? 
Or is it sufficient to measure the financial revenue generated by this working 
only? There is a fairness issue behind this question. Provided that two partners 
both manage to create the same revenue in one week, but one worked 40 
hours, and the other 60 hours to achieve that. Should that make a difference? 
If they share the profit equally in a Lockstep system, should the first partner 
work more, as much as the second, to add to their common profit pool? In a 
Merit based system, the equivalent question is whether the formula includes 
working hours or not. The hidden concept between these questions is the idea 
that in a ‘fair’ system, ‘similar’ work should result in ‘similar’ rewards26. The 
                                            
26 This idea is based on the fairness ideal of Meritocratism (cf. Table 3, p. 18). Someone with 
a fairness ideal of Strict Egalitarianism would not agree.  
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problem is to define and agree what exactly makes work comparable and sim-
ilar.   
Specifically in formula based Merit systems, the attempt to construct a ‘fair 
formula’ that at the same time gives the ‘right incentives’ can lead to very com-
plex formulas, and some law firms use up to 12 criteria to calculate (JUVE 
2018).  
m. Involves peer pressure to perform 
Peer pressure can be an effective motivator and can have an antagonistic ef-
fect to free riding and shirking (Kandel and Lazear 1992). Such pressure can 
be perceived as normal (cf. Martin’s quote p. 51), but also as problematic, e.g. 
when Imogen said about friends who work in Lockstep firms: 
“There is an immense pressure. Very high revenue expectancy (…) we 
[in contrast] have more freedom (…) I’m not under pressure, because 
then I simply take less profit next year” (Imogen: 37, Merit) 
Equal share and Pure Lockstep systems basically have no other way of ensur-
ing that the fellow partners engage sufficiently, choosing such a system there-
fore means accepting peer pressure.  
n. Requires trust in fellow partners efforts 
Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) argue that trust research should differentiate be-
tween level of trustor and referents, i.e. trust from individuals, teams or organ-
isations as trustors; and trust in individuals, teams or organisations as trustees. 
For a PSS, two levels are relevant (Kay and Hagan 2003): First, the individual 
partner’s trust in their (single) fellow partners. This is about trust between col-
leagues. Second, the trust invested in the firm and ‘the rules’, i.e. trust in the 
organisation.  
In chapter 5.1 it was shown that the importance of trust in the fellow partners 
is diverse for the different PSS’s. Such trust seems to be very important for 
Pure Lockstep systems, of use in Modified Lockstep and Merit systems, but 
not to be required in Eat-what-you-kill systems (see chapter 5.1, summary p. 
77). This characteristic is therefore appropriate to help differentiate between 
PSS’s.  
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The second level, trust into the system, is not well suited to classify PSS’s. It 
depends more on the individual position as discussed above (p. 106) or on 
preconditions that are better treated separately like the fairness principle (see 
a. to c.) or transparency (see q. below).  
o. Emphasizes extrinsic motivation by money 
The findings chapter on motivation (5.3) showed that generally, the extrinsic 
motivation by money was meaningful for all interviewees. Every PSS contains 
an element of this (except Equal share, which is not relevant in this study); 
even Pure Lockstep includes the principle of financial incentive, only that long 
term engagement with the firm is financially rewarded instead of short term 
performance. Differences between PSS’s however exist: Interviewees with 
Pure Lockstep (and only them) expressed explicitly that money is not a key 
motivator for them (see quotes on p. 53). Eat-what-you-kill and Merit based 
systems on the contrast are inherently based on the idea that money is a key 
motivator; in Modified Lockstep systems, the modification with bonus schemes 
is specifically intended to provide an extrinsic motivation to stay with the firm. 
p. Considers (also) qualitative performance elements 
Eat-what-you-kill is based on the idea that ‘only revenue counts’ - sometimes 
costs are also considered, but it’s just about financial figures. In Merit based 
systems, it depends on the calculation method: sometimes, non-quantitative 
factors like management engagement are included, sometimes not (see Table 
6, p. 81; also examples in JUVE (2018)).  
In contrast, Lockstep systems are generally based on qualitative 
considerations. Even in those Modified Lockstep systems where financial 
figures are used in the discussion e.g. when a gate decision is made by a 
remuneration committee, the figures are subject to interpretation and only used 
as one of several factors.  
q. Needs decisions about financial transparency 
Other than the characteristics a. to p. above, the degree of financial transpar-
ency is not a general characteristic of any PSS type (or modification). In theory, 
the partners in any PSS can decide to share or not to share the information as 
to how exactly the profit shares were determined and who receives which 
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share.27 Transparency is however seen as a very relevant feature, as the 
quotes on p. 74 show.  
The professional literature also indicates that transparency is an important is-
sue, not least because it is included as a separate item in the relevant surveys. 
Wesemann and Kerr (2015) specifically asked for this aspect and found that 
in Europe, 80% of all firms have transparent (“open”) PSS, with a rising ten-
dency. Lowe found for US based law firms that 62% are open, 13% partially 
open and 24% closed, i.e. financially non-transparent. In the US, partners in 
transparent systems were “much more likely to classify themselves as ‘very 
satisfied’ than in closed systems” (2016: 8) (p. 8), and Major et al. (2017) con-
firms the same tendency for London law firms. For Germany, Schoen (2016) 
found in his non-representative study that 13% of the partners do not know, or 
only partially know what other partners earn, whereas 25% rate the transpar-
ency of the system as ‘negative’. These figures indicate that dissatisfaction 
exists in both directions: partners with no transparency might miss it, but there 
must also be partners having full transparency that are not happy with this 
situation. A detail in Major et al.’s report seems to confirm that financial trans-
parency is not primarily a question of the PSS type: Out of 60 partners that 
experienced a move from (Modified) Lockstep to Merit based systems, about 
one fifth reported that this move had a positive impact on transparency, 
whereas another fifth reported a negative impact.  
Findings of this study on the other side showed that in practice, only partners 
from Modified Lockstep systems discuss the pros and cons of financial trans-
parency and also see disadvantages (cf. chapter 5.1, p. 74), whereas partners 
in all other systems seem to agree that transparency is a matter of course. To 
account for that, this characteristic is included in the list using ‘needs decision’ 
instead of ‘is based on’ as qualifier. 
                                            
27 It is an interesting question, if not completely sharing all financial information within the 
partnership would be legally enforceable at all, if any single partner would take this case to 
court. The partners of a partnership are the owners, and jointly liable (Partnership Compa-
nies Act). Notwithstanding, some law firms actually do not share all financial information be-
tween equity partners (cf. Gareth’s quote, p. 79). 
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Evaluation of the characteristics of each PSS subtype 
In Table 12 below, every relevant characteristic discussed above is now as-
sessed against the available PSS and relevant modifications (see section 6.4). 
The evaluation is a summary of three perspectives: first, the findings discussed 
in chapter 4 regarding the different PSS’s, cf. the summaries for Pure Lockstep 
(Figure 7, p. 55), Modified Lockstep (Figure 8, p. 58), Merit based (Figure 9, p. 
64) and Eat-what-you-kill (Figure 10, p. 69); second, the findings in chapter 5 
regarding trust, fairness and motivation (see summary Table 7, p. 91); and 
third, the literature on PSS as exemplified in chapter 6.5 and discussed in this 
section. 
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Scope of responsibility (what is rewarded) 
              
a. Rewards are based on performance - - + + + +  ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
b. Rewards are based on seniority - ++ ++ + + +  - - - - - - - 
c. Rewards allow for exceptional performance - - - + - ++ - ++    
 
++ ++ 
Mode of decision making 
              
d. Decision-making and thereby discussions are 
avoided 
++ ++ - - - -  + -    + ++ 
e. Decisions are based on humans (committees)  - - + + ++ ++ - - + -  - + - 
f. Decisions are based on algorithms (formulas) - - - - - - + ++ + +  ++ ++ ++ 
Advantages 
              
g. Is long term oriented  ++ ++ ++ ++ +  ++ -  + +  - - 
h. Encourages client referral and collaboration ++ ++ +     +     - - 
i. Encourages non-billable/management work + + +     - ++    - - 
j. Provides individual financial security ++ ++ ++ + -   - - + - - - - 
k. Encourages individual autonomy and diversity - - - - - - - + +    ++ ++ 
Other 
              
l. Is based on detailed performance monitoring - - + +  +  ++    ++ ++ ++ 
m. Involves peer pressure to perform ++ ++ ++ + +  - -    + - - 
n. Requires trust in fellow partner’s efforts ++ ++ ++ +    -  + + + - - 
o. Emphasizes extrinsic motivation by money - -   + ++  ++ ++  + + ++ ++ 
p. Considers (also) qualitative performance ++ ++ ++     - +    - - 
q. Needs decisions about financial transparency   + + + +         
Legend: ++ Yes (strongly), + Yes (moderately) – No 
Table 12: Summarising evaluation of relevant PSS types and modifications against im-
portant characteristics, based on findings and literature 
Up to this point, the framework presented is more or less generic: it tries to 
incorporate the most important aspects of the relevant PSS types/modifica-
tions in large German law firms, and looks at the typical needs of partners in 
these firms. That does not mean it is exhaustive or universally valid. Some law 
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firm partners might find other characteristics that are relevant for them. The 
PSS types and characteristics that are included are however of relevance - at 
least for the interviewees, and (as far as the literature presented suggests) for 
many other law firm partners. It is also possible to disagree for good reasons 
with the specific evaluations of the characteristics against the PSS types, sum-
marised in each cell in Table 12 (with ++, + or -). The partner needs and the 
PSS characteristics presented should however be a good starting point for the 
next step: Matching what is needed with what is available. This shifts the focus 
from establishing the different building blocks of the framework to its practical 
application. 
6.6 Matching the needs with the characteristics of the PSS 
Q5: “Which PSS characteristics match best with my needs?” 
The partner needs in 6.2 and 6.3 as well as the PSS types and characteristics 
in 6.4 to 6.5 describe the generally available options.  
By contrast, the matching process between both is always individual. It is 
based on the needs and beliefs that an individual partner has – be it uncon-
sciously or knowingly. These needs and beliefs determine which PSS charac-
teristics are perceived as important. Every partner has a different set of needs 
and beliefs, and therefore will likely give different priorities to the PSS charac-
teristics. Some partners might for example have a general desire to avoid quar-
rel with their peers (need for harmony, cf. p. 105), whereas others don’t have 
a problem with powerful disputes. For the first group, the PSS characteristic 
“avoids active decision making and discussions” (cf. p. 121) is important, for 
the second not.  
It is also possible that the same PSS characteristic is important for two part-
ners, but for different reasons. Two partners might for example agree that they 
need a PSS that “encourages client referral and collaboration” (cf. p. 129). One 
partner might emphasise that this increases the motivation of all partners to 
invest time in acquisition, thereby increasing the client base of the firm, and 
eventually the long term success of the firm. The other partner might attach 
importance to the fairness aspect: that someone who charges less hours, but 
brings in more clients than others is equally treated.  
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For each person there exists a specific combination of needs (both contextual 
and individual) and matching characteristics. Taking the evaluation matrix from 
Table 12, every characteristic can now be judged against these needs. The 
next subsection gives an example how to do that. 
6.7 Example: Operationalising the framework 
Let us imagine a partner would answer the first two questions in the following 
way, using the topics described in 6.2 and 6.3:  
1. What environment are we in? 
25 partners, 1 large and one small office, several areas of law, diverse 
client base, rarely projects that require cooperation of several partners 
2. What do I want as partner? 
It’s fair if people working more hours get more. Someone who is ex-
ceptionally good deserves additional financial appraisal. We should 
care for each other if someone is seriously ill. It needs careful individ-
ual decisions in such a case; you can’t put that into a formula. It’s bet-
ter to avoid open fights about money in the partnership. I trust that my 
fellow partners are able to and do work as hard and good as I do. I do 
like to earn money, but I would prefer an intellectual challenging man-
date to a more profitable one. It’s important for me to have the free-
dom to make such a decision. The long term success of this firm is 
very important for me.   
Every PSS characteristic can now be judged against these stated needs. For 
example, the answer “It’s fair if people working more hours get more” 
matches to “a. Rewards are based on performance”. Therefore, all PSS that 
have this characteristic (showing “++” or “+” in row a. in Table 12) are suited 
and can be marked (here with a yellow circle): 
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The answer “We should care for each other if someone is seriously ill.” 
matches to “j. Provides individual financial security”: 
 
The answer “It needs careful individual decisions in such a case, you can’t 
put that into a formula.” matches to “f. Decisions are based on algorithms 
(formulas)” – but negatively: 
 
Going through all answers, and matching them with all the characteristics, 
might finally result in the evaluation exemplified in Table 13 below.  
As next step, it is now possible to count how many ‘hits’ every PSS type 
has28, indicating how much congruence exists between the stated needs of 
our fictive partner and the respective PSS type. 
Based on the number of characteristics that match, the profit sharing systems 
can be sorted in descending order, and ideally, one is identified as the most 
qualified PSS for an individual partner. In this example, the result gives an 
impression which PSS’s might be suitable: A Modified Lockstep system, 
modified with bands (7 hits) and/or bonus schemes (6 hits) seems to have 
the highest match, even though some needs are not fully met with this PSS, 
e.g. the need for autonomy. 
 
                                            
28 Just counting the circles is just the simplest way. It would also be possible to weight ++ 
more than +, or to use a multiplier for those characteristics that are seen as more important 
than others. It should be noted that these are all qualitative decisions, and any quantitative 
result is only indicative and not of absolute value. 
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Scope of responsibility (what is rewarded) 
              
a. Rewards are based on performance - - + + + +  ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
b. Rewards are based on seniority - ++ ++ + + +  - - - - - - - 
c. Rewards allow for exceptional performance - - - + - ++ - ++    
 
++ ++ 
Mode of decision making 
              
d. Decision-making and thereby discussions are 
avoided 
++ ++ - - - -  + -    + ++ 
e. Decisions are based on humans (committees)  - - + + ++ ++ - - + -  - + - 
f. Decisions are based on algorithms (formulas) - - - - - - + ++ + +  ++ ++ ++ 
Advantages 
              
g. Is long term oriented  ++ ++ ++ ++ +  ++ -  + +  - - 
h. Encourages client referral and collaboration ++ ++ +     +     - - 
i. Encourages non-billable/management work + + +     - ++    - - 
j. Provides individual financial security ++ ++ ++ + -   - - + - - - - 
k. Encourages individual autonomy and diversity - - - - - - - + +    ++ ++ 
Other 
              
l. Is based on detailed performance monitoring - - + +  +  ++    ++ ++ ++ 
m. Involves peer pressure to perform ++ ++ ++ + +  - -    + - - 
n. Requires trust in fellow partner’s efforts ++ ++ ++ +    -  + + + - - 
o. Emphasizes extrinsic motivation by money - -   + ++  ++ ++  + + ++ ++ 
p. Considers (also) qualitative performance ++ ++ ++     - +    - - 
q. Needs decisions about financial transparency   + + + +         
Number of Hits (yellow circles) 4 5 6 7 4 4 1 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 
Legend: ++ Yes (strongly), + Yes (moderately) – No 
Table 13: Fictional example for the evaluation of one partner’s needs   
The framework presented is a multi-factor model and does not always result 
in a clear recommendation without ambiguity. In many cases, it is however 
suited to provide a clear steer towards one or the other system.  
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This evaluation of one partner’s needs is difficult enough. Unfortunately, the 
resulting ‘most suited’ PSS is not always the same for all partners of one law 
firm; partners have to agree, to negotiate, to compromise. The overall resulting 
PSS will be some sort of common denominator of the needs of all the partners 
involved in the designing process. 
The exercise of comparing the needs with the characteristics is not only helpful 
because it results in an indication about the best suited PSS for a specific part-
ner; it might also enable and facilitate the discussion between partners, which 
characteristics they see as more important than others, and what specific 
needs they really have. 
The next section looks at the specific challenges of this next step, balancing 
the individual needs to determine a common profit sharing system. 
6.8 Choosing or changing the PSS 
Q6: “Which PSS is best suited for us?” 
Seldom are partners in a position where they can choose the best suited profit 
sharing system based on the own needs and the specific circumstances with 
a greenfield approach – in practice, that happens only when a new law firm is 
founded as a start-up, often as a spin-off of an established law firm (Günther 
2012). Much more often, a profit sharing system already exists; this poses 
specific challenges.  
Reasons for a change 
Four situations typically trigger a partner discussion about the PSS: 
 Spin-off or start-up (greenfield approach) 
 Mergers of two (or more) law firms29 
 Changes of the environment in an existing firm 
 Changes of the needs of the partners in an existing firm 
                                            
29 Only if of comparable size; if the firms are very different in size, the ‘discussion’ is usually 
very limited – the smaller unit is integrated in the larger and accepts their rules. The same 
applies if a single partner or small group changes from one firm to another. 
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In the first two occasions, it is mandatory to decide about the designated PSS, 
as the PSS is part of the contracts between the future partners. Spin-offs and 
mergers are carefully considered, active decisions (hopefully), and partners 
know that the future PSS is an important part of it. In these situations, there is 
enough dynamic to enforce a discussion about the PSS. 
Whatever the basis of the other two occasions, change is often gradual. As 
discussed above, profit sharing systems are contingent to the circumstances. 
If the circumstances change, the PSS might have to be adjusted. And circum-
stances always change: law firms grow in number of people and/or revenue 
(or shrink); some areas of law depend on economic trends, so that revenue for 
some partners can be highly cyclical; and all partners simply advance in age 
each year. Transitions occur from one firm development phase to the other, 
e.g. from founder dominated firms to a partnership with different seniority lev-
els. External change can even challenge the business model of a law firm as 
such (Greenwood et al. 2017). A system that matched perfectly some years 
ago might not make all partners happy any more now. As a result, 60% of the 
partners in Schoen’s (2016) survey about German partners see a need for 
change, whereas (or because) more than 50% of the PSS’s are untouched for 
more than 10 years. For the long-term success of a law firm partnership, it 
would therefore be wise to review the PSS at regular intervals, e.g. every 6 or 
8 years. However, changing a PSS is often difficult.  
Inertia 
One problem with any change of an existing PSS is that a majority of the part-
ners in the partnership has to agree on the change; typically, each partner in 
a partnership has one vote. Every partner is usually able to assess the esti-
mated differences between the old way of sharing and any suggested new 
PSS. Given that money is a very relevant extrinsic motivator (cf. chapter 6.3), 
partners will likely easily accept a system that promises an increasing individ-
ual share, but be sceptical if their individual share is predicted to shrink. If more 
partners expect a decrease than an increase with a new system, approval is 
not very probable. The other way around however is also double-edged. If the 
partners who expect an increase outnumber those who cede, the latter group 
must have had above-average profit shares before (assuming the same profit 
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to distribute). These are often the most powerful and successful partners. A 
forced change against their interest might result in their departure, thereby 
lowering the average revenue per partner of the firm and eventually having a 
detrimental effect on everybody’s absolute profit.  
Another effect adds to the inertia of an already existing PSS. Typically, there 
is a reciprocal impact of needs and chosen PSS. Initially, the partner’s needs 
shape the system. Once established, the system’s characteristics then also 
work as a filter for future partner nominations. The existing system influences 
what needs are present and dominant in the partnership. For example, only 
partners who share specific values and beliefs come together in a Lockstep 
system (cf. chapter 4.1, p. 53). This reinforces the homogeneity; therefore 
fewer discrepancies between partners arise. A similar selection process can 
happen when (typically strong) partners decide to leave their existing partner-
ship, when they feel insufficiently rewarded. With such a motivation, they will 
likely prefer a new firm with a Merit based system. Merit systems attract 
money-motivated partners. 
Incremental changes are therefore much easier to implement than radical 
change (Wesemann and Kerr 2015). A radical change would for example be a 
change from Equal share or Pure lockstep to Merit based, whereas incremen-
tal changes only introduces some (new) modifications to Lockstep or alters the 
calculation rules in Merit. In the classification taxonomy (Figure 2, p. 24), an 
incremental change would alter the position only slightly, whereas a radical 
change is a large move vertically in the ‘Scope of responsibility’ or horizontally 
in the ‘Mode of decision making’ – or both. 
Due to these obstacles to radical change, it requires an important change in 
the environment or the partner needs to trigger it. Either suddenly, such as a 
sharp revenue drop, or cumulated over years, so that a majority of partners 
sees major problems with the existing system, which (in many cases) hasn’t 
been changed for decades (Schoen 2016).  
Is there a general direction of change? 
There is a tendency in the professional as well as academic literature to pos-
tulate a move away from Lockstep towards Merit based systems. Brock et al. 
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for example describe a replacement of Lockstep with Eat-what-you-kill sys-
tems and attribute that to “increasing profit motives and decreasing profes-
sional collegiality” (2007: 226); however, they concede that the underlying re-
search is Anglo-American centric and that more research is necessary in Eu-
ropean (and Asian) contexts. Major et al. also found that many of the London 
based law firms moved from Lockstep towards Merit based systems, “at least 
notionally”. They found a positive impact on earnings, retention and transpar-
ency, but a negative on collaboration (2017: 4). For Germany, Schoen (2016) 
shows an already increased share of Merit systems and also postulates further 
rising. There are also critical views like Lienemann, who states that High Per-
former rewards “open Pandora’s box” (2018b: 33) and can result in great dis-
satisfaction. 
Wesemann and Kerr by contrast compared their 2015 international findings 
with 2013 figures and found that Lockstep seemed to decline before, but “ap-
pears to be returning to prominence everywhere except the United States and 
Canada” (2015: 1). Stender (2018) reports anecdotally from German partners 
that chose a Merit system but plan to switch back to the ‘inherently better’ 
Lockstep, when possible. A similar stance appeared in Oliver’s interview, who 
now has a Merit based system, but regrets bygone times with Lockstep (cf. 
quote p. 125). The interviewees in this study with Pure Lockstep systems also 
emphasised unanimously the satisfaction with their PSS. It is therefore ques-
tionable if there is a general shift towards Merit based systems, at least outside 
the US.  
Interestingly, this discussion has been going on for decades. Morris and Pin-
nington report as early as 1998, that seniority based systems “have become 
under attack because of [their] poor incentive properties” (1998: 23), but found 
in their quantitative study that those systems persist and show that there are 
specific reasons for staying with them, rooted in the professional standards 
and values of lawyers, specifically the urge for cooperation. They criticize that 
other research, specifically American, assumes too much business rationality 
in decision-making – a gap that is explicitly addressed by this thesis. 
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6.9 Summary 
In this chapter, a new framework was presented that integrates the findings in 
this study on partner needs with the characteristics of different profit sharing 
systems that are in use in large commercial law firms. A detailed discussion 
showed that partner needs depend on contextual factors like the number of 
partners and offices; the homogeneity of the partnership; cooperation needs 
of clients; and the age structure of the partnership. The individual partner 
needs depend on the individual fairness ideal; the need for transparency and 
procedural fairness; the trust level in people and in the system. Motivational 
factors that are important for the choice of the PSS (not the work as a lawyer 
as such) are primarily extrinsic, but intrinsic motivation factors do exist.  
It was shown that profit sharing systems and, importantly, their modifications 
can be assessed by differentiating between specific characteristics. These 
characteristics use the taxonomy model presented in chapter 2.6 (see Figure 
2, p. 24) and define the scope of responsibility (what is rewarded); the mode 
of decision making (committee decisions or formulas); specific advantages of 
each system, and some other properties like peer pressure and financial trans-
parency, which are important when law firm partners have to decide which 
PSS matches best with their context and their needs. An example showed how 
the framework could be used in practice. It was discussed why changing an 
existing PSS is difficult and in which situations this change might still happen. 
Even though some authors postulate a trend away from seniority based to-
wards Merit based systems, it was shown that such a trend is not undisputed 
and also not found in this study.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This concluding chapter first summarises the topic, the research questions and 
the methodology, findings and discussion. It will then highlight the contributions 
to theory and to practice, and review limitations as well as suggestions for fur-
ther research. 
This study was induced by an observation of the author in his daily work with 
law firms: In law firm partnerships, where several partners (the owners of the 
firm) with equal rights have to agree on a way to allocate the profit of their 
collective work, very different ways of doing so exist. All partnerships strive to 
find a way that is perceived as fair, and that ensures ongoing motivation of all 
partners. Different groups of partners however use very different profit sharing 
systems, even though they seem to do comparable work in comparable law 
firms: Some split equally, some split based on seniority, some use complex 
formulas to consider several performance factors, and others just look at indi-
vidual revenue. Obviously, these groups have different understandings of what 
exactly “a fair share” means, how far they can trust each other that everybody 
is putting in the same effort, and how they are best motivated. The relative 
importance of trust and fairness in turn depends significantly on what motivates 
each individual person.  
The literature review showed that although substantial knowledge in the fields 
of fairness, trust and motivation in an organisational context exists, most of the 
academic research is based on hierarchical situations. There is little research 
that considers peer-to-peer situations, in which not only the results, but also 
the underlying rules are subject to discussion. Professional literature on the 
other hand does recognise the different profit sharing systems and discusses 
the respective advantages and disadvantages, but gives little advice how to 
decide which system is actually suited in a particular situation.   
This resulted in three research questions: What understanding of trust, fair-
ness and motivation do law firm partners have? How does this understanding 
link to their specific profit sharing system? Which profit sharing systems suit 
best to specific given structures of law firms and the individual interests of their 
partners?  
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To answer these questions, semi-structured interviews with 15 equity partners 
from 10 different large German commercial law firms were chosen as the best-
suited data collection method. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the 
data, following the research protocol of Braun and Clarke (2014). A detailed 
and thorough description of the data collection and analysis procedures in the 
methodology chapter ensured trustworthiness, dependability and authenticity 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994). Comparison of the results with professional literature 
(surveys and magazine articles on the topic) was used to ensure confirmability.   
Findings showed that unsurprisingly partners of top law firms, having received 
the same education and having successfully passed a year-long tournament, 
share some values and beliefs: They are all intrinsically motivated to work as 
a lawyer and partner, but also attach special importance to the extrinsic moti-
vation of money, which is also seen as a proxy for power and reputation (this 
adds an intrinsic aspect to money). They consider distributional fairness as 
important for the stability of the firm, but recognise that fairness is always sub-
jective. There are however also important differences that affect the choice of 
the PSS. Trust between partners is key to most systems, but was not men-
tioned at all in one system; financial transparency is seen as mandatory in all 
but one (other) system. It could be shown that different fairness ideals regard-
ing distributive fairness match to the preference of specific PSS types. Each of 
the four main profit sharing systems that are in use in Germany (but also in the 
UK, the US and other European countries) is suited when certain external pre-
conditions exist, and when the partners share specific beliefs and values. All 
have specific positive, but also negative consequences.  
Based on these findings, a framework was developed that facilitates linking 
the beliefs and values of the partners on the one hand with the specific char-
acteristics of the PSS on the other hand. This framework provides partners of 
law firms and potentially other professional service firms with a systematic ap-
proach to identify and discuss their needs and to identify the best-suited PSS 
for their specific situation. 
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7.1 Contribution to theory 
This thesis contributes to academic knowledge in different ways. First, it looks 
at fairness, trust and motivation from a peer-to-peer-perspective, which is a 
rare perspective in the existing literature. It seems that that the often used dif-
ferentiation between distributive, procedural, informational and interpersonal 
fairness (Greenberg and Cropanzano 1993) is also appropriate in this context, 
but that they manifest differently than in hierarchic situations. Whereas in hier-
archical situations negotiation between employee and supervisor is typically 
restricted to distributional aspects, peers do also negotiate the procedures and 
aspects of informational fairness, notably the degree of transparency. In addi-
tion, procedural and distributional fairness aspects interact.  
Second, it adds to the knowledge about professional service firms and their 
profit sharing systems by emphasising interpersonal aspects, going beyond 
the dominant economic perspective on profit sharing in the literature. The clas-
sification of profit sharing system archetypes is enhanced by introducing a sec-
ond dimension. The usual classification distinguishes between individual ori-
ented, performance based systems and group oriented, seniority based sys-
tems. The mode of decision-making is introduced as additional dimension to 
differentiate between formula based systems and human decision based sys-
tems. Further contribution lies in the systematic assessment of the available 
modifications of PSS archetypes, as described in subchapter 6.4 (p. 111). 
These modifications are very important in practice and might change the char-
acter of a system significantly, but are rarely considered in the academic liter-
ature yet.  
Third, it provides valuable insights in how law firm partners think about fair-
ness, trust and motivation. There is very limited availability of such information 
as lawyers hesitate to share them publically. The materials and information 
collected from the interviews could be used to inform further research on the 
firm.   
7.2 Contribution to practice 
The framework presented in chapter 6 provides practitioners in partnerships 
with a valuable tool that can be used to facilitate the discussion about how to 
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best share the profit of their joint work. The first contribution is that it high-
lights the importance of individual values and beliefs when discussing this 
topic, an aspect that is rarely openly present. Focussing the discussion on 
what the individual partners generally consider as fair and how they want to 
be motivated might help to avoid proxy discussions about ‘mechanical’ de-
tails of a PSS. The second contribution is the detailed identification of im-
portant characteristics of available PSS and specifically the typical modifica-
tions used. The entirety of characteristics identified in this study might not all 
be relevant for every partnership, and they are likely not exhaustive; they do 
however provide a good starting point to discuss the available options for 
profit sharing. Discussing single characteristics of each PSS separately and 
comparing them with the identified needs of the partners provides the oppor-
tunity to rank available PSS options according to the specific needs. Even if 
partners found themselves having other needs than those depicted in this 
study, and even if they evaluate the characteristics differently than presented 
here, this framework provides a good framework (sic) to approach this sensi-
tive, but very important topic for every partnership.  
This study is based on interviews from a selected group of interviewees, part-
ners from large German law firms. Even though, the results might be transfer-
able to other situations, as far as these have structural commonalities, notably 
the peer-to-peer situation. This is the case for other Professional Service Firms 
like management consultancies or tax auditors, insofar as they are organised 
in partnerships. In these firms, the partners also share a comparable education 
and professional ethos, and they typically went through a tournament situation 
to become a partner. They also have very high incomes compared to the na-
tional average, which likely influences fairness judgements and motivational 
issues.  
On a more abstract level, the framework presented might also be of practical 
use in other situations where sharing between equals requires a commonly 
accepted system. An example for that is the situation when founders of a start-
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up have to decide about the share allocation of their firm30. Similar questions 
to those in a partnership arise: Should the shares be divided equally? Or based 
on some sort of contribution? Should ‘senior’ day-one-founders receive more 
than others who joined later on? In this situation, the procedure and questions 
presented in chapter 6 could be used to assess the needs of the founders and 
identify the best-suited share allocation system. 
Several surveys of consultancies showed that the usage of the different PSS’s 
is comparable in Germany and UK, but differs significantly between Europe 
and the US (Wesemann and Kerr 2012; Viney 2013; Wesemann and Kerr 
2015; Schoen 2016). There is little data about the situation in European coun-
tries other than Germany and the UK. Some results of this study will likely be 
of use also in other countries, like the characteristics of the PSS’s. General 
cultural differences between countries as well as differences in the educational 
systems for lawyers however will likely have an impact on beliefs and values 
of law firm partners in other countries, so that transferring the results from this 
study into other countries should be done with care. 
7.3 Limitations 
The methodological limitations of this research were discussed in chapter 3. 
Summarising, this comprised: challenges that result from access issues to elite 
interviewees; sampling; maintaining a critical distance while establishing trust; 
and meeting ethical standards such as protecting privacy and avoiding exploi-
tation. The described steps that were taken to mitigate these challenges turned 
out to be suitable and effective.       
As far as the results are concerned, the intention of qualitative research is not 
to deliver generalisable, but transferable results (Lincoln and Guba 1985). As 
addressed above, the relative small and focussed sample of interviewees lim-
its the generalisability. The more the environment differs from that of this study, 
the more care should be taken when transferring results.  
                                            
30 Shares are an equivalent to future profits, both from regular activities and from selling the 
firm e.g. by going public; share distribution therefore represents profit distribution  
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The interviews were conducted at a specific point in time. Even so some of the 
interviewees reflected upon several years of partnership and some changes 
that occurred during that time, each interview represents a snapshot in time. 
Workplace environments are constantly changing, but specifically the ongoing 
digitisation might fundamentally challenge the business model of Professional 
Service Firms in the next years. With that, also the needs of partners will 
change. The same might occur if the current period of constant economic 
growth in Germany, which was mirrored in ever raising revenues and profits of 
the top 100 law firms, comes to an end after ten years. It is very likely that in a 
situation of a shrinking pie, the implications of fairness, trust and motivation 
related needs change considerably. The principal approach of the developed 
framework should however still be viable and useful. 
Finally, the framework presented is not a verified theory, but the result of an 
exploratory study, with a focus on practical usefulness. Further research is 
necessary to test the framework, but also to enhance the applicability. 
7.4 Suggestions for further research 
Further research should consider several areas. First, overcoming some of the 
sampling related limitations mentioned above, it would be interesting to com-
pare the findings of this study with other countries and/or other professional 
services such as management consultancies or architects. Given the Eu-
rope/US divide reported in the literature, specifically a comparison with US 
firms would be interesting. Since the interviewees in this study were all very 
successful partners in established, large and growing firms, it might be insight-
ful to compare them with lawyers on the threshold to partnership: what needs 
and perceptions do they have? Are there changing work-life-balance interests 
when looking at younger lawyers, and does that influence the preferences for 
profit sharing?  
Second, it is necessary to deepen the understanding of the observed differ-
ences between individual’s beliefs and values, e.g. by using established meth-
ods from other fields like psychology to assess relevant individual perceptions 
and beliefs.  
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Third, it would be helpful to use quantitative methods to examine the relation-
ship between the needs and beliefs and the specific PSS the partners opted 
for. For that purpose and to operationalise the process of identifying individual 
partner needs it would be beneficial to formulate a set of specific statements 
that can be used in a questionnaire or as basis of structured interviews like 
those presented as example statements in chapter 6.6 (p. 133). This is not 
only of academic interest, but could be used as a tool for partners who want to 
enhance their PSS discussions with a common and structured understanding 
of their respective needs. 
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Appendix I: Information sheet 
  
Informationsblatt für Forschungsteilnehmer 
Sie sind eingeladen, als Teilnehmer an der Promotionsstudie von Thomas Wiegmann teilzunehmen. 
Was ist der Zweck dieser Studie? 
Anwaltskanzleien nutzen sehr verschiedene Methoden der Gewinnverteilung, von gleichmäßiger Pro-
Kopf-Verteilung über Lockstep und Merit-based zu rein leistungsbasierten Eat-what-you-kill-
Systemen, und vielen Kombinationen daraus. Marktstudien zeigen allerdings, dass ein großer Teil der 
Anwälte in  großen wirtschaftsberatenden Kanzleien mit dem vorhandenen System nicht zufrieden 
ist. Es gibt zudem wenig wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse, warum genau sich Partner von Sozietäten 
für ein bestimmtes System entscheiden, und nicht ein anderes wählen. 
Diese Studie zielt darauf, wahrgenommene Vor- und Nachteile der jeweiligen Systeme und die 
individuellen Gründe und Umstände für die Wahl des jeweiligen Systems zu verstehen. Ziel ist 
insbesondere, die Bedeutung von Emotionen und deren Wechselwirkung mit ökonomischen 
Aspekten aus der Perspektive der einzelnen Partner zu verstehen.  
Warum wurde ich ausgewählt? 
Sie sind eingeladen, an dieser Studie teilzunehmen, weil Sie ein Partner bzw. eine Partnerin einer 
Anwaltskanzlei sind, die in der JUVE TOP 100-Liste aufgeführt ist. 
Was umfasst meine Mitwirkung? 
Ihre Mitwirkung besteht in einem Interview, das bei Ihnen in der Kanzlei oder an einem anderen 
Platz Ihrer Wahl stattfinden kann. Das Interview besteht aus einer Reihe offener Fragen und dauert 
etwa 45-60 Minuten. Es wird (mit Ihrer Erlaubnis) mit einem Aufnahmegerät aufgezeichnet, 
abgeschrieben und für die Forschungsarbeit ausgewertet. Wenn Sie möchten, erhalten Sie eine 
wörtliche Abschrift des Interviews. Zudem können Sie auf Wunsch nach Abschluss der 
Forschungsarbeit eine Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse erhalten.  
Anonymität und Vertraulichkeit  
Die persönlichen Daten aller Teilnehmer werden vertraulich behandelt und anonymisiert. Dazu 
werden alle Namen von Personen und Kanzleien bereits in den Abschriften durch fiktive Namen oder 
Nummern ersetzt. Teile der Abschriften können für die Promotion benutzt und so ggf. auch publiziert 
werden. Dabei wird allerdings kein Teilnehmer oder Kanzlei identifizierbar genannt. Spezifische 
Beschreibungen, die eine indirekte Identifikation ermöglichen würden, werden entfernt oder 
geändert. 
Datenaufbewahrung und -vernichtung 
Die gesamten Forschungsdaten inklusive der Audioaufzeichnung werden ausschließlich auf 
verschlüsselten, kennwortgeschützten Geräten aufbewahrt. Die Audiodateien werden vier Wochen 
nach Graduierung gelöscht, die Abschriften und abgeleitete Forschungsdaten werden für 10 Jahre 
aufbewahrt und danach gelöscht. 
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Wer hat Zugriff auf die gesammelten Daten? 
Alle Forschungsdaten werden ausschließlich durch den Forschenden ausgewertet, und ggf. 
von dessen Supervisoren (Dozenten an der University of Bradford, Faculty of Management 
and Law) überprüft. Die Audioaufnahmen werden von einem professionellen 
Transkriptionsservice verschriftlicht, der eine spezifische Vertraulichkeitsvereinbarung 
unterzeichnet hat, inklusive der Verpflichtung, verarbeitete Audiodateien und Abschriften 
unmittelbar nach Bearbeitung und Übergabe zu löschen und bis dahin nur auf 
verschlüsselten, sicheren Systemen zu bearbeiten.  
Kann ich meine Zustimmung auch wieder zurückziehen? 
Sie können das Interview jederzeit beenden oder entscheiden, dass Ihre Aussagen (oder 
Teile davon) nicht verwendet werden sollen. Dies ist auch noch bis zu 14 Tage nach dem 
Interview möglich. Wenn Sie Ihre Zustimmung zurückziehen, werden sämtliche 
Aufzeichnungen unmittelbar vernichtet. 
Ist dieses Vorgehen üblich und angemessen? 
Das beschriebene Vorgehen erfüllt die hohen englischen Forschungs- und Ethikstandards. 
Diese Studie und die verwendete Methodik wurde von der zuständigen Ethikkommission 
der University of Bradford, Chair of the Humanities, Social & Health Sciences Research 
Panel geprüft und  am 29. August 2017 genehmigt. 
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Appendix II: Consent form 
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Appendix III: Interview guide 
 
  
RQ:  What understanding of trust, fairness and motivation do law firm partners have, and 
how does this understanding link to their specific profit sharing system (PSS)? 
This study aims to understand the perceived advantages and disadvantages of each system and 
the individual reasons and circumstances for the choice of each system. In particular, the aim is 
to understand the significance of emotions and their interaction with economic aspects from the 
perspective of the individual partners. 
Flight mode 
Introduction: Thank you. Restate aim: Thesis 
Anonymous interview, names and specific information will be substituted.  
Would like to record, OK?  
Explanation and signing of consent form 
Switch on recording 
Start:  Tell me something about your profit sharing system 
What is the concept, the basic idea of your profit sharing system? 
What do you think about it (helpful? Discriminating? Frustrating?) 
Does your PSS have a steering effect? In which direction?  
Is there a guiding principle would you say? 
(Influences you to work in a specific way? Motivates? Demotivates?) 
Do you have an individual influence on your PSS or is it a ‘partnership’ decision? 
(What do you think of that? 
Can you give me an example of your influence?) 
If you were in sole charge of the system, what, if anything, would you change?  
(Make it fairer? More motivating? Better in which sense?) 
What are strengths of your profit sharing system? 
What are weaknesses of your profit sharing system? 
Does your PSS have an influence on your collaboration with other partners? How? 
(How would you describe your relationship to other partners?) 
 
End: Did we miss anything you consider important? 
Is there anything you would like to tell me about that we haven’t touched on? 
Do you have any questions for me? 
Switch off recording SAVE !!! 
 Thank you. Will transcribe now. Would you like a copy of the transcript to check?  
May I contact you in case of queries?  
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Appendix IV: Example transcripts 
(Not included in digital version for confidentiality reasons) 
